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Since the early 2000s, large-scale agricultural investment has experienced a revival on 
the agenda for rural development in Africa, purported to bring, for instance, efficient 
agricultural production, reduced import expenditures and poverty alleviation. This new 
wave of large-scale agricultural investment has been described as more extensive in scale 
than previous attempts to promote such large farms. However, closer scrutiny reveals 
that in many countries, the expected flood of investments has so far been only a trickle. 
So far, few studies have been conducted to investigate this trend of failure.
The overarching aim of this thesis is to contribute to the knowledge about how and 
why this new wave of large-scale agricultural investment failed to deliver proposed 
outcomes. This is done by exploring the empirical trajectories of, and the reasons behind, 
the failure of a planned public private partnership, a large scale sugar-cane investment in 
Tanzania, to deliver promised outcomes.
In interviews with project proponents and rural residents targeted by investment, the 
thesis shows how project proponents simplified complex contexts in order to ‘sell’ 
narratives of imminent success. Such simplifications interacted with context to produce 
delays in project implementation and subsequent failure of the project to materialise.
Importantly, these delays had severe negative impacts on local communities. Despite 
delay being a common feature in development projects, it has been little discussed. 
Combined, these findings suggest that delay is an important, but overlooked, factor when 
understanding development failure, and that delay should not be conceived as inevitable 
and innocent. 
Through discourse analysis and drawing on the concept ‘resilient narratives’, I analyse 
discursive practices used by proponents to sustain the image of success, in the face of 
contradicting narratives and materialities. 
Mainly drawing on post-development and post-colonial theory, I then position my 
findings in debates on development narratives and development failure, and advance 
some reflections on the influence of close collaboration with a private actor in 
development assistance in relation to these findings. 
While the context of the case study is highly complex and to a certain extent 
unpredictable, I argue that proponents have a responsibility to understand this context, and 
address it in their policies and projects. Finally, I argue that more attention must be paid to 
the impacts of delayed or non-materialised projects in both academia and policy debates.
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Abstract

Sedan början av 2000-talet har storskaliga jordbruksinvesteringar återinförts som 
utvecklingsstrategi för Afrikas landsbygd, som en reaktion på globala livsmedels-, klimat 
och finanskriser. Investeringarna sägs bidra till exempelvis effektiv livsmedelsproduktion, 
arbetstillfällen och fattigdomsbekämpning. Den nya investeringsvågen har beskrivits som 
snabbare och mer omfattande än historiska försök med storskaligt jordbruk. En närmare 
granskning visar emellertid att bara ett fåtal av alla förväntade investeringsprojekt har 
genomförts. Hittills har det dock gjorts få studier med fokus på just detta. 
Den här avhandlingen ska undersöka hur och varför ett planerat offentligt-privat 
partnerskap – ett storskaligt sockerrörsprojekt i Tanzania – inte har lyckats uppnå utlovade 
resultat. Utifrån intervjuer med beslutsfattare och den lokalbefolkning som berörs av
investeringarna visar avhandlingen hur projektets förespråkare presenterar förenklade 
budskap om en komplex kontext i syfte att "sälja in" ett narrativ om nära förestående 
framgångar. Avhandlingen visar också hur dessa förenklingar samspelar med kontexten 
och ger upphov till upprepade förseningar, som orsakar stora problem för lokal-
befolkningen och i slutändan leder till att projektet läggs ned. Trots att förseningar är ett 
vanligt inslag i utvecklingsprojekt har de hittills inte fått någon större uppmärksamhet. De 
är dock en viktig förklaring till att utvecklingsprojekt misslyckas, och bör inte ses som 
ofrånkomliga och harmlösa faktorer.
Genom diskursanalys och utifrån begreppet ’resilienta narrativ’ visar jag hur 
projektförespråkarna vidmakthåller bilden av ett lyckat projekt, trots en mängd 
motstridiga narrativ och problem på plats. Slutligen analyserar jag hur narrativ som 
stöder investeringen skapas, sprids och konsumeras mellan projektförespråkarna.
Med användning av post-development och postkolonial teori positionerar jag mina 
resultat i debatten om utvecklingsnarrativ och utvecklingsarbetets misslyckande att 
leverera utlovade resultat, samt reflekterar över eventuella konsekvenser av 
privatiseringen inom biståndet.
Min avhandling visar att även om kontexten där dessa projekt ska implementeras är 
komplex och delvis oförutsägbar, så har förespråkarna av storskaliga jordbruks-
investeringar ett ansvar att förstå och ta hänsyn till kontexten i policybeslut och projekt-
planer. Slutligen argumenterar jag för att effekterna av nedlagda eller försenade projekt 
förtjänar mer uppmärksamhet i både den akademiska och den policyrelaterade debatten.
Nyckelord: simplification, delay, development failure, development narratives, large-
scale agricultural investment, land grabbing, privatisation of development
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Sammanfattning

This thesis grew out of a sense of puzzlement: Why would Sida officers, who 
specialise in contexts in ‘developing’ countries and who work at an agency with
the stated objective to fight poverty and social injustices, decide to support a 
large-scale agricultural investment in rural Africa, after barely talking to the 
local people affected and with little acknowledgement of the overall complexity 
of rural life and policy implementation. 
Many experiences guided me towards this puzzle. I gained one of the most 
important ones as a Master’s student in zoo ecology studying orangutans in 
Indonesia, with focus on the impacts of logging on the forest and orangutans in 
the Bornean peat swamp: I learnt that protecting rainforests is a social 
endeavour.
To mention but one experience that contributed to that insight: One day, after 
splashing our way between stilt roots, climbing over fallen trees, regularly 
pulling our rubber boots from the deep soggy peat and sometimes ‘saved’ by 
man-made logging trails, we arrived back at the stilt house Lubuk Kuali – a
Harvard University-funded camp for investigating forest resources and 
experimenting with so-called ‘reduced impact logging’. While the sun was 
setting and huge fruit bats were flying overhead, dressed culturally appropriately 
in our sarongs, my Swedish friend and I were just about to jump into the brown, 
winding river. At that moment, a local canoe, a ketingting, landed by the small 
decaying wooden jetty. A team of loggers, all men, living in villages 
downstream, had also finished their day’s work – cutting down selected 
hardwood trees for the timber market, in the same forest where we were doing 
our research – and needed somewhere to stay the night. I felt provoked, since 
they were cutting down the forest we were trying to save. However, the camp 
manager invited them to eat and stay the night in our camp. I later learnt that 
these loggers were all employed by the local head of police, who took most of 
the money earnt from selling the timber. With the local head of police in charge 
of illegal logging activities, any confiscation of chainsaws by the local police 
force proved in vain, since they were frequently returned to their ‘rightful owner’ 
– himself. Through this experience, and many other similar to it, I went from 
viewing environmental protection as mainly an issue of conservation of species 
diversity with little need for considering local people, as I had done during my 
university biology training, to realising the importance of understanding, and 
focus on, the complexity of socio-political structures and drivers behind 
deforestation, and of investing in relations with the people who perform it. I 
Preface
gradually learnt about the non-linear, unpredictable and complex context in 
which local people lived and acted.
This experience, seven months of living inside the rainforest in West 
Kalimantan, and later returning for another 1.5 years, to East Kalimantan, all the 
while working and living with the local people, learning their language, culture, 
personalities, values and ways of seeing and thinking, in many ways different to 
Sweden, would become an important reason for me initiating this thesis about 
12 years later. By that time I had also taken a degree in journalism, learnt the 
‘language’ of the journalist and started working as an advisor to Sida on 
environmental integration into Swedish Development Aid,  employed at the Sida 
Helpdesk for Environmental Assessment.  There, I learnt yet another language, 
that of policy. As part of my job, I followed the process at Sida leading up to the 
decision to engage in large-scale land investments in Africa, where the Sida 
Helpdesk was assigned to provide comments on risks and opportunities 
concerning the environment in various documents and processes. Due to my 
previous experience from Indonesia and challenges related to large-scale palm 
oil production, these assignments were often delegated to me. 
The Swedish company involved in the case study in this thesis applied for 
Sida support twice. On the first occasion, in 2009, its application was rejected, 
partly with reference to an assessment I had performed identifying, for instance, 
controversial changes made in the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment 
(ESIA) for the Bagamoyo project. However, following the second application, 
in 2012, the project was granted financial support by Sida. Nevertheless, it never 
managed to deliver proposed outcomes.
At that time, although risks and opportunities with large-scale agricultural 
investments were fiercely debated, there was very little empirical evidence on 
the impacts of these investments. It was not known what actually took place on 
the ground where these investors were given access to land and the real (not only 
the anticipated) positive or negative impacts. In collaboration with researchers 
at Nordic Africa Institute and Sokoine University of Agriculture, I wrote a 
successful application for funding to study this topic.
From a background as a natural scientist, with experience from studying 
breeding behaviour among guillemots on the island of Stora Karlsö, catching 
Barnacle geese at sunrise in Gotland and working in the Kalimantan rainforest, 
and then as a print journalist and a policy advisor to Sida, I now had to learn yet 
another new ‘language’, that of the social scientist. 
This thesis presents my findings about how and why the Bagamoyo project 
failed to achieve what was proposed and how and why it nevertheless maintained 
strong support. In a sense, I was uniquely placed to write it, as I had already been 
following the project, and the debate around it, for several years before I started 
my PhD studies. Importantly, the research presented is based on an ample 
selection of project documents and strengthened by the opportunity to follow the 
Bagamoyo project over many years, but does not claim to tell the whole story 
about this development project, nor does it claim to provide an exhaustive 
account of why it, or why many other investments in many African countries, 
have failed. Rather, it sheds light on one investment in one particular context, 
and from one particular angle. However, the thesis findings does contribute to a
general discussion about why so few of the planned large-scale agricultural 
investments since early 2000’s have delivered proposed outcomes.
Uppsala, June 2018
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Interview with a smallholder farmer living on the land targeted for large-scale 
sugarcane investment, 12 April 2014:
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Farmer: Because it gives economic development, employment for 
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Me: Where did you learn this?
Farmer: In training provided by consultants hired by the company
Me: Is it true in practice as well?
Farmer: I don’t think so, because I read in the newspapers about 
Kisarawe [jatropha project] where they were promised 8000 
jobs but only got 200 jobs, with low salaries.
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I look out through the open car window over the widespread, flat grasslands. 
The hot wind, carrying light sand, touches my face. The grass is brown, 
awaiting the upcoming rainy season, and sparsely sprinkled with trees. We have 
stopped to make way for cattle crossing the dirt road, herded by a young 
Barabaig boy. As we continue north along the road transecting the area, we see 
scattered sheds and houses, and pass larger congregations of houses, where by 
now I have stopped many times to talk to the people living there. A dala-dala
(mini-bus) overtakes us. It is overloaded with people and goods from 
Bagamoyo town and Dar es Salaam. We, the driver, the interpreter and I, are 
driving through the project site, the area where 20 374 hectares of land were 
selected for investment by a Swedish investor in 2006, through a Memorandum 
of Understanding with the Tanzanian government. In 2013, the company was 
provided with its Right of Occupancy, a 99-year lease, to develop 7800 hectares 
of sugar plantation and a processing plant on this ranch, situated a two-hour 
drive north of Dar es Salaam. Promises were made to produce hundreds of 
thousands of tons of sugar, millions of litres of ethanol and electricity for the 
national grid, provide the state with 30 million US dollars in yearly tax 
revenues, create 12 000-15 000 jobs and add at least 10 million US dollars per 
year to the local communities. Resettlement was to take place in line with 
international best practice. Yet, more than a decade after the Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed, no sugarcane plants are in sight. None of the 
residents has yet been resettled. Instead, people have been awaiting 
resettlement for many years, with increasing uncertainty about when and where 
to move, how to plan their agricultural production and the rate of compensation, 
and suffering from a range of livelihood impacts.
The Bagamoyo project (see Figure 1) planned for the Razaba Ranch, which is 
the case study examined in this thesis, enjoyed unprecedented political support 
in Tanzania. Since its initiation in 2006, key actors within the Tanzanian 
government, development banks, agri-business partnerships and the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), among many others, 
1 Introduction
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expressed high expectations as to its overall outcomes, including its poverty 
alleviation effects. Yet, over a decade later, the gap between proposed and 
achieved outcomes is striking. What happened? 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, large-scale agricultural investment (LSAI) 
in biofuel and food production has experienced a revival in rural Africa, as a 
response to multiple global crises of food and energy, climate change and 
financial instability (Borras Jr, Franco, Gómez, Kay, & Spoor, 2012; Hall, 
2011). This new wave of LSAIs has been described as more rapid than previous 
attempts to promote LSAI as a strategy for rural development (Kaarhus, Haug, 
Hella, & Makindara, 2010) and has entailed an ‘unprecedented surge’ for large 
tracts of farmland, not least in Africa (Schoneveld, 2014:34). The trend for 
setting aside large tracts of land for monoculture plantations has been backed by 
a range of influential global actors, including the African Development Bank 
(AfDB), the United Nation Food and Agricultural Organisation, the World Bank, 
bilateral development agencies and transnational companies such as Syngenta, 
Monsanto and Unilever, and facilitated by governments in many African 
countries. 
The initial debate on LSAI was divided between two rather distinct camps. 
Proponents suggested a range of beneficial outcomes, such as tax revenues, 
reduced imports costs for fuel or food, widespread employment opportunities, 
technology transfer to smallholders and improved food security (Deininger et 
al., 2011; SAGCOT, 2011; Sida, 2012a; WB, 2012). In the other camp, some 
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academics feared 
environmental damage and dispossession of smallholders and there were outcries 
from international civil society organisations (CSOs), mainstream media and 
research institutes. The message was that millions of hectares in Africa were now 
in the hands of foreign investors, depriving rural residents of their land and 
livelihoods, and that food security was at risk when biofuel crops would replace 
food crops in food insecure areas, the so-called food or fuel-debate (GRAIN, 2011, 
2012; Oxfam, 2011). As will be outlined in Paper II, estimates of the land area 
targeted by foreign investment range from 56 million hectares (ha) by the World 
Bank (Deininger et al., 2011) to 227 million ha (GRAIN, 2011). Africa was the 
main target for these investments. 
Thus, both camps built on figures indicating huge transfers of land, current 
or imminent, and speculations about risks or opportunities. Yet, as I will return 
to in Paper I, at closer inspection, many planned investments never went beyond 
the paper stage and many investors who managed to access land have left their 
sites or investments are delayed (Anseeuw, Alden, Cotula, & Taylor, 2012; 
Burnod, Gingembre, & Andrianirina Ratsialonana, 2013; Cotula, 2013; 
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Deininger, 2013; Hall, 2015; Maltsoglou, Koizumi, & Felix, 2013; Teklemariam 
et al., 2017). Tanzania is no exception.
During this recent wave of LSAI, Tanzania has become a major target for 
investment (Schoneveld, 2014). As in Africa in general, there have been huge 
expectations. For instance, the major agricultural partnership Southern 
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) envisaged the 
development of 350 000 ha of land into irrigated large-scale agriculture and 330 
000 ha into out-grower schemes within the corridor (SAGCOT, 2011; 
NewAlliance, 2014). SAGCOT was launched at the World Economic Forum in 
2010, aiming to ‘foster inclusive, commercially successful agribusinesses that 
will benefit the region’s small-scale farmers, and in so doing, improve food 
security, reduce rural poverty and ensure environmental sustainability’2.
At the onset of this research, the numbers presented by Sulle and Nelson (2009) 
on the status of LSAI were the most frequently quoted: Four million hectares (ha) 
had been requested by external investors for biofuel investments, 640 000 ha had 
been allocated and 100 000 ha had been granted rights of occupancy. As will be 
outlined in Paper I, through a review of NGO reports and statistics in 2011, I 
identified more than 30 companies that had requested more than 2000 ha of land 
in Tanzania since 2003, primarily for biofuel crops. In total, they had requested 
1.1 million ha and required approximately 200 000 ha. Yet, our first finding was 
that a majority of the planned investments had not materialised and that many were 
delayed or stalled, without delivering proposed outcomes. All biofuel investments 
had gone bankrupt or switched to food crops, but were struggling to become 
operational, like the Bagamoyo project at Razaba Ranch. 
Indeed, the expected flood of projects has so far been only a trickle in 
Tanzania too, a fact that has been recognised in various academic publications 
(Anseeuw et al., 2012; Cotula, 2012; Deininger, 2013; Maltsoglou et al., 2013; 
Neville & Dauvergne, 2012; Segerstedt & Bobert, 2013) and by development 
banks. For example, a World Bank report argues that many of the investors it 
surveyed were in financial and/or operational difficulty, and that it is difficult to 
make LSAIs a success, especially in a developing country context (Deininger et 
al., 2011). However, few studies have investigated the reasons behind, and the 
empirical trajectories of, the failure of the new wave of LSAIs in Africa to 
deliver proposed outcomes, and a closer ‘scrutiny of failed projects’ has been 
called for (Edelman, Oya, & Borras Jr, 2013:1517). This thesis presents one such 
scrutiny, based on empirical research on the large-scale sugarcane investment in 
Bagamoyo. 
A few possible explanatory factors behind the limited implementation of 
LSAIs have been proposed, for instance the financial crisis, inadequate 
2 http://www.sagcot.com. Accessed in February 2018.
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infrastructure, technology and institutions, failure to obtain free prior, informed 
consent from targeted local communities or local resistance (Baglioni & Gibbon, 
2013; Burnod et al., 2013; Deininger, 2013; Deininger et al., 2011; Hall et al., 
2015; Klopp & Lumumba, 2014). While offering perfectly legitimate analyses 
of factors influencing the implementation of LSAIs, none of these studies 
provides an account of failed land deals. 
As regards reasons behind the limited number of materialised LSAIs in 
Tanzania in particular, available studies point to, for instance, difficulty in 
accessing village land (Sulle, 2017), lack of legal frameworks and ineffective 
policy formulation processes (Hultman, Sulle, Ramig, & Sykora-Bodie, 2012),
lack of infrastructure for roads, electricity and irrigation (Coulson, 2015) and 
fluctuations in oil prices and access to finance (Anseeuw et al., 2012). Once 
again, however, none of these studies has been performed with the particular aim 
of investigating the dynamics of failure. For the particular case studied in this 
thesis, explanations for its failure include local community resistance and 
environmental risk (Sulle, 2017) and uncertainties about compensation and 
resettlement (Chung, 2017; Curtis & Mbunda, 2015).
Implicit in many of the studies above is a tendency to root the explanation in 
the context in which LSAIs were to be implemented. This diverts attention, and 
responsibility, away from those who construct and implement LSAI policies. 
Thus instead of arguing that the proponents of a policy or project should know, 
or find out, about the context, and consider this information in order to devise a 
policy or project design that makes it feasible to implement and deliver promised 
outcomes, the problem is identified as lying in the local context. 
Instead, in this thesis I ‘reverse the gaze’3 (Arora-Jonsson, 2009:215) from the 
local context to the LSAI narrative and the actors producing and sustaining it in 
the face of contradicting narratives and materialities4. What I call ‘the LSAI 
narrative’ in this thesis is a development narrative, a story, with a beginning, 
middle and end, outlining a range of promised development outcomes, provided 
3 Arora Jonsson (2009) reversed the gaze from the Global North to the Global South, in order to 
study perceptions of gender equality in rural Sweden and India. In her study, reversing the gaze 
meant using the Indian case as the frame of reference, rather than frames of reference seen as natural 
in the Global North. Thus, I use it differently. However, similar to Arora Jonsson (2009), I criticise 
that ‘Northern’ principles are often, by default, used as reference points.
4 As will be described more in detail in section 4.1, I draw on the critical realist perspective that 
only some transformations are possible through discourse (Fairclough, 2010). Thus, what I call 
‘contradicting materialities’ are events or phenomena that cannot be transformed through 
representing them in a certain way, for instance whether a court case took place or not, whether 
sugarcane has been planted or not, or whether a majority of past LSAIs in Tanzania failed to deliver 
expected outcomes or not.
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that a certain sequence of events occur as expected, with the objective of getting 
those who listen to act (Roe, 1991). I argue here that the proponents producing the 
LSAI narrative and interlinked policies and projects have key responsibility for 
the failure of the new wave of LSAI. 
While the narratives of the LSAI proponents are not completely 
homogeneous, they more or less converge around a simplified, linear story 
about: 1) the problems in rural Africa (e.g. inefficient agriculture) and their 
causes (e.g. ancient agricultural methods performed by underdeveloped 
farmers), 2) the appropriate solution to address these (efficient, large-scale  
investments in agriculture) and 3) the promised outcomes (e.g. employment 
opportunities, technology transfers, poverty alleviation). LSAI is presented as a
natural solution in this narrative. This way in which a certain narrative gains 
influence over others and has ‘socially constructive effects’, by proposing what 
should be seen as natural while concealing potentially complicating evidence, 
can be seen as a manifestation of power (Fairclough, 2010:5).   
The LSAI narrative underpins policy documents at a more general level and 
particular projects, such as the Bagamoyo project. In the latter case, the story 
about problems, causes and solutions is largely the same, but the part where 
outcomes are outlined is more specific to the particular project. In addition, 
beyond investment, LSAI is promoted as delivering tangible development
outcomes, as indicated above. Thus, in the narrative, LSAI is portrayed as a 
development strategy for rural Africa. 
Importantly, reversing the gaze towards the dominating LSAI narrative does 
not render the local context irrelevant or exclude actors from less influential social 
positions, such as rural residents targeted by intervention. As I will show, it is in 
the interaction between the construction of dominant narratives and a complex 
context, including contradicting narratives and materialities, that important 
processes are shaped. Not least, rural residents produce a major contradicting 
narrative, in relation to which I analyse the dominating LSAI narrative.
In this thesis, I use the concept ‘large-scale agricultural investment’, although 
I could have used other more common terms such as ‘large-scale land 
allocation’, ‘land grab’ or ‘green grab’ – ‘the appropriation of land and resources 
for environmental ends’ (Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012:238). However, 
none of these concepts reflects my research focus on investment in agricultural 
production. While Marx mentions ‘land grab’ in Das Kapital (White, Borras Jr, 
Hall, Scoones, & Wolford, 2012), it was first used in relation to the recent rush 
for land in 2008, by GRAIN (Larder, 2015; Wolford, 2015). Since then, the term 
has become quite ambiguous, used in many different ways, even though it was 
carefully defined in the Tirana Declaration in 2011. Furthermore, as pointed out 
by Ribot and Peluso (2003), the term land grab only refers to the initial process 
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of gaining (grabbing) access to land, while land grabs deserve much wider 
attention, including a scrutiny of ‘the narratives of legitimisation’ (Wolford, 
Borras, Hall, Scoones, & White, 2013).
As indicated above, the LSAI narrative is backed by a multitude of actors 
who present it as a ‘win-win’ solution for private and public sectors. There are 
at least two aspects which make this narrative interesting. First, LSAI has been 
promoted previously as a development strategy for rural Africa (Baglioni & 
Gibbon, 2013; Bush, Bujra, & Littlejohn, 2011), including Tanzania (Coulson, 
2013; Iliffe, 1979; Ponte, 2002), and many past attempts have failed (Coulson, 
2013; Ponte, 2002). Yet this development strategy is being pursued again. 
Second, as indicated above, there is increasing evidence that the recent wave of 
LSAI is not achieving the proposed results, yet the LSAI narrative and the vision 
of imminent success remain intact. In this thesis, I explore how such resilience 
to past and present contradicting narratives and materialities is possible.
As I will return to in Paper III, in line with neoliberal logic, one of the new 
elements of the current LSAI development strategy, promoted as the key to 
success (compared with previous LSAI), is the close collaboration with the 
private sector (Collier & Dercon, 2009). For instance, contemporary LSAIs are 
pursued through public private partnerships, portrayed as the ‘ideal’ 
combination of private actor efficiency and state regulation and facilitation of 
land deals (Kragelund, 2004). This is promoted in Tanzanian agriculture 
policy. Such support for public-private partnerships in large-scale agriculture, 
such as the Bagamoyo project, also fits ‘hand in glove’ with the current trend 
for privatisation in development assistance.
1.1 Earlier studies of development narratives and failure
Based on the premises outlined above, in this thesis I investigate how the 
LSAI narrative around the Bagamoyo project is constructed in relation to 
complex local contexts with a main focus on contradicting narratives and 
materialities. Using the words of Li (2007b), I investigate ‘what ways of 
thinking, what practices and assumptions are required to translate messy 
conjunctures, with all the processes that run through them, into a linear 
narrative of problems, intervention and beneficial result’? (p. 4). Moreover, 
I investigate how narratives supporting the project are sustained in the face 
of contradicting narratives and materialities. Substantial attention has 
already been paid to such ‘remarkably resilient narratives’ (Li 2007), which 
have persisted over decades in the face of contradicting narratives and 
materialities, in critical analyses of development. Of particular interest to my 
analysis were those scholars who perform critical accounts of development 
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failure. Due to the nature of these studies, based on rich empirical 
investigation of development practitioners’ representations and practices, 
they are sometimes referred to as ‘aidnography’ (Büscher, 2010:29), 
development ethnographies (Watts, 2001) or ethnographies of aid (Mosse, 
2005). They include the works of Tania Murray Li (e.g. 2007b, 2010), James 
Ferguson (1990) and David Mosse (e.g. 2005), who all put forward 
theoretical explanations for why and how development interventions fail by 
analysing development narratives and linking them to the practical 
implementation of development projects. 
A key lesson from these aidnographies that was important for this thesis was 
their findings about the ‘disjuncture’, the disconnectedness, between ‘the “ideal 
worlds” that development actors aim to bring about through the execution of 
proper policy and project design and the social reality they have to relate to’ 
(Lewis & Mosse, 2006:2), and the role this disjuncture plays in understanding 
development failure. The inherent logic is that a policy or project is based on 
simplified assumptions and representations, and therefore fails when 
overlooked, complicating events and processes interfere with the 
implementation process. As so eloquently argued by Tania Li: 
The sets of relations and processes with which government is concerned present 
intrinsic limits to the capacity of governmental interventions to rearrange things. 
There is inevitably an excess. There are processes and interactions, histories, 
solidarities and attachments that cannot be reconfigured according to plan. To 
examine those processes, the excess, we need to attend to the particularities of 
conjunctures – specific times, places and sets of relations. (Li, 2007a:277)
I investigate this ‘excess’ to show how simplified project plans promising efficient 
large-scale sugarcane production, thousands of jobs and poverty reduction were 
traversed by a range of complicating events and processes. I examine where 
project plans met the resistance which delayed them, in what ways they were 
grinded down to produce almost nothing of what they promised, in the course of 
project implementation. I also advance some reflections on why these simplified 
representations, resilient to contradicting narratives and materialities, were 
produced.
My scrutiny of failure is not restricted to this body of literature, however. For 
instance, Scott (1998) is an important contribution to the debate on failure, with 
particular focus on simplification as a discursive and material practice behind 
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the planning of large schemes5 over centuries, in order to render complex 
contexts legible for intervention.  
As I will outline in Chapter 3 and Paper III, the interlinkages between 
simplified development narratives and failure have also been studied within 
post-colonial literature, with particular focus on certain colonial ‘discursive 
homogenisations’ (Escobar, 1993:8) of ‘the Other’ (Said, 1978:1). This body of 
literature on development narratives and their underpinning colonial legacies, 
was also important for analysing the LSAI narrative, and its immunity to 
counter-evidence that I observed in the case study6.
Importantly, the accounts of failure outlined above have paid little attention 
to delay – the lagging behind of project implementation in relation to the 
proposed timeline – as a consequence of simplification and have not linked it 
with development failure. One of the most important messages of this thesis is 
that delay is important, as an empirical feature, and through contributing 
analytically to understanding development failure, as will be outlined in Paper 
II and in Chapter 6. 
As with ‘resilient narratives’, the gap between policy and context in 
development intervention has also been extensively studied, including the 
rationales behind this gap. However, the question of how win-win narratives are
able to thrive despite major contradictions has received less attention. As stated 
by Wolford (2015), ‘not enough attention has yet been paid to the ways in which 
different forms of knowledge are mobilised and circulated in defence of large 
scale land allocations or in support of alternatives’ (p. 226). Similarly, Büscher 
(2014) argues that little research has been conducted to investigate how ‘policy 
success’ is ‘produced, distributed and consumed’ (p. 79). This is, he continues, 
especially important in ‘contexts of sharply contradictory realities’ (p. 81), a 
context relevant to the present case.
Apart from giving little attention to delay, literature on development 
narratives and development failure has paid little attention to the context where 
governments and development agencies enter into close collaboration with 
private sector actors. However, there is an emerging body of literature on how 
the neoliberal context influences conservation and development projects and 
their underpinning narratives more broadly (for instance Büscher, 2013, 2014; 
Green, 2015; Lund, Sungusia, Mabele, & Scheba, 2017). Here, development 
5 The term ‘large schemes’ is adopted from Scott (1998), who uses it to refer to a wide variety 
of state-backed large-scale interventions, including forest plantations, rural development initiatives 
and the construction of cities. A large-scale agricultural investment is a type of large scheme.
6 There are of course other relevant conceptual frames within which my findings could have 
been situated, such as governance or global capitalism. However, I applied existing concepts 
sparsely in order to avoid expectations of positioning my findings within the vast debates and 
literature on these topics. 
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narratives promising change are portrayed as ‘discursive commodities’ (Lund et 
al., 2017:125), biased towards ‘selling success’ as ‘capital’, only useful when 
they are spread and consumed by others (Büscher, 2014:79).
Since collaboration with profit-seeking private companies is purported to 
deliver more efficient development aid, it is relevant to better understand the 
implications of these types of collaborations. Therefore, in this thesis I advance 
some reflections on the possible influence of private sector collaboration on the 
LSAI narrative and its practical implementation, with reference to this emerging 
body of literature. In all, post-colonial theory, post-development and other 
studies of development in particular those focusing on privatisation of 
development, and land grab literature constitute the main bodies of literature 
with which this thesis engages.
In summary, there are two knowledge gaps which this thesis addresses. In 
relation to literature on the failure of the new wave of LSAIs, often referred to 
as ‘land grab literature’7, this thesis intends to contribute to the knowledge 
about how and why these LSAIs fail, by studying the interlinkages between 
simplified narratives, delay and failure. It also addresses the production, 
circulation and consumption of such narratives in a context of private sector 
collaboration, including an analysis of how and why they are sustained in the 
face of contradicting narratives and materialities. 
1.2 Aim
The overarching aim of the thesis was to contribute to the knowledge about how 
and why the recent wave of LSAIs has failed to deliver proposed outcomes. This 
was done by exploring the failure of a planned public private partnership, a large-
scale sugar investment in Bagamoyo, Tanzania. Through a case study approach, 
including discourse analysis, it explored the gap between the simplified LSAI 
narrative produced by project proponents, on the one hand, and complex 
contexts of contradicting narratives and materialities at the Bagamoyo 
investment site, on the other. It also analysed how the LSAI narrative was
produced and sustained in the face of such contradicting narratives and 
materialities, in a context of close collaboration with a private actor. Lastly, I 
reflected on findings and their contribution to understanding development 
failure, concentrating largely on the role of delay.
7 Land grab literature includes studies of land deals for agricultural purposes (LSAI), but also 
grabs of land for, for instance, mining, tourism and conservation purposes. 
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1.3 Research questions
In order to guide the work in this thesis, I formulated three research questions (RQ) 
based on the knowledge that few LSAIs in Tanzania have materialised (presented 
in Paper I). RQ1 required both empirical investigation and theoretical reflections, 
RQ2 was mainly empirical and RQ3 considered the need for theoretical 
development in the field of development failure. The questions gradually 
developed alongside an iterative research process described in section 4.6.  
RQ1: How and why is the LSAI narrative about the Bagamoyo project produced 
and sustained in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities?
RQ2: How does the LSAI narrative contribute to failure of the
Bagamoyo project? 
RQ3: What do the findings from RQ1 and RQ2 contribute to the current 
understanding of development failure? 
1.4 Outline of the thesis
This thesis consists of a cover essay (kappa) comprising six chapters and four 
appended scientific papers (Papers I-IV). Paper I formed the entry point for setting 
up the research questions. Papers II and III constitute the core of the thesis in terms 
of addressing the research questions, while Paper IV situates the research in a 
wider context of land alienation in Tanzania and provides an important illustration 
of the complex context of land governance. Figure 2 outlines the contribution of
each paper to the thesis. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides 
background to the case investment and interlinked narratives, including a 
description of the origin of the Bagamoyo investment and how it gained the 
support of Sida and key Tanzanian actors. Thus, it helps explain the unprecedented 
support gained by the project and some important characteristics of the case. 
Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework, divided into a conceptual framework 
(section 3.1) and post-colonial and post-development theory (section 3.2). The 
methodology chapter (Chapter 4) starts with a brief description of my
epistemological position (section 4.1), and goes on to present research design, 
methods for data collection and analysis, and reflections (sections 4.2-4.7). 
Chapter 5 presents a synthesis of the findings in Papers I-IV, while in Chapter 6 
these findings are discussed in five different sub-sections and general conclusions
are drawn (section 6.6).
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Figure 2. Thesis overview: Papers I-IV in relation to the research questions.
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Rather than blaming the context for project failure to deliver proposed outcomes, 
I reverse the gaze to project proponents and analyse how and why they did not 
pay more attention to context in planning and implementing the Bagamoyo 
project. In this chapter, I describe some of the complex context of the case, 
starting by outlining the setting of contemporary neoliberal agriculture and 
development policy. Thereafter, I provide an outline of the LSAI narrative in 
order to show what it contains. I then list complex features of Tanzanian land 
governance, before moving on to illustrating the socio-economic and 
environmental context of the Bagamoyo project. This context proved to be 
highly relevant for project implementation, but was overlooked by proponents 
to various degrees. I end by outlining the story of the Swedish sugarcane project 
and its many elements of controversy later neglected by project proponents.
2.1 From socialist self-reliance to neoliberal partnerships
Since independence, Tanzania has moved from what is often referred to as 
African socialism, towards increasingly liberalised rural development policies. 
Detailed accounts of this development have been given elsewhere (see for 
instance Boesen, Storgaard Madsen, & Moody, 1977;  Havnevik, 1993; 
Havnevik & Isinika, 2010; Iliffe, 1979; Ponte, 2002) and are beyond the scope 
of this thesis. In this section, I only provide a brief account of early independence 
socialism in order to situate contemporary Tanzanian agriculture policy in the 
current neoliberal agenda. 
In stark contrast to the contemporary neoliberal agenda, rural state 
interventions in early independence were shaped by President Nyerere’s socialist 
vision of nationalising the country’s assets in order to achieve self-reliance and 
social equality, as reflected in the Arusha Declaration (Boesen et al., 1977;  
Havnevik, 1993; Havnevik & Isinika, 2010; Ponte, 2002). In line with this 
2 Setting the context 
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agenda, Nyerere launched Operation Ujamaa vijijini (Eng. socialist or 
brotherhood villages) and resettled rural populations into villages, in order to 
increase agricultural productivity and provide schooling, healthcare and water 
for everyone.
As will be outlined in Paper I, the socialist era began to decline in the 1980s, 
when President Nyerere reluctantly launched liberal structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs), as a consequence of a number of co-emerging crises and 
under strong pressure from the neoliberal ‘revolutions’ in Britain and the US 
(Harvey, 2007:23), the ‘heartlands of neoliberal discursive production’ (Peck & 
Tickell, 2002:380). Promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, SAPs built on the core argument of neoliberalism about the failure and 
inefficiency of the state and other ‘non-private modes of social organization of 
production’, combined with the necessity for increasing the influence of private 
actors (Swyngedouw, 2005:82). In line with this way of seeing, neoliberal reform 
is assumed to deliver, for instance, more efficient and flexible management and 
poverty alleviation (Stein, 2010; Swyngedouw, 2005), an important assumption 
underpinning the LSAI narrative and the Bagamoyo project. 
As will be outlined in Paper I, since Tanzania launched its SAPs, there has been 
an increasing focus on privatisation, a process through which the role of the 
government and public sectors is downsized, combined with increasing space for 
private actors, in order to achieve well-being (Savas, 2005; Shivji, 2006). For the 
agriculture sector in particular, the neoliberal agenda is proposed to bring 
poverty alleviation through, for instance, efficient production, processing and 
marketing of crops, more investment and new technology to increase yields 
(Stein, 2010). As indicated in Papers I, III and IV, neoliberalisation has had a 
major influence on current agriculture policy in Tanzania, in this thesis 
represented by three key agriculture policies and strategies; Kilimo Kwanza 
(Agriculture First), the Southern Agriculture Growth Corridor of Tanzania 
(SAGCOT) and Big Results Now (BRN), combined with associated donor-
funded programmes such as The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 
and Grow Africa8. According to President Kikwete (2005-2015), who strongly 
promoted foreign investment and creation of a conducive business 
environment in Tanzania, Kilimo Kwanza ‘properly anchored the involvement 
of the private sector in the development of agriculture’ (SAGCOT, 2011). In 
addition, it has been stated that, with Kilimo Kwanza, ‘official agricultural 
8 Grow Africa is a partnership comprising over 200 companies and governments in 12 countries, 
out of which 10 countries are part of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. Grow Africa 
was founded jointly by the World Economic Forum, African Union and the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2011. It works to increase private sector investment in 
agriculture and promote inclusive and responsible investment. Source: www.growafrica.com.
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policy took a sharp turn towards large-scale investment in agriculture’ 
(Cooksey, 2012). Indeed, one explicit aim with Kilimo Kwanza was to increase 
general land to about 20 percent by converting village land and to amend the 
Land Act of 1999 in order to facilitate access by investors to land (see section 
2.2. and Papers I and IV for an overview of Tanzanian land law).
SAGCOT, a public private partnership9 launched after Kilimo Kwanza, is 
one of two growth corridors in Africa (Paul & Steinbrecher, 2013), designed 
and implemented under significant influence of corporate actors (Bergius, 
Benjaminsen, & Widgren, 2017; Byiers & Rampa, 2013; Kaarhus et al., 2010). 
The concept of ‘African Agricultural Growth Corridors’ experienced a revival 
on the development agenda for Africa during the financial crisis in 2008, 
presented at the World Economic Forum in Davos and engaging major 
corporations, high-level government officials and bankers together 
representing billions of dollars (Paul & Steinbrecher, 2013). Moreover, as
pointed out by Green (2015), public private partnerships were introduced as a 
‘new development order’ (p. 635) and promoted as a means through which 
capital can be safely invested and generate returns in times of crisis. The 
concept of growth corridors has more recently been supported by a group of 
similar actors in the so-called New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 
(hereafter referred to as the New Alliance) supported by the G8 countries, 
donors such as USAID, African governments and 45 companies. According to
the New Alliance, SAGCOT is an example of how Tanzania is ‘a showcase for 
public-private partnership in agricultural growth’ (G8, 2012). The Bagamoyo 
company is a partner to SAGCOT, even though it was initiated five years 
before the launch of SAGCOT and even though its location is somewhat 
outside SAGCOT’s geographical scope, an indication of its importance as a 
flagship project for the Tanzanian government.
A final example of the increased emphasis on private actors, as mentioned on 
page 5 in Paper II, BRN clearly views the private sector as the key to achieving 
development. It has an ambition to develop 25 commercial farming deals, on 
350 000 hectares, mainly on newly irrigated land, by 2015 (BRN, 2013), an 
ambition that has not yet been fulfilled. In contrast to Kilimo Kwanza, which has 
a wider focus as regards crops, BRN entails a strategy focusing on three target 
crops: maize, rice and sugar. The focus on sugar aims to fill a demand gap and 
9 SAGCOT is a public private partnership between the Government of Tanzania, large 
multinational companies and multi- and bilateral donors, partnering with, for instance, the United 
Nations, the World Bank, bilateral donors from the UK, Norway and the Netherlands, Syngenta, 
Monsanto, Yara and conservations NGOs such as The Nature Conservancy. The corridor covers 
approximately one-third of mainland Tanzania, extending from the port of Dar es Salaam through 
the Southern Highlands of Tanzania to the borders with Zambia and Malawi (SAGCOT, 2011 and 
www.sagcot.co.tz).
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thus reduce import costs; in 2014-15, Tanzania produced 300 000 tons of sugar 
annually, while the demand is estimated to be more than 500 000 tons annually. 
The government has set the aim to increase sugar supply by 6 percent annually10.
Thus, the Bagamoyo project is an important way to fulfil this aim and company 
executives have maintained close contact with the BRN implementation agency 
throughout the implementation process. Kilimo Kwanza, SAGCOT and BRN 
are now all included as important take-off points in the ongoing development of 
a new National Land Policy (URT, 2016), a process in which attempts have been 
made to further increase the leverage of private investors to access village land 
(Stein, 2017). During field work, I interviewed top officials in both SAGCOT 
and BRN’s implementation agency.
2.1.1 A neoliberalised development agenda
The trend of an increasingly neoliberal agriculture policy in Tanzania dovetails 
with the privatisation trend in development assistance, the context in which the 
Bagamoyo project gained financial support from Sida in 2014. As will be 
indicated in Papers I and III, while collaboration with the private sector in 
development aid has been part of development thinking since the late 1950s, it 
has been increasingly placed at the forefront of the development agenda since 
the 1980s (Kragelund, 2004). Making more space available for private actors to 
influence development policy is justified by the claim that the state or the 
development community can no longer perform the work alone, and that 
businesses have access to much larger financial flows (Faye, Gajigo, & 
Mutambatsere, 2013; NewAlliance, 2013). Thus, engaging with private 
investment is promoted as a means to increase the efficiency of aid, contribute 
to income equality and accelerate poverty alleviation (Peluso & Lund, 2011; 
Stein, 2010).
While this agenda has been lingering for over half a century, the past decade 
has seen a ‘paradigm shift’, with reference to a number of changes in the 
development architecture. According to three Swedish journalists who have 
assessed Sida’s collaboration with large companies (not including the company 
in focus of this thesis), this paradigm shift has provided private actors with much 
more space to identify and design development projects, that is, they have come 
‘closer to the “joystick”’. This means that private actors have gained 
‘unprecedented influence’ to identify and implement projects independently 
(Omvärlden, 2017). Indeed, the Bagamoyo project was identified, initiated and 
designed by a private company. 
10 http://www.tic.co.tz/agriculture accessed 11 April 2018.
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Green (2015) and Kindornay and Reilly-King (2013) point to a new closeness 
between bilateral development agencies and investors through new, business-
orientated policies. In all, the paradigm shift influences the constellations in 
which knowledge is produced, circulated and consumed. 
An interlinked input to the emerging debate about the meaning of 
neoliberalism in a context of development is offered by Büscher (2014), who 
argues that value statements about development projects, such as success, have 
turned into commodities, to be ‘sold’ (p. 87) as ‘capital’ (p. 80) to a wider 
audience in order to gain value. In a similar vein, Green (2015) points to a re-
arrangement in which knowledge is deemed adequate and trustworthy, where 
increasing emphasis is being put on growth, employment, investment and 
modernisation, simultaneously marginalising narratives focusing on the public 
sector’s responsibility to re-distribute resources and provide basic services and 
other priorities more in line with Millennium Development Goals. Thus, there 
has also been a rearrangement of how one defines what should be considered 
‘developmental’ (Green, 2015:629).
In parallel to increasing emphasis on privatisation, public-private partnerships 
have been increasingly emphasised, broadly defined as a ‘cooperative institutional 
arrangement between public and private sector actors’ (Hodge & Greve, 2007:545; 
Kragelund, 2004; Savas, 2005). Such partnerships can be seen as a kind of 
neoliberal ‘roll-out’, the active construction of modes of governance involving a 
neoliberalised state (Peck & Tickell, 2002:384). As will be indicated in Papers II 
and III, the Bagamoyo project was part of two private public partnerships, but not 
part of such a partnership with Sida.
Following the privatisation trend, many bilateral donors, including Sweden, 
have increased their focus on private sector collaboration and support (Bergius
et al., 2017; Havnevik & Haaland, 2011; Tomlinson, 2012). A letter from the 
British Department for International Development (DFID) to the Swedish 
Minister of International Development Cooperation in 2011 shows that DFID 
encouraged bilateral donors, such as Sida, to mutually ‘pioneer transformational 
new approaches’, including the strengthening of partnerships in the private 
sector, in order to use development assistance ‘to greatest effect’ (DFID, 
2011:1). Indeed, the conservative government ruling Sweden from 2008-2016 
intensified efforts to collaborate with the private sector. As I will show, this was 
important for the case study in this thesis. In 2017, eight percent of Sida’s budget 
was allocated to private sector collaboration (Omvärlden, 2017)11. Through a 
Business for Development (B4D) approach, Sida, similarly to DFID, portrays 
11 It is important to note that the 8 percent includes a range of support to, and collaboration with, 
small, medium and large companies in various forms and not only support to projects identified and 
implemented by large companies.
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private sector collaboration in development as a way to achieve ‘more 
development impact’ (Sida, 2012b). 
One of the tools for private sector support particularly relevant to this thesis 
is Sida’s guarantee instrument, which aims to reduce risk for the private investor. 
The (loan) guarantee12 means that Sida, and by extension the Swedish state, pays 
the lender (usually a bank) if the borrowing investor fails to make their payment. 
Thus, the guarantee is a tool that explicitly introduces private capital into Sida’s 
work. Since 2008, guarantees have been heavily pushed by the conservative 
government and Sida needed to strengthen its capacity to understand and analyse 
business reports and related financial conditions.
2.2 A brief overview of Land governance in Tanzania
2.2.1 Land categories and land allocation to investors
Already when attempting to outline the broad picture of Tanzania’s land and 
land use, one encounters confusing and conflicting information on land: The 
public figure on Tanzania’s total land area is 885 800 km2 (NBS, 2017) and the 
official area of arable land, available for agriculture, is 440 000 km2 (SAGCOT, 
2011). Moreover, the forested area is estimated to 460 000 km2 (URT, 2016), 
which, combined with agricultural land, add up to more than the total land area. 
As will be shown in all papers, particularly in Papers I and IV, land 
governance in Tanzania is complex and rests on partly contradicting figures, 
laws and regulations concerning the governance of three land categories: village, 
general and reserved land. According to one of the key land laws (Village Land 
Act No. 5, 1999), village land can be defined in multiple ways, including with 
consideration to how the land was used and managed before the Land Act came 
into force in 2001 (URT, 1999:40-45). However, as we show in Paper IV, even 
where rural residents refer to how the land was used previously, in line with the 
Village Land Act, they rarely gain formal recognition for their claims. Similarly,
due to inconsistent land laws, what is considered village land, that is, under the 
management of the village as opposed to the government, becomes ambiguous 
and subject for negotiation and interpretation in each specific case, generally 
underpinned by unequal power relations (Odgaard, 2002). As a consequence, 
since the 1990s, there have been frequent transfers of village land in order to 
create protected areas, successively reducing the proportion of village land in the 
country. This was an important dynamic also observed in the Bagamoyo case. 
12 This instrument was initiated for a test period in 1998 and had been made permanent by 2009.
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On top of these challenges, amendments to the current land laws add further 
complexity through a continuously changing legal framework. In addition, 
Ujamaa entailed physically reshuffling approximately two-thirds of 
Tanzania’s rural residents and has generally contributed to overlapping and 
contested claims to land in the country. Thus, as we argue in Paper I, it is 
questionable whether there is anyone who is knowledgeable and updated on 
the process in detail in its entirety. For instance, overall data on LSAI seem to 
have been lacking. In fact, in 2012, when I showed a review of the status of 
LSAI in Tanzania to a Tanzanian Investment Centre (TIC) officer, he asked if 
he could make a copy. 
The complex land governance and inconsistency in data and representations 
regarding available land constitute a major challenge in the context of land 
allocation to investment. As will be demonstrated in Paper I, the processes 
through which land can be identified and allocated to an investor are multiple 
and complex. One requirement for investment was especially important for the 
Bagamoyo project and is worth mentioning, namely the Environmental 
Assessment Certificate. According to the National Environmental Management 
Act of 2004, large-scale projects such as the Bagamoyo sugarcane investment 
require an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA). This ESIA 
should present baseline studies on the socio-economic and environmental 
context and the potential impact on these of the project. As outlined by Havnevik 
and Haaland (2011), there are several steps in this process. Initially, a feasibility 
study, providing information on the investment site and detailed project plans, 
should be provided to the agency responsible, the National Environmental 
Management Council (NEMC), which decides whether a full ESIA is required 
or not. Based on this, Terms of Reference must be developed and approved 
before the ESIA process can start. If the completed ESIA is approved, NEMC 
will advise the vice-President’s Office for Environment to issue an 
Environmental Assessment Certificate. 
Thus, the Bagamoyo case is situated in a context where the processes 
described above resulted in a significant lack of clarity of regulations, roles 
and responsibilities, thus posing major challenges. As I will show, conflicts 
concerning rights to land in the project site clearly reflect these overlapping 
and inconsistent regulations, which were largely overlooked in project design, 
including proposed timelines.
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2.3 Past LSAIs in Tanzania and the new rush for land 
As will be outlined in Paper III, experiences gained from past efforts to 
implement large-scale agriculture in Tanzania show a mixed track record 
(Coulson, 2015). Not least, these past LSAIs have frequently displaced 
pastoralists and smallholder farmers. For instance, the wheat scheme in Hanang 
displaced Barabaig people from their prime grazing land (Lane, 1994), causing 
ongoing problems for Barabaigs in identifying new grazing grounds. Barabaigs 
constitute the majority of pastoralists in the Razaba Ranch area.
The new rush for land has been launched with little reference to these past 
LSAIs. While drivers behind this new wave of LSAI have been widely debated 
(Oya, 2013), many scholars view the LSAI development strategy as a response 
to multiple global crises of food and energy, climate change and financial 
instability (Borras Jr et al., 2012; Hall, 2011; Kaarhus et al., 2010; Matondi, 
Havnevik, & Beyene, 2011). Given this setting with parallel financial, food, 
energy and climate crises in which LSAI policies in Tanzania and other 
African countries have been developed, this seems a highly plausible 
explanation. Studies investigating past waves of LSAI in Africa have shown 
that international crises are a common setting in which they re-emerge 
(Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013). Bergius et al. (2017) outline another way to 
explain these dynamics. Drawing on Harvey (2006), they argue that in times 
of declining rates of profit in any sector, restructuring of capital becomes 
necessary. This can take place through, for instance, capitalisation of non-
capitalist spaces and geographical expansion, in order to solve the ‘crises of 
accumulation’ at hand (p. 17). 
The new wave of LSAIs in Africa started out partly for production of 
renewable feedstock for biofuel production, as a response to climate change, 
peak oil and a projected increase in energy need world-wide (Ministry for 
Agriculture, 2009). The biofuel agenda was driven not least by the need to
reduce the use of fossil fuel within the European Union (EU), aiming at a 10 
percent mandatory proportion of biofuels or other renewables in the transport 
sector by 2020 (EC, 2009; Näringsdepartementet, 2008). While waiting for the 
second generation of biofuels based on, for instance, cellulose, to become 
economically viable, land-based investment in bioenergy crops was promoted 
as an interim solution. A multitude of actors showed interest in supporting 
biofuels, where Africa appeared as ‘the ultimate investment frontier, a new 
paradise where an unlimited supply of land and labour can yield profits in 
times of crisis’ (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:1559). This is the setting in which 
the Bagamoyo project was ‘born’ and marketed in 2005-07.
However, as indicated, the biofuel agenda was met with fierce resistance by,
for instance, global CSOs and NGOs. Moreover, the increased interest in 
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biofuels was blamed for the rising food prices in 2008 (Guardian, 2008), 
resulting in demonstrations world-wide13. The gain in terms of reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions was also increasingly questioned and there was 
growing concern about the social and environmental impacts of the EU biofuel 
policy in general. All of this, together with reduced global oil prices, reduced the 
interest in land-based biofuel production within a few years14.
Tanzania was by no means excluded from this hype surrounding biofuels. On 
the contrary, Tanzania was perceived as a major target for large-scale biofuel 
production (Chachage & Baha, 2010; Cotula, 2013; Schoneveld, 2014), with a 
plethora of proponents involved in its promotion. For instance, in a report by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the use of sugar and cassava 
to produce ethanol was said to provide a new opportunity to enhance economic 
development in Tanzania (Arndt, Pauw, & Thurlow, 2012). 
While the idea of growing biofuels was increasingly promoted in Tanzania, 
local and international NGOs, CSOs and researchers pointed to the lack of policy 
and legal frameworks and the potential risk of biofuel production to the 
environment and to rural livelihoods (Kamanga, 2008; Mwamila, 2009). Sida 
became a key actor in the process to address these concerns. In 2006-2009, Sida 
supported a range of initiatives in Tanzania in relation to large-scale biofuel 
production. For instance, together with the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (Norad) and the Swedish Energy Authority, Sida supported the 
installation of a National Biofuel Task Force in 2006, set up with representatives 
from all relevant ministries, organisations and private actors, including the 
Swedish investor involved in the Bagamoyo case. The main aim was to develop 
the legislation needed, including a biofuel policy, to secure sustainable 
production. As indicated in the Preface, the Sida Helpdesk for Environmental 
Assessment15 (hereafter referred to as the Sida Helpdesk) was involved in 
several steps in this process and was asked to deliver comments. 
However, the process was delayed. In 2008, the work of the National Biofuel 
Task Force was at a standstill, allegedly due to lack of resources. Therefore, in 
2010, Guidelines for Sustainable Liquid Biofuels Development were presented 
13 Estimates of the proportional influence of biofuel production on food prices range from 5 to 
65 percent, by actors such as FAO, OECD, Oxfam, Action Aid and the World Bank (Engstrom, 
2009).
14 For more detailed descriptions of the rise and fall of biofuel policies, see for instance 
Humalisto (2014), Widengard (2015) and Harnesk (2018).
15 The Sida Helpdesk for Environmental Assessment, currently called the Sida Helpdesk for 
Environment and Climate Change, is an advisory unit funded by Sida, situated at the Swedish 
University for Agricultural Sciences, Sweden, whose main task is to provide Sida with advice on 
how to integrate environmental consideration, including links to socio-economic issues, into 
development projects and programmes and sector support.
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as an interim solution (MEM, 2010). However, during my fieldwork in 2012, 
none of the informants, including an officer for agricultural investment 
promotion at TIC and employees at the Ministry of Energy and Minerals 
(MEM), had heard about these guidelines. This points to the problems with 
assuming adherence to regulations, particularly when considering that MEM is 
responsible for implementation of these guidelines. In 2012, when the final 
biofuel policy was made public, all large-scale biofuel investments had already 
seized activity for various reasons (see Paper I). At that time, Sida had decided 
to take another step towards supporting LSAI. Instead of focusing on legal 
frameworks only, Sida now wanted to collaborate more closely with private 
actors, as expressed in a concept note:
It is important that development cooperation adapts to this new reality [of 
increasing number of large-scale national and foreign land investments in Africa]
and support people in poverty to benefit as much as possible from good land 
related investments. These investments are difficult and risky. However, if 
development cooperation does not dare to deal with sensitive and complicated 
matters, there is a risk that Africa is industrialised without benefitting the poor. In 
addition to support to national governments and civil society, Sida has therefore 
decided to explore possibilities to collaborate around land related investments as 
part of the Business for Development-programme. (Sida, 2012a:1)
As this quote reveals, policies are often formulated in a way that makes them 
appear pragmatic (Wedel, Shore, Feldman, & Lathrop, 2005), an issue that will 
be put into more context on p. 73. Moreover, the quote clarifies that, while most 
efforts have so far been allocated to providing legislation for biofuel production, 
Sida’s support encompassed support to LSAIs in general, for both biofuel and 
food production. 
2.4 Outlining the LSAI narrative for Africa and Tanzania
In this section, I provide a brief account of key arguments in the narrative about 
LSAI as a development strategy for Africa, and for Tanzania, drawing on the 
definition of development narratives from (Roe, 1991), indicated on page 34, as 
stories having a beginning (problems and their causes), middle (solution: LSAI) 
and end (a range of proposed development outcomes). The account is based on 
documents produced by key actors in promoting LSAI in Africa and Tanzania. 
Where relevant, I also include quotes from key interviewees in my case study. 
The problems invoked and causes naturalised in a development narrative are of 
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particular interest, since they often determine which solutions are presented as 
‘inevitable’ (Bacchi, 2009). 
As indicated, problems that large-scale biofuel production claimed to address 
included peak oil, dependence on oil imports and growing energy demands. 
However, the general problem descriptions in the narrative about LSAI as a 
development strategy centre on the argument that investment in agriculture is 
required to achieve poverty alleviation (Deininger et al., 2011; Faye et al., 2013; 
NewAlliance, 2013; Takavarasha, Uppal, & Hongo, 2005). This reasoning was 
largely shaped by an influential World Development Report from 2008 
emphasising the importance of investment in agriculture to move away from the 
‘meager bounty of subsistence farming’ (WB, 2008:1), identifying problems in 
agriculture such as ‘underinvestment’, ‘misinvestment’ and low productivity
(WB, 2008:2).
For Tanzania, similar problem descriptions were presented. For instance, in 
a paper written by two IFPRI researchers, the persistent poverty in Tanzania16
was attributed, at least partly, to slow growth in agricultural incomes (Pauw & 
Thurlow, 2011). This view was supported by the Tanzanian Ministry for 
Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (Ministry for Agriculture, 2009). 
Another important argument concerns the availability of arable land. This 
‘fact’ introduces a World Bank report on the topic, stating that ‘many countries 
have suitable land available that is either not cultivated or produces well below its 
potential’ (Deininger et al., 2011:xiii). A report by the African Development Bank 
advances similar statements, pointing to the unlocked potential of Africa’s arable 
land, combined with a statement on the limited areas of arable land in ‘developed’ 
countries. With reference to two World Bank reports, the authors claim that 
possibilities to expand agricultural production outside Africa are limited because 
‘half of all the land suitable for cultivation that is currently uncultivated … is in 
Africa’ and ‘arable land is actually decreasing in industrialized countries’ (Faye et 
al., 2013). Thus, the logic of investing in Africa becomes natural.
Again, similar arguments were advanced as regards abundant land in Tanzania, 
identified as being among the top 10 countries in Africa as regards abundance of 
arable land (Faye et al., 2013). Moreover, the SAGCOT Blueprint describes 
Tanzania as having ‘immense opportunities for agricultural development since 
only 24 percent of the 44 million ha of arable land is being utilised’ (SAGCOT, 
2011:4). In interview, one TIC officer responsible for investment promotion in 
16 While Tanzania’s economy performed well since the turn of the millennium, with economic 
growth exceeding 5 percent per year, this was not reflected in the national poverty headcount during 
2001-2007 (WB, 2009), based on 1.90 USD/day. During 2007-2012 poverty rates did show a
decline from 34.4 to 28.2 percent (WB, 2017), but this could still constitute an increase in the 
number of poor people.
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agriculture said: ‘There is plenty of idle land. It is not being used because of the 
inability of smallholders to use the land’ (26 March 2012).
A particularly influential paper was written by two professors of economics at 
Oxford University, Paul Collier and Stefan Dercon17. The main message of their 
paper is that the evidence for the hitherto exclusive focus on smallholders as the 
engine for growth and poverty reduction is weak, and that it is time to seriously 
consider altering the development model for agriculture in Africa. The paper 
reproduces colonial representations of ‘the Other’ (Said 1978) as lagging behind, 
since it describes an Africa as needing to catch up with the performance of other 
countries (Collier & Dercon, 2009). 
Similar reference to the current dominating and backward agricultural 
practices of smallholder farming are expressed in SAGCOT’s Blueprint:
Tanzania’s agriculture is predominantly smallholder, characterized with very low 
productivity due to very limited use of modern technology and techniques of 
production. As a result, therefore, the country’s huge agriculture potential remains 
unutilized. (SAGCOT, 2011)
Interestingly, experiences from past LSAIs are referred to in this context, 
where previous megafarms are portrayed as being fundamentally different 
from the neoliberal strategy currently used. For example, (Collier & Dercon, 
2009) argue that these state-led megafarms, with little concern for farming 
communities, exemplified by the notorious Groundnut Scheme in Tanzania,
are history. Similarly, SAGCOT claims long-term commitment to smallholder 
farmers and that, ‘the land farmed through SAGCOT investments will be 
developed as a partnership, where all sides will take part in a sustainable rural 
development process: and do so without regrets’ (SAGCOT, undated:6-7). 
Thus, privatisation serves as a way to justify yet another wave of LSAI.
The problem descriptions outlined above (including their causes) pave the 
way to suggesting investment in (allegedly) highly productive, private-driven, 
agricultural production, based on modern technology and irrigation, with 
important emphasis on the public-private partnership character as described in 
section 2.1.1. The problems are thus turned into opportunities, inspiring 
identification of solutions to unleash Africa’s untapped potential, where ‘the 
agricultural sector presents a major opportunity for Africa given its share in most 
economies, as well as the region’s comparative advantage’ (Faye et al., 2013).
17 At the time of writing, Dercon is chief economist at DFID. While the paper was published in 
World Development 2014 (Collier & Dercon, 2014), an earlier version of the paper was written for 
the FAO expert meeting in 2009 on ‘How to feed the World in 2050’. At that time, Collier was 
director of the Development Research Group at the World Bank. In 2010 and 2011, Collier was 
named by the magazine Foreign as one of the ‘top global thinkers’. 
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Finally, as regards the ‘end’ of the LSAI narrative, LSAIs in Africa and 
Tanzania are proposed to deliver, for instance, increased agricultural 
productivity, new markets for smallholder farmers, employment opportunities, 
secure access to food, better living conditions, economic growth, poverty 
alleviation, reduced import expenditure and a more conducive business 
environment (Ministry for Agriculture, 2009; NewAlliance, 2013; Takavarasha 
et al., 2005; WB, 2012). 
In a similar vein, in its decision to support the Bagamoyo project in 2014, 
Sida suggests that private investment in agriculture will solve many of the 
problems outlined above, emphasizing the mix of large- and small-scale, in line 
with Collier and Dercon (2009):
The (agricultural) production increase is insufficient since it is only marginally 
higher (four percent) than the population growth (three percent). To achieve the 
country’s poverty alleviation target and food security, a substantial increase in 
private investments in the agricultural sector is necessary. These investments need 
to include both small-scale agricultural and larger investments in agriculture. 
(Sida, 2014c)
In all, the LSAI narratives for both Africa and Tanzania follow similar patterns, 
invoke similar problems and naturalise similar causes, in a context where the 
agriculture sector is repositioned as the hub of African economic transition (WB, 
2008), largely influenced by multilateral development institutions and private 
business interests. Ultimately, they also propose similar outcomes through the 
solution promoted: the LSAI development strategy. 
2.5 A case description of the Bagamoyo project
2.5.1 Bagamoyo 
“Bwaga–moyo” (lay down your heart) or Bagamoyo is a small coastal town that 
…was the last major exit port for slaves before they were shipped to Zanzibar and 
the Arab countries. At this point, slaves were telling themselves to lay down their 
hearts because they would never see their land again. (Sosovele, undated)
Today, 140 years after the slave and ivory trade was abolished, Bagamoyo town, 
with its decaying, white-washed stone buildings and its vibrant harbour 
overlooking the turquoise waters of the Indian Ocean, continues to act as the 
centre of Bagamoyo district. Situated 65 km north of Dar es Salaam, the town 
was used as headquarters by the German colonial regime, before they moved to 
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Dar es Salaam (Sosovele, undated). While the interest in Bagamoyo declined 
after this move, it was re-ignited under the rule of President Kikwete, who was 
eager to ‘deliver’ to his home district before stepping down as President in 2015. 
Bagamoyo district is one of six districts within the Pwani (coast) region 
(Gautum, 2009), with a relatively low population density of 32 people per km2
(data from the 2012 census) (NBS, 2013). While the fishing industry is a large 
employer in the region, smallholder agriculture and fishing constitute the main 
contributors to the regional economy. Moreover, Bagamoyo district is a major 
supplier of charcoal to low-income areas in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, at a 
value of 340 million Tsh in 2004 (equivalent to 160 000 USD in current 
exchange rates). This can be compared to, for instance, 140 million Tsh from 
fish production (equivalent to 66 000 USD in current exchange rates) (NBS, 
2008; Sosovele, undated). In general, the area has had high rates of 
unemployment and in 2008 there was rapid migration, in particular of young 
people, to urban centres in the region (NBS, 2008), which made the Swedish 
investor’s promises on employment opportunities highly attractive. Since then, 
the tourism sector has expanded rapidly (Gautum, 2009; Sosovele, undated), 
which may have reduced unemployment rates.
Apart from the sugarcane investment examined in this thesis, President 
Kikwete has also initiated a number of other large projects in Bagamoyo, for 
example a harbour that aimed to become the largest in Eastern Africa. Linked to 
the harbour plans, an export processing zone was established on 9000 ha, to 
serve as a processing hub for the country. However, during my last visit to 
Bagamoyo in 2016, both projects had stalled; there were few active processing 
companies in the processing zone and the resettlement required for harbour 
construction had not yet been initiated. 
2.5.2 Razaba Ranch - a description of the project site 
It is early morning when we leave a cool, overcast Bagamoyo town behind us 
driving north-west towards the project site in Razaba Ranch. It will be our first visit 
and we – myself and two colleagues– want to talk to the people living on the land 
targeted by the project, to understand their perceptions of it and its implementation. 
The rainy season has just started and we expect a muddy, slippery trip. As we 
approach Razaba Ranch, we round a bend in the road and see that the Ruvu river 
has burst its banks, covering the bridge in slowly simmering, brown water. Two 
young men have seen the potential to make some money and are doing the 
important job of guiding cars through the water in order to avoid invisible rocks and 
to direct drivers to the shallow waters. Our car cannot pass through with us inside 
it. We pull off our shoes and start wading through the brown water until we reach 
across to the muddy road, surrounded by shouts and small-talk among other people 
passing by. Over the years, these floods will cause delays in project timelines, since 
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they reduce access to the project site, and they will be repeatedly omitted in new 
timelines. We stop at one sub-village on the left side of the road, the side that is 
promised to the investor. We greet the village chair, show our papers from the 
district and explain why we are there. People appear from nearby houses and some 
people travelling along the road stop, all gathering under a huge tree to talk to us 
about the planned investment, sitting on logs and, as the group expands, on yellow 
plastic containers. Outside the nearest house are rows of white plastic rice bags 
packed with charcoal. In the meeting, we are told, among other things, that due to 
restrictions on agricultural practices while awaiting resettlement, more people have 
become dependent on charcoal production for their livelihoods. People are hoping 
that, after the ongoing rainy season, something will progress as concerns the 
resettlement as the roads are opened up again.
The project site where the Swedish investor acquired rights of occupancy to 
20 374 hectares of land in May 2013 is part of a larger area, called Razaba Ranch 
(Ranchi ya Zanzibar Bagamoyo). The ranch includes another approximately 
6000 hectares to the east, along the coast. The area has been inhabited for at least 
1500 years (Mwasumbi, Mligo, & Suleiman, 2007). As part of the idea during 
early independence of setting up large, state-owned farms, in 1974 the Tanzanian 
government granted 28 097 hectares of land in Makurunge village to the 
Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, to be used as a cattle ranch18. In 
exchange, the Zanzibar Government paid approximately 260 000 Tsh 
(equivalent to 130 USD in current exchange rates) to compensate villagers for 
the loss of land (ORGUT, 2008). The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar 
used the land as a cattle ranch up until 1994, when the project was abandoned 
due to, for instance, tsetse fly attacks on the cattle and leopard attacks 
(Mwasumbi et al., 2007). The approximately 300 workers and their families 
were permitted to live on the land until the farm was re-purposed for other 
activities (Chung, 2017; Mwasumbi et al., 2007)19.
In the north, the former Razaba Ranch is bounded by the Wami river which 
forms the southern border of Saadani National Park. In the west, the Uhuru railway 
line leading from Dar es Salaam to Tanga constitutes the border. In the south, the 
area borders Makurunge, and in the east it encounters the Ruvu river and the Indian 
Ocean (Figures 3 and 5). The rivers are important for the livelihoods of people in 
the entire district, as the flood plains are used for agricultural production and the 
rivers for both subsistence and industrial fishing. A road dissects the ranch, 
18 The Razaba Ranch was a so-called NARCO, a National Ranching Company Ltd. Such 
NARCOs were established when President Nyerere decided to nationalise farms in the 1970s in 
order to increase state influence over rural development.
19 In 2007, the Tanzanian government decided to allocate land to the sugarcane investment and 
the Zanzibar government agreed to allocate 22 000 hectares of its former Razaba Ranch to the 
investment, in return for compensation (ORGUT, 2008).
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branching off the Bagamoyo-Msata road at Makurunge in the south, running north 
towards Matipwili and Saadani National Park (Figure 3 & 5, and Image 1). 
Although covered in coastal forest a long time ago, today the area is basically flat 
bushland and semi-natural woodland with some low hills, rising gradually from 
the coastal mudflats to about 30-40 m above sea level at the western border of the 
area (Mwasumbi et al., 2007; ORGUT, 2008).
As illustrated in Figure 5 below, there are five sub-villages in the Ranch area; 
one in the south, two further north and two on the southern banks of the Wami 
River, with a large number of scattered houses and huts in between. The exact 
population in the project area is difficult to estimate, due to a constant influx and 
outflux of people and contesting figures presented by different informants. In 
2012, the number of people estimated to be impacted by the project amounted to 
1374 (AfDB, 2012). Chung (2017) estimated the number of people living and
working on the land in 2014 to be around 1400 people and pointed out that the 
people in the area represent a wide range of tribes including the original peoples 
of the Swahili coast, such as Zigua, agro-pastoralists such as Sukuma, and 
pastoralists such as the Barabaig. This reflects the mix of people in the district 
due to migration and settlement of different ethnic groups from longstanding 
migration since the slave and ivory trade (Sosovele, undated). The ranch is 
surrounded by three villages and four sub-villages, whose total population was 
estimated to be 6000 people in 2008 (ORGUT 2008). 
None of the people living inside the project site have had their land rights 
formally acknowledged, and were frequently referred to as ‘invaders’ or 
‘settlers’ by the company representatives, state officials and development staff.
As outlined in Paper I, while project proponents represented the land as 
unambiguously general land, there were a range of contradicting narratives. For 
example, some of the Razaba Ranch residents insisted that they were not 
adequately compensated at the time when the land was granted to Zanzibar and 
questioned the allocation of the land in the 1970s. Other residents claimed they 
had never been never part of Razaba Ranch and therefore should not be included 
in any resettlement scheme targeting the ranch. 
As outlined in Paper IV, in some cases when state farms were privatised in 
the 1990s, people advanced their customary rights of occupancy in accordance 
with part IV of the Village Land Act, allowing people who have being using or 
occupying the land for 12 consecutive years to claim formal land rights.
However, their land rights were usually not recognised, although they were in 
line with existing land laws (Chachage & Mbunda, 2009).
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Figure 3. Map of the project site in Razaba Ranch and surroundings.
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Instead, when privatisation of these farms was initiated, new investors could 
lease the contested lands from the formally recognised, owners, whether 
government or an investor, and attempt to evict the smallholders or pastoralists. 
This has happened in Kilombero (Maganga, Askew, Odgaard, & Stein, 2016), 
and it was also exactly what happened in Bagamoyo, where contesting claims 
led to a range of conflicts and court cases, as I return to in Papers II and III.
However, due to the condition set by the African Development Bank and Sida 
that the project had to adhere to International Finance Corporation Performance 
Standard 5 for involuntary resettlement (hereafter referred to as international best 
practice), a total of 1374 people within the site were identified as project-affected 
people and thus legible for compensation when resettled (AfDB, 2012). In the 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) performed by the Swedish 
consultancy ORGUT in 2008, villagers from adjacent villages were found to use the 
land for temporary cultivation, firewood collection, hunting and charcoal burning. 
Moreover, there had been an influx of pastoralists, in particular Barabaigs, who used 
the land for grazing, especially during dryer periods. All these activities constituted 
important parts of local people’s livelihoods (ORGUT, 2008). 
In the hot, humid climate, averaging a temperature of 28o C, smallholder 
farmers20 on Razaba Ranch grow many of the major Tanzanian subsistence 
crops, including maize, paddy rice and cassava. Moreover, many households 
grow perennial fruit trees and cash crops, for instance banana, avocado, mango, 
watermelon, sesame and cashew nuts (Chung, 2017; Kjellin, 2015). Income 
from these crops meets important household expenses, such as food, school fees 
and health services. Women frequently grow vegetables in their back gardens, 
which they cook or sell at local markets, such as the one we passed on our way 
to the ranch. Only a few households grow sugarcane, and then mainly for 
domestic consumption. In addition to smallholder farmers and Barabaigs, other 
groups residing in the project area include charcoal producers and seasonal 
fishermen (Chung, 2017). 
As I return to in Papers I and II, although the project was to comply with 
international best practice, resting on principles of prior, informed, consent, 
throughout this research, there was much confusion among people living on 
and around Razaba Ranch about what the project actually entailed, what was 
happening or not, and why, findings supported by others studies of the same 
case (Chung, 2017; Curtis & Mbunda, 2015; Kjellin, 2015). In all, Razaba 
Ranch and the Bagamoyo project became entangled in the inconsistent, 
20 While I have not conducted a study on the land holdings of farmers in the area, Kjellin (2015) 
points to an average land holding of 3-10 hectares in one of the adjacent villages. Kjellin also 
mentions some common other income generating activities among smallholders in the area, 
including working in a pharmacy, teaching or producing charcoal.
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unequal land governance outlined earlier in this chapter, resulting in 
contradicting representations of land borders, land rights, compensation and 
progress of project implementation.
2.5.3 The Bagamoyo project or ‘The Bagamoyo Saga’21
In this section, I outline the story of what I call ‘the Bagamoyo project’, which 
came to be referred to as ‘state-of-the-art’ by Sida, a ‘flag bearing project’ (Sulle, 
2017:16) and an ‘iconic project’ (BRN, 2012:23) by the Tanzanian government, 
with a vision to become a ‘role model’ for agroenergy production (PIM, 2010:6).
This story shows that the paradigm shift in development assistance outlined 
above can provide substantial leeway for private actors to influence 
identification and design of development projects. A key character in the story 
is the chief executive officer (CEO) for the Bagamoyo company, Per Carstedt. 
In this section I outline how Carstedt, an award-winning lobbyist called ‘Ethanol 
Jesus’ in the Swedish press (Carlsson, 2011; Johannesson, 2014) with no 
previous experience in Africa, ‘sold’ the project to municipalities in Sweden. 
Moreover, he convinced Sida to support this high-risk project in a complex and 
partly unpredictable context, and despite a number of controversies. 
Initially, the Bagamoyo project was to be implemented by a company called 
SEKAB (Svensk Etanolkemi AB). It took place at the peak of the biofuel hype 
outlined above, where Sweden had set the highest biofuel target of all EU countries 
aiming for a share of 49 percent renewable energy by 2020 (EC, 2009; 
Näringsdepartementet, 2008). As outlined, expectations on the project were huge, 
including the transformation of smallholders into entrepreneurs. This 
transformation process is illustrated on the company’s website (Figure 4) and 
entails a smallholder farmer, using a hand hoe, becoming a businessman solely 
through ‘doing business’. The view that smallholders needed to become business-
minded entrepreneurs, was clearly reflected in statements by company 
representatives as will be shown in Paper III.
SEKAB22, Europe’s largest importer of ethanol at the time, played a major 
role in promoting biofuels as the future energy source in Sweden. In 2005, three 
Swedish municipalities23 bought SEKAB, and Carstedt was installed as the 
CEO.
21 To the horde of increasingly critical spectators, this story has become known as ‘the Bagamoyo 
Saga’, a name coined by Ann Usher, journalist at Development Today, who has been following this 
project since it was made public in Sweden in 2007 (see for instance Usher, 2016).
22 SEKAB was initiated in 1984 to produce ethanol from forest resources in the north of Sweden,
but largely imported ethanol from Brazil. (http://www.sekab.com/sv/om-oss/).
23 Umeå, Örnsköldsvik and Skellefteå municipalities.
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Figure 4. The Bagamoyo company’s vision of how smallholder farmers would become businessmen.
Source: http://www.ecoenergy.co.tz/home/.
Figure 5. Eco Energy’s project sign in Razaba Ranch, illustrating the project area, adjacent villages
and Ruvu and Wami rivers.
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Through previous engagements in marketing ethanol in Sweden and Europe, and 
as the CEO of SEKAB, Carstedt became an influential force for the expansion of 
ethanol production, consumption and of necessary infrastructure. In addition, he 
was an advisor to the Minister of Enterprise, Energy and Communications, his 
former classmate. While awaiting results from ongoing testing activities on 
cellulose in Sweden, the CEO turned his focus to agricultural crop-based biofuel 
production abroad and engaged in persuading the three Swedish municipalities to 
support such projects. Within a year, projects in Tanzania and Mozambique, but 
also Poland, Hungary, Togo and Ghana, were in planning, all financed by the 
Swedish municipalities. These investments amounted to an estimated 1.4 billion 
SEK (equivalent to 155 million USD in current exchange rates) of Swedish 
taxpayers’ money (Carlsson, 2011). However, after pressure to scrutinise 
SEKABs activities, not least from the local press, in September 2007 leading 
politicians in the three Swedish municipalities stopped all investments and 
Carstedt was fired as SEKAB’s CEO. 
Meanwhile, the CEO had started selling his ideas in Tanzania too, representing 
the investment as the first large sugar investment in the country in 40 years (Usher, 
2017). The ‘buy-in’ of the Tanzanian government was institutionalised in at least 
three Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), indicating huge expectations, 
including more than one million jobs, billions of dollars in export revenues and 
offering Tanzania an opportunity to become independent of oil imports (URT, 
2006). The company was also supported by other key actors in the Tanzanian 
government: As I return to in Papers I and III, the Minister of Lands, Housing and 
Settlement at the time initiated a shareholder agreement through a new ‘Land for 
Equity’ policy, where the Bagamoyo project would serve as a pilot project. Thus, 
this case entails yet another means through which investor can gain access to land 
outside the procedures outlined in the Land Act. 
In 2007-08, SEKAB established an office in Masaki, Dar es Salaam, and hired 
a range of consultants, including a Sida officer who later returned to Sida and 
became a key driver of Sida support for large-scale land deals in Africa (for 
instance, she became a driving force to develop the Sida concept note on support 
to land deals quoted on p. 52). Moreover, through its local business partner, 
SEKAB gained access to 200 hectares of prison land (Kigongoni Farm)24 outside 
Bagamoyo town to establish a seed cane farm where sugarcane varieties 
particularly suitable for the local climate would be refined. The seed cane farm 
was up and running rather quickly and produced seed cane every season (Image 
6). Since the main estate was not prepared for planting, however, the seed cane 
crop had to be burnt down every season from 2007 until 2016 (Image 7). The 
24 It has been estimated that public bodies such as the army and prisons control more than 2 
million ha of general land suitable for agriculture (TNBC, 2009 in Kaarhus et al. 2010).
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initial timeline as per 2007 that about 3000 ha of plantation would be developed 
in 2008 was repeatedly delayed. 
In Sweden, two public seminars25 arranged by SEKAB served the important 
aim of selling the Tanzania plans to Swedish organisations and individuals who 
would be willing and able to provide such support, with focus on the social and 
environmental sustainability of the project. At the time, SEKAB aimed for 
investment in two Tanzanian districts; Rufiji and Bagamoyo. At the seminars, 
Carstedt held one of his talks, which have been referred to as ‘intense’, 
‘missionizing’, or ‘charming’ the audience (Johannesson, 2014). By referring to 
peak oil and population growth, Carstedt’s story fitted well into the discourse on 
the need for ethanol globally, and the role that Africa could play, given, for 
instance, its vast tracts of available, unused land (Carstedt, 2014). Portraying the 
project as a highly risky development project, with an emphasis on how it could
serve Africa’s needs, it was presented as an ideal combination of aid and trade, 
worthy of support from development agencies and banks. At the seminars, 
Carstedt also repeatedly emphasised the sustainability ambitions of the company 
and pointed to the rising competition in Tanzania with companies based in, for 
instance, the US and China, implicitly drawing on the notion that a Swedish 
investor would have a relatively high sustainability profile. 
At the seminars, SEKAB’s ideas were supported by, for instance, the 
Swedish ambassador to Tanzania, who advanced some reflections on how 
biofuel was a priority for the Tanzanian government. Another important 
supporter was Professor Rockström, head of the Stockholm Environment 
Institute (SEI) at the time, one of the most influential lobbyists in Sweden 
concerning climate change and other global environmental challenges and a 
supporter of large-scale biofuel production in Africa26. Rockström’s 
presentation identified similar problems as Carstedt’s, and leaned heavily on 
scientific data on, for instance, energy efficiency of sugarcane relative to other 
biofuel crops and Africa’s favourable climate for generating fivefold 
productivity.
Then followed one of the key controversies surrounding the project. A few 
months after being fired as SEKAB’s CEO, Carstedt was hired as a consultant 
by SEKAB. His assignment entailed finding a buyer for SEKAB’s investments 
in East Africa (SVT, 2014; Usher, 2009). However, he failed to find a new buyer, 
and after a seven-month paid consultancy, with an hourly rate of 700 SEK, he 
‘found himself’ as the buyer. Thus, on 21 October 2009, after having made 
25 The seminars were held on 20 November 2007 and 6 February 2008.
26 For instance, his opinions were expressed in an Opinion Piece in Göteborgsposten on 13 
March 2009, written as a response to an Opinion Piece written by myself earlier that year: 
available at http://www.gp.se/debatt. Accessed 9 May 2018.
64
approximately 1 million SEK on the consultancy assignment, Carstedt bought 
the Tanzanian branch of the company for 400 SEK (approximately 50 USD) 
(Häggqvist, 2014; SVT, 2014)27. The deal received substantial criticism in the 
local press in the three municipalities and a documentary broadcast on national 
television, in particular because it contributed to making one of the three 
municipalities the most indebted in Sweden (SVT, 2014). 
A few months earlier, on 28 July 2009, SEKAB BioEnergy Tanzania had sent 
a 2.5 page application letter to Sida, applying for funding of development costs 
(Sida, 2009), which would lead to another key controversy. In response to this 
application, Sida assigned the Sida Helpdesk to provide comments on the 
sustainability of the project and perform an assessment of SEKAB ESIA 
documents, assignments which I carried out. The Sida assignment entailed 
performing a comparison between the original ESIA version, which was approved 
by the Swedish consultant, and the version submitted by SEKAB to NEMC, from 
which the Swedish consultant distanced herself. The subsequent Environmental 
Impact Assessment Certificate was based on the latter. The process is outlined in 
detail elsewhere (Havnevik & Haaland, 2011), with substantial input from my 
report to Sida. While I refer to Havnevik and Haaland (2011) for a detailed outline 
of the whole ESIA process, suffice it to say here that I identified major changes in 
the ESIA (see pp 117-118 in Havnevik and Haaland, 2011 or Sida Helpdesk, 
2009). These changes systematically downplayed environmental and social risks 
in the document, changes not approved by the Swedish consultant (Sida Helpdesk, 
2009). Subsequently, the Swedish consultant stated that the report had been 
‘substantially altered’ to present ‘the conclusions in the best light’ (Usher, 2009).
Furthermore, as will be shown in Paper III, criticism of the Bagamoyo project 
started appearing in the national news in both Sweden and Tanzania, with 
reference to, for instance, threats to rural people’s livelihoods, the risk of 
displacement of local communities, overlaps with forest reserves in Rufiji and 
associated risks of increased greenhouse gas emissions (ActionAid, 2009a, 
2009b; DN, 2009; Engvall, 2009; Östberg, 2008). 
On 29 October 2009, Sida decided to reject SEKAB’s application. While 
there is reason to believe that the decision was affected by all the criticism 
outlined above, the motivation provided in the decision included references to 
Sida Helpdesk’s assessment, such as high environmental and socio-economic 
risk and lack of a legal framework, but also to that Sida does not support 
development costs, only specific projects (Sida, 2009).
27 The deal was that SEKAB (SEKAB International AB) and EcoDevelopment in Europe AB 
entered an agreement in which EcoDevelopment took over 100 percent of the shares in the two 
subsidiaries in Tanzania and Mozambique (Havnevik & Haaland, 2011).
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Around this time, the new company, Bagamoyo EcoEnergy Ltd (PIM, 
2010:11)28 (hereafter referred to as BEE) was registered in Tanzania, and the focus 
shifted from ethanol to sugar as the main product. This fitted well into Tanzanian 
policy with sugar as one of three target crops and high sugar import costs. Only a 
few months after the new company had been created, a new constellation of 
financers had bought into the project, including the African Development Bank 
(PIM, 2010:21). In the new project information memorandum (PIM), a new 
timeline was presented, according to which sugar production would be initiated in 
June 2013, that is, three years later than initially planned. 
In order to access a loan from the African Development Bank, several 
conditions needed to be met. A condition particularly relevant to this thesis was 
that a credit guarantee had to be provided, given the high-risk profile of the 
investment. Therefore, in May 2012 Sida received yet another application, for a 
94 million USD credit enhancement guarantee (940 million SEK29), which, if 
affected, would have been Sida’s largest such guarantee ever. 
While the project was run by a ‘new’ company, the company executives 
remained the same. Moreover, the project targeted the same land, with the same 
crop. The same people were targeted by resettlement and outgrower schemes, 
and the project was based on the same environmental certificate. However, the 
Rufiji plans, which had attracted the most substantial criticism in 2009, had been 
downplayed, although not removed. Another difference was that the project was 
marketed as a food project, rather than a (more controversial) biofuel project. 
Another difference from the SEKAB application was that there had been a 
change in the staff at Sida involved in handling the application. Finally, the 
project still enjoyed strong support from the Tanzanian President.
Most likely, these conditions all contributed to Sida deciding to go ahead 
with an assessment of the project, its relevance and potential impacts, in 
contrast to its response to the first application. This decision initiated a range 
of evaluations amounting to 1300 pages of documentation (Sida Helpdesk, 
2012), indicating the much more complex deal involving the coordination of 
multi-million dollar loans and credit guarantees. These documents were 
important material for this thesis. 
28 The new company, owned by Eco Development, operated in Africa through Agro EcoEnergy 
Africa Ltd. In turn, Agro EcoEnergy Africa Ltd was owned by Eco Energy Africa AB, registered 
in Sweden, and operating in Tanzania through registered ‘special purpose vehicle’, Bagamoyo 
EcoEnergy Ltd (PIM, 2010:11).
29 Sida used an exchange rate of 10 SEK per dollar at the time (Sida, 2015).
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Image 1. The road intersecting the project site,  
surrounded by bushland and woodland.  
Photo: Linda Engström.
Image 2. I am wading through Ruvu River floods when 
entering the project site. Photo: Kjell Havnevik.
Image 3. Ongoing farming activities on Razaba Ranch. 
Photo: Linda Engström.
Image 4. Some Razaba Ranch residents have become more 
dependent on charcoal production for their livelihoods  
while awaiting resettlement. Photo: Linda Engström.
← ←
←←
Image 5. A Razaba Ranch subvillage where I often conducted interviews under the large tree (right side).  
Photo: Linda Engström.
Image 6. Sugar cane varieties have been refined on  
the seed cane plantation since 2007.  
Photo: Linda Engström.
Image 7. Since no factory is in place, and existing factories 
are too far away, all harvested sugar cane has been burnt 
since 2007. Photo: Linda Engström.
←
← ←
In its assessment, Sida deemed the project relevant to both Swedish and 
Tanzanian policy. The ORGUT ESIA was not mentioned. Instead, a new ESIA 
performed by the African Development Bank was referred to (Sida, 2014b). 
When asked about the controversial ESIA process in interview, a Sida officer 
stated that Sida had decided to assess the project on its current merits, 
notwithstanding its history. Importantly, during this process, several Sida 
officers raised criticism of the project. For instance, in a procedural meeting 
where the project was discussed, one Sida officer asked if experience from the 
LSAI in Hanang, where Barabaigs were displaced, had been taken into account. 
Another important point raised was that risk reduction solely through 
communication with the investor, as suggested in the risk assessment, would not 
be enough. Nevertheless, following time-consuming and challenging 
paperwork, in February 2014 Sida decided to support BEE with a smaller 
guarantee of 16.2 million USD from its regular development budget (Sida, 
2015), without reference to this criticism (Sida, 2014c). One important driver for 
BEE requesting a smaller (faster), early loan was that its partners were losing 
faith in the project due to repeated delays (Sida, 2014a) and it became pertinent 
to show progress. In all, as outlined in Paper II, delays constituted an important 
reason for this application. 
As I will outline in Paper II, after having paid 54 million SEK (6.2 million USD) 
during 2014, Sida set a number of conditions before providing the next payment 
(Sida, 2015), which were not fulfilled. Therefore, in May 2015, Sida decided to stop 
any further payments to BEE.
As I will return to in Paper II and III, after a messy process of continued 
attempted implementation, on 15 April 2015 the newly elected President Magufuli 
decided to revoke BEE’s Right of Occupancy30. This was done despite pressure 
from Sida to support BEE, due to the money it had invested. While one might 
imagine that this would be the end of the Bagamoyo Saga, it was not. As I will 
return to in Paper II, on 11 September 2017, BEE launched a lawsuit against the 
Government of Tanzania and submitted a request for arbitration at the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, (ICSID)31 in 
Washington DC, claiming to have lost 52 million USD. Thus, the Bagamoyo Saga 
continues.
30In October 2016, the President granted 10 000 ha of land in Bagamoyo to the domestic 
company Bakhresa. One month later, BEE received a letter revoking its land title because the 
Government no longer ‘have an interest’ in the project, a decision finally made public four months 
later, in February 2017. According to national media, Bakhresa re-initiated activities on the seed 
cane farm in December 2017.
31 ICSID was instigated by the World Bank in order ‘to further the Bank’s objective of promoting 
international investment’ https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/default.aspx. Accessed 24 
April 2018.
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In this chapter, I described the wider setting of privatisation of agriculture 
and development policies, followed by an outline of the LSAI narrative. I also 
provided a description of the local context within which the Bagamoyo project 
was initiated. From these descriptions, it is evident that the Bagamoyo project 
fitted well into the political agenda on privatisation of development. Moreover, 
it fitted well into the agenda on biofuels in Sweden and the EU at the time, partly 
created by CEO Carstedt himself. I reveal how a charismatic and skilled CEO 
was provided space to sell the Bagamoyo project to a wider audience and how 
the project has received criticism and involved a number of controversies. 
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3.1 Conceptual framework
This section outlines key concepts used in the papers. The concepts of discourse, 
narrative and resilient narratives are given little space in Paper III, and are thus 
described in more detail here. In contrast, the three interrelated concepts of 
simplification, delay and failure are outlined in detail in Paper II and thus more 
briefly outlined here. 
3.1.1 Discourse and narrative 
In this thesis, I use narrative as the object of analysis. This section starts by 
describing the broader concept discourse and then returns to narrative and 
describes how the two concepts are interlinked.
Discourse is conceptualised in many different ways in social science literature. 
In this thesis, I draw on critical discourse analysis (CDA), where discourse is 
defined as a practice in the form of written and spoken language expressed from 
social positions, and perceived as only one part of what shapes the social world 
(Fairclough, 2010; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). In CDA, discourse is simultaneously 
constituted by, and shapes, the social structures within which it is produced. 
Moreover, in CDA, discourse is to be empirically studied within its social context 
(Fairclough & Wodak, 1997).
Discourse is made up of similar, but not necessarily identical, 
representations, however all sharing a particular way of seeing and describing 
the world, that are more or less naturalised within that domain (Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 2002; Neumann, 2003). Thus, a discourse follows patterns, for instance 
in terms of shared knowledge, assumptions and representations of a particular 
phenomenon (Adger, Benjaminsen, Brown, & Svarstad, 2001). 
3 Theoretical framework
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Discourses often gain influence by conveying potent messages through 
simplifying complex issues and processes (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002; Wolmer 
et al., 2006) in order to, for instance, shape policy decisions (Bacchi, 2009; 
Wolmer et al., 2006), gather or maintain political support (Büscher, 2014; 
Mosse, 2004, 2005) or generate a (continued) flow of financial resources (Lund 
et al., 2017, Mosse 2004).
As I will return to in Paper III, ‘narrative’ is used in this thesis as a story 
about a particular phenomenon within a wider discourse32. The message of a
discourse is communicated through narratives (Adger et al., 2001), and 
analysing these narratives offers opportunities to examine how discourses ‘filter 
through to the everyday’ (Doughty & Murray, 2016:304). Such more localised 
expressions of discourse have also been framed as tales (Escobar, 1993) or 
storylines (Hajer, 1995). As I showed in Chapter 2, the character of a 
development narrative as having a beginning, middle and end, promising 
development outcomes and serving certain interests (Roe, 1991), is particularly 
relevant to the case analysed in this thesis. Thus, the LSAI narrative is a story 
about the particular phenomenon, LSAI, situated within the wider development 
discourse, whose producers share certain assumptions and representations of, for 
instance, what constitutes development. In this thesis, I analyse the LSAI 
narrative in relation to contradicting narratives, for instance provided by 
accumulated academic knowledge (as I will return to in Paper III) or by rural 
residents targeted by the project (as outlined in Papers I, II and III).
Drawing on Gramsci, the LSAI narrative can be conceived as a hegemonic 
discourse, dominating the way of seeing the world, where other perceptions 
and perspectives of that reality (about what is going on, why and with what 
effects) have been undermined to the extent that the hegemonic discourse 
appears natural (Hajer, 1995; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Moreover, a 
discourse is hegemonic when it has been enacted into institutional practices 
and regulations (Adger et al., 2001; Neumann, 2003), such as bureaucratic 
procedure, policies and strategies.
As I will show in section 3.2, key representations in the development 
discourse ‘filter through’ to the LSAI narrative. In turn, the LSAI narrative is 
enacted in policies such as SAGCOT and projects such as the Bagamoyo project, 
all part of ‘the LSAI development strategy’. 
32 In this thesis, the development discourse (see section 3.2) constitutes such a wider discourse.
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3.1.2 Simplification
Simplification, reduction of complexity, is part of shaping any story in order to 
achieve legibility, but can be produced in different ways, in different contexts, 
with different effects. Simplification is an intrinsic character in any discourse or 
narrative intended to shape policy (Scott 1998, Bacchi 2009, Wolmer et al 2006). 
Broadly, narratives intended to shape policy can be simplified: 1) to achieve 
legibility for practical reasons, while knowing the context and with an awareness 
of what is likely to interfere with the policy and interlinked projects, or 2) from 
a belief that something will be very simple to implement due to lack of 
knowledge, lack of incentive to find particular knowledge, based on a political 
agenda or certain simplified values and assumptions. In this thesis, I analysed 
simplifications largely stemming from the second set of factors, which are rarely 
innocent. Rather, they constitute an important political tool in order to shape the 
LSAI narrative and the design of the Bagamoyo project. 
Apart from achieving legibility, however, the simplifications under scrutiny 
simultaneously achieve other purposes. For instance, by disguising their 
fundamentally political nature they tend to appear functional and pragmatic
(Wedel et al., 2005). A telling example of the pragmatic feature of policy is 
Sida’s justification for engaging in LSAIs, despite strong global criticism and 
potential risks circulating in the public debate, as outlined on page 52 in Chapter 
2. Sida pointed out that the new wave of LSAIs is already happening and that 
the only thing it can do is to ‘adapt’ to this trend and engage in order to maximise 
benefits for the poor.
As outline in Papers II and III, a common way to simplify in my case is 
through discursive practices of depoliticisation (Ferguson, 1990) or ‘render 
technical’ (Li, 2007:7). One example of where political decisions are represented 
as administrative or technical, rather than political, is through institutionalised 
bureaucratic procedures such as Sida’s risk assessment, as outlined in Paper III.
As I will show in Paper III, while Li’s (2007) and Ferguson’s (1990) accounts of 
such depoliticisation mainly entail discursive simplifications, rendering technical 
can also be achieved through material practice, concrete actions. These include 
‘tick-off exercises’ and assessments, performed by authorities to adhere to 
bureaucratic procedure, that are presented as adequate to address complex, often 
political, issues. Thus, this thesis presents simplification as both a discursive and 
a material practice.
The practice of depoliticisation is given a slightly new framing in the 
emerging body of literature on neoliberalised development narratives. For 
instance, Lund et al. (2017) point to how policy models are dependent on 
narratives rendering contextual complexity technical to sell market-based
development strategies as something new. While these observations largely 
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overlap with those of, for instance, Mosse (2005), literature on neoliberalised 
development narratives emphasises the importance of selling seemingly 
competitive solutions, particularly important within a neoliberal logic where 
profitable efficiency is key. Moreover, as outlined on page 47 in Chapter 2, the 
kind of knowledge that is likely to be consumed by a wider audience has 
changed, with increasing emphasis on growth and investment. 
Apart from depoliticisation, I also analyse other types of simplifications, 
including the disregard of environmental complexities, external events and 
discursive homogenisations (Escobar, 1993) of the Other (Said, 1978) (see 
section 3.2.2, Papers II and III). Discursive homogenisations categorise and
ascribe one or a few particular characteristics to a constructed group of people, 
simplifying not only their characteristics, but also relations between actors. As 
outlined in Paper III, this way of seeing smallholder farmers occurred in the case 
examined, expressed more or less explicitly among project proponents.
In my analysis, I compared the simplified LSAI narrative with the messy 
project realities on the project site, in order to investigate what complexities were 
disregarded.
As shown in Papers I-IV, simplified statements on land were key to 
understanding why the Bagamoyo project failed, where a sharp focus on 
productivity repeatedly disregarded, for instance, other ways of seeing and 
utilising land. For example, the simplified notion of vast tracts of unused land in 
Tanzania has frequently been observed in other studies (Coulson 2013, Maganga 
et al 2016, Bergius et al 2017, Walwa 2017). As outlined in Paper I, villagers 
living around Razaba Ranch dismissed the existence of unused land, referring to 
activities such as grazing, the collection of non-timber forest products or set-
asides for future generations. Moreover, in Paper IV, we show that the narrative 
on vast tracts of available land proved to be at odds with repeated reports on 
conflicts over land and aggregated pressure on land from a number of sectors. 
Finally, as outlined on page 64 in Chapter 2, the CEO of SEKAB drew on a 
range of simplified representations of the state of the world. These included the 
abundance of land in Africa, the unused land in Razaba, perfect climate 
conditions and the simplified image that a Swedish investor would, by default, 
constitute a more ethical and sustainable option than companies from other 
countries. 
In sum, I conceive simplification as a discursive and material practice that 
reduces complexity to achieve legibility, simultaneously creating potent 
messages used to sell success to a wider audience. Moreover, as will be outlined 
in Paper II, I use simplification as having effects, not only by shaping policy and 




Delay, that is, the lagging behind of project implementation in relation to the 
proposed timeline, is used in this thesis as an important effect of simplification, 
and an important contributing factor to failure. Thus, it constitutes an important 
link between simplified development narratives and development failure, and a 
key concept in the analysis of how the Bagamoyo investment fails to deliver 
proposed outcomes, as will be outlined in Paper II. Overall, in this thesis, delay 
is used as a process integral to understand how the Bagamoyo project fails to 
deliver promised outcomes.
As will be outlined in detail in Paper II (p. 7), delay is a frequent feature in 
development intervention, including LSAIs (Burnod et al., 2013; Folster, 2001; 
Hall et al., 2015; Holden, Otsuka, & Deininger, 2013; Li, 2007b; Svarstad & 
Benjaminsen, 2017), although rarely discussed. Even though delay appears to 
have played an important, sometimes decisive, role in the implementation 
processes of development projects, and for actors involved, none of these 
scholars analyse delay any further, even though they sometimes implicitly link 
delay with disregards by project proponents (such as Hall et al., 2015). Nor do 
they explicitly link delay with development failure. Rather, delay is often treated 
as unexpected, innocent and inevitable. 
However, in other bodies of literature, delay is referred to as ‘purposeful 
friction’ (Hiedanpää, Pellikka, & Ojalammi, 2016:18) or ‘temporal uncertainty’ 
(Griffiths, 2014) and is outlined as a strategy of either the subaltern, the 
bureaucrats, or both (Bedi, 2015; Griffiths, 2014; Hiedanpää et al., 2016; von 
Essen & Allen, 2017).
Thus, delay is discussed in this thesis as an important, but overlooked, feature 
of development intervention. Moreover, it is used as a concept in order to analyse 
the project implementation process. Overall, delay provides analytical leverage 
in the analysis of development failure.
3.1.4 Development failure
As opposed to delay, the concept of failure has been widely discussed in studies 
of development, where failure is defined in different ways. In this thesis, failure 
is used in two main ways: as an effect of simplification and delay, and thus part 
of the analysis of how the project fails (see Paper II), and as a means to 
understand how different actors relate to propositions that the Bagamoyo project 
has failed in order to sustain the image of imminent success (see Paper III).
Defining what failure is can be problematic; not least since what constitutes 
failure for some can mean success for others. Moreover, value statements such 
as failure, or success, are often based on vested interests. In this thesis, I adapt 
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the definition used by Ferguson (1990) and Scott (1998), that is, ‘failure to 
deliver expected outcomes’, into failure to deliver proposed outcomes. I believe 
that this minor adaptation is necessary, since it is difficult to assess and that it 
varies, whether proponents behind a scheme actually do expect the outcomes 
they put forward. As a consequence, my conception of failure lies closer to that 
of Li (2007), as failure to deliver what was promised, since an outcome can be 
promised regardless of whether there is a belief that it will be delivered, or not. 
In the case study examined in this thesis, the failure to deliver promised 
outcomes eventually equalled the failure of the project to materialise at all. Many 
promised outcomes from the Bagamoyo project, such as creation of 12 000 jobs 
and the production of hundreds of thousands of tons of sugar, are listed in Table 
1 in Paper III. In contrast, actually achieved outcomes were a few hundred jobs 
and no sugar produced. It is in relation to such concrete promises, and outcomes, 
that I conceive failure in this thesis.
I then focus my analysis on the ways in which informants relate to 
propositions of project failure in the course of project implementation. As 
indicated, there will always be contesting perceptions of whether a project has 
failed or not, and in what way, depending on whose perspective one applies and 
whose interest it serves. Along these lines, Mosse argues that even if a project 
fails in practice, it can still succeed as a policy argument in a wider arena (Mosse, 
2005). Thus, value statements such as success or failure are labels given to 
development projects which can mask project realities in a way that serves the 
interest of the narrator (Mosse, 2004). In this thesis, such statements are analysed 
in order to understand development narratives, and the discursive efforts used to 
sustain them.  
Importantly, the approach used in this thesis of focusing on simplification 
in underpinning narratives is just one of many possible analytical approaches 
to study development failure. Focusing on simplification is important for 
drawing attention to the responsibility of those producing (repeatedly failing) 
policies and projects.
3.1.5 Resilient narratives
As mentioned above, failure has been described in previous studies, but not all 
of these discuss repeated failure. However, a conclusion that can be drawn from 
reading post-development, post-colonial and other studies of development is that 
failure is repeated, over time and contexts. For example, the failed large schemes 
described by Scott (1998) took place over centuries and in differing continents. 
Furthermore, Kindornay and Reilly-King (2013) point to the ‘cyclical nature’ of 
the ‘latest’ development strategies, stating that privatisation in development aid, 
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underpinning the much criticised SAPs, is now being repeated (p. 538). Another 
example is Ferguson’s (1990) conclusion from accounts of rural development 
projects in many African countries, including state interventions in rural 
Tanzania that ‘again and again, projects have failed’ (p. 266). 
One important reason behind patterns of repeated failure is that narratives 
underpinning the projects disregard context and tend to resist criticism and other 
alternative ways of seeing the world (Shore & Wright, 2003). Even though there
are always contradicting narratives in constant struggle over different ways 
people see the world (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), certain narratives persist and 
others are more temporal (Svarstad, 2002). 
There are many examples of discourses and interlinked narratives that have 
persisted over decades in the face of substantial contradicting narratives. Again, 
post-development and post-colonial literature provide relevant examples. For 
instance, there has been a dominant simplified discourse, based on science, 
technology and neoclassical economic models, which has marginalised other,
‘non-Western’, knowledge (Escobar, 1993:13). The agrarian transition narrative, 
closely linked to the LSAI narrative, is another persistent narrative, pointing to 
ancient farming models as opposed to modern, backward farmers as opposed to 
entrepreneurial, among others. Similarly, as shown in Paper III, values and 
assumptions underpinning the LSAI narrative have demonstrated remarkable 
persistence. 
This phenomenon of the ‘formidable durability of discourse’ or its ‘sheer 
knitted-together strength’ (Said, 1978:6), its ‘inertia’ (Neumann, 2003:120) or 
its ‘parasitic relationship to its own shortcomings and failures’ (Li, 2007b:1) has 
been studied within many different domains, framed in different ways. In Paper 
III (p. 2), it is shown to exist behind a wide array of development strategies 
which have repeatedly failed.
Many studies of development failure show that development strategies and 
policies rarely reflect experience. Ferguson (1990) writes about how development 
repeatedly disregards previous experience, where ‘many observations and lines of 
thought commonplace in scholarly literature on Lesotho are effectively excluded 
from the discourse of development’ (p. 29). Nyamnjoh (2000) describes notions 
of modernity, what it entails and how it is superior to other development ‘stages’ 
as often ‘turning a deaf ear to empirical evidence and confusing ideal types with 
reality’ (p. 8). 
Regarding LSAI specifically, a handful of authors have written about 
immunity to experience. For instance, the simplified assumption of unused land 
underpinning the LSAI narrative is described by Baglioni and Gibbon (2013) as 
‘exceedingly resilient over the years’ (p. 1561). 
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In this thesis, what all these scholars have observed is called ‘resilient 
narratives’. The concept is drawn from Li’s (2010) account of the persistent and 
simplified claim in the agrarian transition narrative that there is a natural and 
linear development trajectory: 
Too often, hard thinking about the predicament of surplus population is avoided by 
the repetition of some remarkably resilient narratives about agrarian transition that 
assume a linear pathway, and a predictable set of connections. According to these 
narratives there will be—sooner or later—a transition from agriculture to industry, 
country to city, and peasant to entrepreneurial farmer or wage worker (p. 69)
Indeed, if contradicting narratives were acknowledged, the idea would seem less 
potent, less likely to deliver promised results. As noted by Büscher (2013), the 
gap between proposed and achieved outcomes, or the ‘tensions between material 
realities and reified representations’ (p. 5), are exploited by policymakers in 
order to gain competitive advantage.
The argument by Büscher (2014) that interpretations such as success should 
be seen as capital, defined as ‘value in motion’ (p. 80), means that they are only 
useful when spread and consumed by actors outside a narrow circle of project 
managers. Therefore, an idea, and its (upcoming or achieved) success, needs to 
be sold to a wider audience, that is, the message needs to be consumed. When a 
particular narrative is produced and reproduced through written and oral 
statements by a number of actors, Büscher (2014) refers to them as belonging to 
an ‘epistemic community’ (p. 80). Drawing on Haas (1989:384), an epistemic 
community is defined as ‘a specific community of experts sharing a belief in a 
common set of cause-and-effect relationships as well as common values to 
which policies governing these relationships will be applied’ (Büscher, 
2014:80). Within an epistemic community, the actors have a common interest in 
selling success, ‘notwithstanding any contradictory and unintended outcomes’ 
(Lund 2017:126; Büscher, 2014; Mosse, 2004). While I mainly studied 
representations of success in an ongoing implementation process, not post-
implementation as in Büscher’s case, his findings are relevant to the Bagamoyo 
case study. For instance, the Swedish CEO managed to rapidly sell his ideas to 
a wider audience in both Sweden and Tanzania, as outlined in Chapter 2, and 
created an epistemic community within which success was produced and 
sustained (see Paper III). Thus, epistemic communities are important in 
understanding the workings of resilient success narratives in this thesis.
A number of rationales have been suggested for such an epistemic 
community to maintain success. Apart from legitimising a project, other 
rationales advanced by Büscher (2014) include the will to be associated with 
success rather than failure in order to, for instance, sustain one’s own career. 
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Other rationales could include creating the image of a smooth and manageable 
implementation process (van Ufford, 1993), or producing and sustaining 
authority on behalf of the epistemic community, where authority is produced and 
reproduced when actors confirm each other’s positions (Fairclough, 2003).
In this thesis, the resilient narrative concept was important because there are
many experiences and so many research findings have been produced that could 
have informed the current LSAI development strategy, and not least, the design 
of the Bagamoyo project. Furthermore, the proponents of the Bagamoyo 
investment consequently marginalised the voices of rural residents and 
information about current problems and struggles on the project site. However, 
instead of being influenced by all this evidence in any radical way, the 
assumptions and representations underpinning the LSAI narrative, and the vision 
of the project as an imminent success, remained intact. Thus, resilient narrative 
is a useful concept to explain why a development narrative is resilient.
However, the concept also proved useful to analyse how the LSAI narrative 
was sustained in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities. Sustaining 
a criticised narrative does not take place automatically. On the contrary, it 
requires considerable investment by its proponents. As stated by Neumann 
(2003), ‘power and social effort … is needed to sustain dominating 
representations’ (p. 63). Just like hegemony, resilience is created through 
discursive effort, where confirming propositions are repeatedly produced 
(Neumann, 2003). Thus, a dominant hegemonic narrative and a resilient 
narrative are not necessarily different things, since a hegemonic narrative is 
implicitly resilient. However, a resilient narrative is not necessarily hegemonic, 
since marginalised narratives can also be resilient. 
I chose resilient narrative as a concept because I believe it is more illustrative 
when studying how a narrative is sustained. In its dictionary form, the word 
resilience means ‘elasticity’ or ‘flexibility’, which entails a notion of dynamics 
in a way that I think ‘hegemony’ does not. Thus, the resilient narrative concept 
opens the way for scrutiny of the dynamics of how resilience is challenged and 
sustained, and how the proponents behind the narrative deal with contradicting 
narratives and materialities, including an investigation of the practices that 
constitute this elasticity. This was useful for the analysis in Paper III of how a 
wide range of what I call ‘deflection practices’ were applied to shield the LSAI 
narrative from critique. Calling a narrative hegemonic steers the analysis into a 
more binary view of what is dominant and subdominant, which is less useful in 
the present case. 
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In sum, I use the resilient narrative concept to investigate why a narrative is 
resilient (since it serves certain interests), but also how it is resilient to 
contradicting narratives and materialities (through a range of deflection 
practices).
In the next section, I outline some of the changes at the end of territorial 
colonialism which formed the basis for the contemporary development discourse, 
including some of its highly resilient representations, assumptions and values.
3.2 Post-colonial and post-development theory 
This section introduces the wider development discourse outlined in post-
development and post-colonial theory. As will be shown in Paper III, these 
bodies of literature contribute to an understanding of how certain ways of 
seeing and interlinked representations and assumptions, filtering through to the 
LSAI narrative, have lingered on over centuries, showing ‘remarkable 
resilience’ (Li, 2010).
3.2.1 An introduction
In this thesis, I use the term ‘post-colonial’ with reference to the argument 
advanced by Fanon (2005) that the liberation from colonialism is divided into 
two parts: liberation from territorial colonialism, which is ‘over and done 
with’, and liberation from certain colonial representations and subject 
positions, which is not. 
In brief, post-colonial theory sets out to explain the origins of values, 
assumptions and representations from pre-colonial and colonial eras which still 
linger in contemporary, powerful Western images of the ‘non-Western’, of ‘the 
Other’ (Said, 1978:1). In this thesis, I apply post-colonial theory to reverse the 
gaze from the local context to proponents of development and their 
representations and assumptions used to produce the contemporary LSAI 
narrative.
An interlinked body of literature often grouped under the heading ‘post-
development’ takes a similar approach to colonial legacies, but with particular 
focus on how these are reproduced within the development apparatus. Due to 
my focus on development narratives and failure, this body of literature provides 
a relevant complement to post-colonial theory. As a matter of fact, these two 
bodies of literature partly overlap, in that they tend to see notions of 
development, progress and modernisation as rooted in the history of Western 
imperialism (Slater & Bell, 2002). 
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Moreover, scholars within both these schools of thought emphasise that 
development is not only a set of projects to alleviate poverty. Instead, they refer 
to the political aspects of how to deliver development to poor people (Nustad,
2001), inspired by a theoretical and methodological framework of discourse 
analysis (Pieterse, 2000) and engaging with the politics of knowledge; how 
knowledge is created and distributed (Escobar, 1993; Ferguson, 1990; Slater, 
2002). Scholars within this field criticise how representations, assumptions and 
values underpinning the development discourse bring with them a whole 
mindset and way of seeing the world, and facilitate Western dominance rather 
than getting rid of it after colonialism (Matthews, 2017). 
3.2.2 Important insights from post-colonial and post-development 
literature
This section outlines representations and practices relevant in this thesis, which 
originated before, during and after the colonial era, arranged along the 
interlinked themes of Eurocentrism, modernity and Western knowledge systems.
The Post-War development discourse
Escobar’s (1993) post-colonial critique of development is an eloquent example 
of how post-colonial and post-development literature converge, as he uses a 
post-colonial lens to deconstruct the development discourse emerging at the end 
of the Second World War. This section focuses on what Escobar, among others, 
identify as representations emerging at that specific time, which became key for 
the formation of the development apparatus.
Like many other scholars, Escobar (1993) points to how the ‘underdeveloped’ 
subject was invented in 20 January 1949, when President Harry S. Truman held 
his famous inaugural speech. From that moment, the large majority of the world’s 
population was no longer seen as diverse, but as a homogeneous group – the 
underdeveloped.
Apart from the simplified categorisation of the world into developed and 
un(der)developed populations and countries, another important shift was the 
representation of poverty solely as lack of money, rather than focusing on 
political structures and power relations, inevitably portraying economic growth 
as the necessary solution. The ‘war against poverty’ gained rapid support in 
Western Europe and North America by framing allegedly widespread poverty as 
a potential threat to global stability. 
Another emerging representation at the time was that of the three worlds, the 
free industrialised nations, the Communist industrialised nations and the poor, 
non-industrialised nations. Truman’s speech was a key factor in this re-
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structuring of the world, where industrialised, ‘first-world’ countries were 
expected to support poor, ‘third-world’ countries with development aid through 
impersonal institutions, such as the World Bank, in order to enhance capitalist 
expansion and associated processes (Escobar, 1993:31). Importantly, this 
simplified categorisation equalled development with industrialisation, a 
representation that has remained at the core of the development discourse.
Eurocentrism, the evolutionary development ladder and the Other
In a Eurocentric perspective, development is defined as anything that strives 
towards or conforms to the ideas, expectations and state of progress of the 
developed West (Escobar, 1993), while anything deviating from it should adjust 
accordingly and strive towards it. A Eurocentric perspective, referring to the 
European way of seeing the world as the template, inevitably creates normative 
dichotomies, such as traditional-modern and primitive-civilised (Nyamnjoh, 
2000). In addition, Eurocentrism codes historical processes in a way that 
presents Europe as the continent of ‘reason, progress and modernity’ (Prakash, 
1994:1485), and has been described as an expansionist idea ‘impatient with 
alternative systems of thought and practice’ (Nyamnjoh, 2000:7). While the idea 
of progress emerged already during the Age of Enlightenment in the 18th
Century, it enjoyed more legitimacy after the influence of publication of 
Darwin’s On the Origin of Species in 1859. Applied to society, the notion of 
natural evolution entailed all societies moving towards a predestined end-station, 
from the primitive to the more complex and modern society. The end-station was 
the modern Western nation-state (Eriksson Baaz, 2005). 
More recently, the notion of Eurocentrism was fuelled by modernisation 
theory emerging in the 1950s-1960s, dominated by a belief that modernisation
was the only process through which primitive relations and ways of thinking 
could be destroyed (Escobar, 1993). Underpinned by this notion of 
modernisation, the image of a linear development path evolved, coded through 
what Western countries judged to be a ‘normal course of evolution and progress’ 
(Escobar, 1993:26). This view was influenced by the Rostow (1959) model of 
the stages of economic growth, where he defined five distinct stages expected to 
occur, where traditional societies would mature in a direction towards mass 
consumption. Although criticised for decades, ideas about the evolutionary 
ladder are clearly expressed in the LSAI narrative, for instance in the way 
subsistence farmers are expected to ‘move up the ladder’, become 
entrepreneurial and evolve into more ‘efficient’, technologically more advanced, 
agricultural producers. Thus, development emerged as the process of transition 
from one specific position to another, taking place in a predictable manner. An 
intrinsic assumption in this way of seeing is that industrialisation will absorb 
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landless people from rural areas, for instance those rendered surplus due to 
LSAI. However, this adsorption has repeatedly been found to be minor, 
particularly in formal sectors. As indicated on page 4 in Paper IV, in Tanzania, 
landless people are mainly engaged in informal labour arrangements with 
minimum salaries, and the existing industry does not offer a large number of 
jobs (Wuyts & Kilama, 2016). Seeing societies in undeveloped countries as still 
being on their way has been used to justify development failure. For example, 
Eriksson Baaz (2005) shows how failed development projects were justified by 
the claim that Tanzania was not yet ready for the intervention concerned. This 
way of representing the problem as being in the local structures, mindset and 
culture, rather than performing self-critical analysis and integrating insights 
about complex contexts from such an analysis into policies and project designs, 
is a practice that I observed among LSAI proponents in this study. 
Another important point made by Eriksson Baaz (2005) is that, even if this 
development path was seen as intrinsic to all societies, different societies 
reflected different stages of development in the same evolutionary process. 
Thus, within the notion of an evolutionary ladder, the European and the African 
shared something – they were on the same path – and they were only separated 
by their stage of development, where the developing country needed to catch up,
as reflected for instance in the paper by Collier & Dercon (2009). This created a 
structure where the European could know what the African is going through, 
because they (or their ancestors) had experienced that stage of development. This
approach, referring to the era when Europe, or Sweden, was located at that stage, 
for example when hoes were used in tillage, and the path forward from there 
then becomes unproblematic, even natural. The most important implication of 
this reasoning was the representation of ‘backwardness’, of lagging behind 
(Eriksson Baaz, 2005:39). In the Bagamoyo case, both Sida officers and 
company representatives made statements that were clearly underpinned by this 
notion of an evolutionary ladder (see Paper III).  
This strong notion of superiority of Europe(ans) in relation to the Other 
lingered and formed a fundamental characteristic of the development discourse 
from the onset (Escobar, 1993). In the words of Ferguson, ‘in its extreme forms, 
development discourse sometimes even speaks as if the problem of poverty is all 
in the head – as if impoverished villagers could escape their condition by a simple 
change of attitude or intellectual conversion’ (Ferguson, 1990:58). Thus, the 
underlying causes of poverty can be formulated as being intrinsic in the character
of the poor (Nyamnjoh, 2000). Similar types of discursive homogenisations are 
described by Said (1978), who argues that the image of the Other is permeated by 
‘ideas about what “we” do and what “they” cannot do or understand as “we” do’ 
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(p. 12). This way of portraying social relations is clearly expressed in the LSAI 
narrative (Paper III). 
Through the mechanisms described above, the development discourse 
created the underdeveloped, backward or even lazy subject position, justifying 
it as a target of interventions suggested by the West (Escobar, 1993). All these 
representations enable the Westerner to be very self-confident in identifying 
what the Other needs, that is, to develop the underdeveloped. This notion of 
superiority is perceived by both post-colonial and post-development scholars 
as ‘trusteeship’, built into the construction of development already in the first 
half of the 19th Century (Cowen & Shenton, 1996), when ‘those who saw 
themselves as developed took it upon themselves to guide the development of 
those who were not’ (Nustad, 2001). Having the position of trustee means ‘to 
know how others should live, to know what is best for them, to know what 
they need’ (Li, 2007b:4). This notion of superiority entails ‘overriding the 
possibility that a more independent, or more skeptical, thinker might have had 
different views on the matter’ (Said, 1978:7). In other words, there is no need 
to ask them.
Western scientific knowledge
Another pivotal factor legitimising the idea of evolutionary development is a 
strong faith in modern Western science and its ‘objective accuracy and fairness 
of representation’ (Escobar, 1993:37). Development strategies based on such 
science were seen as more advanced, or even more ‘true’. 
However, as pointed by Haraway (1988) among many others, knowledge 
production, including scientific knowledge, is ‘situated’, produced by subjects 
with particular interests and values, and more a matter of ‘power moves’ rather 
than ‘moves towards the truth’ (p. 581). There are two particularly important 
scientific knowledge disciplines in producing the development discourse; 
natural science and economics. Great technical advance during the Second 
World War emphasised the importance of the expansion of technology and was 
perceived in the Four-Point Programme to deliver progress at a lower price
(Escobar, 1993; Slater, 2002). For agricultural development in particular, 
technology was deemed important to achieve greater productivity and efficiency 
(Escobar, 1993). The view of technology as neutral and inevitably beneficial and 
the interlinked concept of ‘transfer of technology’ are consistently common in 
development projects (Escobar, 1993:36), and also proposed as an important 
outcome of the contemporary LSAI development strategy.
Importantly, however, embedded in the promotion of technology was an 
expectation not only to strengthen material progress, but also to change the 
mindset of undeveloped populations, as expressed by Escobar (1993): 
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‘Modernisation technology was theorised as a moral force that would operate by 
creating an ethics of innovation, yield and result. Technology thus contributed 
to the planetary extension of modernist ideals’ (p. 36). Thus, transfer of 
technology is described in a different light, encompassing subtle mechanisms to 
achieve changes in the mindset of the ‘undeveloped’, another clearly expressed 
objective of the Bagamoyo company.  
There is a final way in which the belief in technology is problematic. The 
view of technology transfer as leading to development entails yet another 
simplification of complex contexts, since such transfers depend on context.
Important social and environmental dynamics such as rainy seasons, soils, 
labour dynamics, household relations and the desire of smallholders are often 
treated as details, so the scientific procedures ‘miss the point’ (Scott, 1998:290). 
Such omissions can prove fatal for development projects. As stated by Scott 
(1998), ignoring such dimensions of local diversity, they ‘all but guarantee their 
own practical failure’ (p. 340).
Alongside the strong faith in science and technology, there is a second 
discipline that Escobar (1993) points out as the single most influential force 
shaping the development, namely Western economic models, whereby social, 
cultural and political progress only can be achieved through material 
advancement. As indicated above, this view generated the belief that capital 
investment and economic growth were the key ingredients to achieve 
development. 
The professionalisation and institutionalisation of development practices
By now, it should be evident that certain representations of underdeveloped 
subjects have been produced and sustained until today, from the era of 
colonialism or before. This is possible because certain types of representations 
and ways of seeing become consolidated within the development apparatus, 
through two main processes: professionalisation of a certain kind of knowledge 
and institutionalisation of certain development practices. In brief, professiona-
lisation is the process through which a ‘politics of truth’ is produced and 
sustained, that is, where certain knowledge is rendered objective and superior. 
Simultaneously, other knowledge is marginalised as less relevant and deviating 
opinions are rendered less trust-worthy or even threatening. In the resulting 
discourse, knowledge based on ‘neutral’ technology and economic theories 
becomes central to develop the ‘third-world’ countries. 
Institutionalisation is the way in which this ‘true’ knowledge becomes 
consolidated into a structure that ensures its reproduction and operationalisation 
into policies and projects (Ferguson, 1990). In particular, this includes 
depoliticising practices which translate ‘certain unmanageable sorts of facts into a 
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more acceptable register’ (Ferguson, 1990:28), such as risk assessments and other 
bureaucratic procedures. Combined, these practices serve to support a certain way 
of seeing the world and enable the simplified development discourse to be 
sustained in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities.
Indeed, despite a number of shifts in the way development has been 
conceived and performed, including the participatory turn, the emphasis on 
partnerships and a varying emphasis on economic growth as the overarching 
goal, the essence of development discourse remains intact. As stated by Nustad 
(2001):
From the point of view of post-development, with its focus on the discursive 
formation of development, what appears to the practitioner as groundbreaking 
revolutions is instead seen as a different constellation of the same elements (p. 481). 
3.2.3 Outlining some relevant criticism of post-development  
The critique of post-development scholarship is diverse and sometimes 
tendentious, and there is no space to elaborate on details. Instead, in this section 
I draw attention to a few points of criticism that match some of my own critical 
reflections. 
First of all, post-development literature has been argued to be simplified  in the 
sense that it makes grand generalised statements without consideration of the 
particular (Crewe & Harrison, 1998; Eriksson Baaz, 2005; Pieterse, 2000). The 
first example I would like to raise here concerns the concept of ‘development’ and 
the interlinked concept of ‘development apparatus’. Crewe and Harrison (1998) 
and Pieterse (2000) emphasise the importance of not seeing the development 
apparatus as a monolithic body, but rather as an apparatus with great diversity in 
organisation and practical work habits. For example, Escobar’s claim that ‘the 
World Bank stories are “all the same”’ disregards repeated shifts in the discourse 
of the World Bank (Eriksson Baaz, 2005). 
Another critique is the generalisation of ‘the West’ and of ‘European’ – what 
is ‘the West’ and what is typical for a Western or European perspective? For 
example, referring to the development path of the West (often referring to 
Western Europe and North America) as one stereotyped way in which countries 
transitioned from peasant to industrial communities gives the skewed notion 
that, for example, all European countries industrialised in exactly the same way 
(Chibber, 2014). Along the same lines, Pieterse (2000) points to the need for 
nuancing the image of the West and non-West, and the Other, since protests 
against modernisation exist also in the West and proponents of modernisation 
are not confined to the West. 
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A final point of criticism is that general statements about development as 
something implicitly negative disregard any actual improvements that 
development has brought, for instance when it comes to life expectancy and 
other issues related to health (Pieterse, 2000). A related point of criticism, 
expressed by Matthews (2017), is that post-development has problems dealing 
with ‘true’ desires for development. She argues that a desire for development 
might not only exist due to the colonisation of the minds of the poor, but might 
reflect a desire for basic comfort, such as access to clean water, or a call for 
equality. Therefore, while acknowledging profound problems with past and 
current architecture behind development, one cannot disregard the fact that 
development can be desired or bring benefits in certain ways.
Nevertheless, knowledge about the development discourse, associated 
narratives and how and why they are produced is valuable in itself, since it helps 
understand why development often fails and what needs to change. As argued 
by Nustad (2001), critical analysis of development is important and should not 
be ignored, since it can reveal that ‘some of the problematic premises on which 
development interventions are based do not hold’ (p. 479).
While I share the criticism of how post-colonial and post-development 
thinkers sometimes homogenise certain phenomena, I believe their categori-
sations can still be useful in order to achieve legibility. Furthermore, they 
continue to raise important points about how certain representations repeatedly
shape development interventions. Moreover, their theories on the contribution 
of the gap between development project design and local context to development 
failure provided valuable background to my research. Therefore, I apply these 
somewhat simplifying concepts in this thesis, while being aware of the 
complicating aspects outlined above. 
To sum up, I showed in this section how findings from post-colonial and 
post-development theory outline historical trajectories of simplified assumptions 
and values underpinning the development discourse, filtering through into the 
LSAI narrative. I also showed that processes of professionalisation and 
institutionalisation can improve our understanding of how resilient narratives are 
sustained and that key concepts used in these bodies of literature have rightfully 
been criticised as sweeping and simplified. 
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This chapter moves from outlining epistemological perspectives to a description 
of research design and methods for data collection and analysis. It also describes
the field work, ending with a section on the research process, interspersed with 
some critical reflections.
4.1 Epistemological and ontological issues
In this thesis I apply a ‘moderate’ form of social constructivism, drawing on 
Fairclough (2010), who argues that discourse is only one part of what shapes the 
social world and that there is a real world which exists irrespective of how and 
why it is represented (p.5). This ‘critical realist’ perspective takes the position 
that certain events or objects are not dependent on being socially constructed in 
order to exist. Rather, ‘the world is such that some transformations are possible 
[through discourse], others are not’ (Fairclough, 2010:5). Thus, what in this 
thesis are called ‘contradicting materialities’ are events or phenomena which 
cannot be transformed through representing them in a certain way. For instance, 
the cover image on this thesis contrasts the vision of BEE to transform the 
Bagamoyo landscape into vast, straight lines of sugarcane plants (left side) with 
the material realities that Barabaig herders are still residing on the land, grazing 
and watering their cattle, and no bush has been cleared for plantation (right side). 
While the company executives discursively sustained the project as an imminent 
success, the reality is that not a single sugarcane has been planted and no-one 
has yet been resettled. 
The approach outlined above is useful for the kind of analysis performed in 
this thesis, comparing proposed and achieved outcomes, since it shows the 
importance of analysing discourse in relation to ‘other objects, elements or 
moments’ (Fairclough, 2010:4). Similarly, drawing on Bhaskar (1998), McKee 
(2009) describes the possibility to ‘contrast the discursive with a more grounded 
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focus on the empirical world and the active agents within it’ (p. 478). This, 
McKee argues, opens up for a scrutiny of how policies are implemented, their 
material effects and ‘their unforeseen and unintended consequences, as well as 
their outward limits’ (p. 479). 
In general, I analyse the LSAI narrative in relation to complex contexts, 
focusing on: 1) contradicting narratives and 2) contradicting materialities. 
Contradicting narratives refer to stories told by rural residents in Razaba about 
the project implementation process or project impacts, or stories expressed in 
academic literature on, for instance, what the causes of low agricultural 
productivity are. Contradicting materialities refer to findings from observations 
on-site of, for instance, unpredictable weather, the status of project 
implementation and ongoing land use and livelihood activities. In Table 1 in 
Paper III, these contradicting materialities are called ‘real-world’ outcomes, as 
opposed to representations created by project proponents. 
Returning to the issue of contradicting narratives, to identify which narratives 
will ultimately have ‘socially constructive effects’, for instance by being 
implemented in policy or concrete action (Fairclough 2010:5), it is necessary to 
bring power relations into the analysis. Discourse is used as a means to gain 
influence, so those with more influence in society are more likely to gain socially 
constructive effects with their narratives. My research supports the perception 
that it is often impossible to identify one truth. Rather, stories overlap and 
diverge, sometimes creating an indecipherable mess. If one were to attempt to 
compare different narratives, one would need to consider the social positions 
from which they are produced (Inglis, 2012). Thus, when outlining conflicting 
discourses or narratives, representations produced by influential and resourceful 
actors should be more critically scrutinised (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). 
For instance, competing narratives on whether residents on Razaba Ranch are 
‘invaders’, as stated by high-level officials and company representatives, or 
whether the land is actually rightfully theirs to use, as claimed by some residents, 
do not have equal opportunity to be considered ‘real’. Thus, the dominating 
version of ‘invaders’ influences the actions taken, in this case leasing land to an 
investor and planning for physical displacement of the residents. 
As indicated in on page 35 in Chapter 1, a focus on critically examining 
dominating narratives does not exclude actors from less influential social 
positions from the analysis. Even though rural residents in and around Razaba 
Ranch are not part of producing the dominating narrative under scrutiny, their 
actions are sometimes explicitly visible and they are also in between the lines, 
that is, they constitute a major share of the ‘excess’; the ‘processes and 
interactions, histories, solidarities and attachments that cannot be reconfigured 
according to plan’ (Li, 2007a:277). Thus, the rural residents ‘do not disappear 
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into discourse but appear in its interstices, subordinated by structures over which 
they exert pressure’ (Prakash, 1994:1482). In fact, my initial interest in 
investigating the impacts of LSAIs on rural residents and their livelihoods was 
the very reason why I reversed the gaze to the more resourceful LSAI proponents 
and their narratives in my analysis.
4.2 Research design
Data collection and analysis in this thesis was guided by the three research 
questions and performed through case study methodology. Overall, I applied an 
explorative and iterative process, where empirical work served to identify 
relevant theoretical perspectives and orientate the thesis within theoretical 
debates, and where theoretical concepts discovered in the process informed 
upcoming empirical work and helped sharpen interview questions and analysis. 
According to Yin (2009), case studies which reflect theoretical propositions 
often have such an iterative nature, where the research focus is successively 
refined and established. In the final stage of reflection and clarification, the 
contribution of the thesis was distilled and the cover story took shape (an 
overview of the research process is provided in Figure 6, and it is described in 
more detail in section 4.6). With my natural science background, I applied a 
cross-disciplinary approach, having no set discipline from which I set out my 
investigation. This approach further enabled inductive research, since I 
identified relevant literature based on empirical findings and relevant themes of 
investigation, where ethnographies of aid and development failure in particular 
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4.2.1 A case study approach
A qualitative case study is a useful approach to investigate a contemporary 
phenomenon within its context (Yin, 2009). Moreover, a case study 
methodology offers a useful tool to explore different representations of reality 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006), where one can look for the complexity of a case and its 
interaction with contexts (Stake, 1995). Alternating between interviews with 
LSAI proponents, mainly based in Dar es Salaam and Stockholm and data 
collection on the project site allowed me to study the connections, or 
disconnections, between narratives supporting the Bagamoyo project in relation 
to contradicting narratives and materialities on site over time, in order to 
understand how this interplay produced delays and development failure. In 
addition, a case study approach fitted well with my iterative research design, 
since case studies are often inductive, where the approach is that one starts with 
finding out about the case and then proceeds to identify relevant theories to 
explain empirical observations (Gillham, 2000). 
In order to investigate the case in relation to its context, I used discourse 
analysis as the main data analysis method (described further in section 4.6.1), 
investigating patterns of shared representations and assumptions across in the 
LSAI narrative and how the narrative was produced, circulated and consumed.
Furthermore, discourse analysis made it possible to analyse the relationship 
between these statements and contradicting narratives and materialities 
(Fairclough, 2010). 
Cases are commonly selected to serve one particular purpose, but when more 
is discovered they may prove to be cases of something else than originally 
intended. As stated by C. Lund (2014): ‘Carefully selecting the cases poses no 
small problem. How and when does one know whether or for what a case is 
critical? How will one even know what it was about before it is studied?’(p. 227)
While the cases selected for this research were initially chosen in order to 
study impacts, they became cases of development failure. As outlined in Chapter 
1, the pilot study in 2012 (empirical task 1 in Figure 6) showed that almost none 
of the reported investments had any project activities on the ground. At least two 
investors were allegedly ‘progressing’, however. Since it was no longer possible 
to investigate the impacts of materialised projects, which was the initial 
intention, there was an important shift in focus for the research project. However, 
the idea to study impacts still lingered when the two cases were selected: The 
Swedish investment in Bagamoyo district aiming for large-scale sugarcane 
production and the Belgian/Tanzanian investment in Kigoma Rural district 
(which later became Uvinza district) aiming for palm oil production on 4253 
hectares. The Kigoma case was studied in data collection phases 2 and 3, during 
approximately 2.5 months living in a village affected by the investment. 
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However, for reasons explained later, this thesis is based solely on empirical data 
from the Bagamoyo case study, although my field work in Kigoma contributed 
some important methodological insights that are included in this section, where 
relevant. 
The Bagamoyo case is a suitable case to address the research questions in at 
least three aspects: i) It provides a case of delayed investment that eventually 
failed to materialise. ii) The investment has received unprecedented political 
support, situated at the centre of Tanzanian policy development and closely 
linked to the Tanzanian government and Swedish development aid policy, which 
makes its failure to deliver proposed outcomes even more interesting to 
investigate. iii) The research benefited from my previous knowledge about the 
project obtained through my employment at the Sida Helpdesk. Thus, in this 
thesis the failed Bagamoyo project is the unit of analysis illustrating a case of 
the more general phenomenon of development failure. 
4.2.2 An overview of field work and thesis data 
The field work was divided into: 1) Observations and interviews with residents 
on and around Razaba Ranch and 2) interviews in Dar es Salaam and Stockholm. 
The field work consisted of six distinct periods of data collection in 2012-2017
(see Table 1), with the exception of interviews with Sida staff. 
Table 1. Overview of data collection phases and their main purpose.
Phase 1 March 2012 Pilot study, validating status of LSAI
Phase 2 April 2013 Broad exploration of narratives of proponents of LSAI and of 
local communities  
Phase 3 Feb-April 2014 General update on LSAI narrative, contradicting narratives and 
materialities
Phase 4 July 2014 Further exploration of LSAI narrative in the face of repeated 
delays, contradicting narratives and materialities
Phase 5 March 2016 Further exploration of LSAI narrative in the face of repeated 
delays, contradicting narratives and materialities
Phase 6 Mar-April 2017 Follow-up interviews to investigate the LSAI narrative after the 
company’s loss of rights of occupancy
In total, this thesis builds on 79 interviews33. Of these, 10 interviews had the 
character of background interviews with, for instance, Tanzanian state officials 
33 If field work in Kigoma is included, a total of 124 interviews were conducted, plus 14 focus 
group discussions and participatory exercises in Kigoma.
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around more general issues on land, regulations and the status of LSAI 
nationally. The other 69 interviews were case-specific. Of these, 30 interviews 
(43 percent) took place in local communities in and around Razaba Ranch and 
39 interviews (57 percent) were mainly conducted in Dar es Salaam and 
Stockholm. Throughout the research, I held interviews at the Sida headquarters
in Stockholm and had informal discussions with Sida staff at seminars. This 
enabled me to collect data about Sida on a more frequent and irregular basis (see 
Appendix 1 for a list of interviews performed).
Apart from interviews, the thesis builds on analysis of key policy 
documents and corporate documents produced between 2006 and 2017. The 
scope of documents included documents which were frequently referred to, 
which enjoyed broad support and played a pivotal role in producing and 
reproducing the LSAI narrative (Neumann, 2003). Broadly, these can be 
divided into key Tanzanian policy documents, Sida documents (policies and 
concept notes, meeting notes, decisions, assessments), and corporate 
documents produced by SEKAB and BEE, the latter category being a hitherto 
underutilised source in research on LSAI (Kuns, Visser, & Wästfelt, 2016) (see 
Appendix 3 for a list of documents analysed). Documents related to the Sida 
assessment in 2012 were shared by Sida officers or requested from Sida’s 
archives. When citing documents from Sida and the investor in particular, I 
was careful to ensure that these are the publically available versions, and not 
partly classified versions. Most other documents were downloaded from 
websites. Apart from these policy and corporate documents, NGO reports, 
Swedish and Tanzanian newspapers and, on occasion, TV documentaries, were 
important sources of data. They provided news related to LSAI and the 
Bagamoyo case, but also formed an important part of the analysis of key points 
of criticism regarding the project and proponents’ responses to this criticism 
(deflection practices described in Paper III). Websites were used to obtain 
other information about the company, its vision and plans. Podcasts about 
Swedish Development Aid also provided important data.
4.3 Data collection methods 
A key feature of case studies is multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2009). When 
trying to understand, for instance, complex land allocation processes such as the 
Bagamoyo investment and contradicting narratives of how and why these 
develop, use of multiple methods enabled an overall understanding and provided 
a means to maximise triangulation and validate data. This section outlines the 
three interview methods used to collect data on the LSAI narrative and 
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contradicting narratives, and observation as the method to investigate 
contradicting materialities, and reflects on some challenges in data collection.
4.3.1 Sampling of informants
Throughout, informants were selected by non-probability sampling, the opposite 
to random sampling, an appropriate method to gain rich information from in-
depth studies of a few cases (Bernard 2006). Thus, given the research questions, 
investigating the LSAI narrative and contradicting narratives related to the 
Bagamoyo project, the selection of informants was biased towards individuals
who supported, or were targeted by, the investment. Bernard (2006) divides non-
probability sampling into three different categories: (1) Convenience (or 
haphazard) sampling, (2) purposive sampling, where different informants are 
interviewed for different purposes, and (3) snowball or respondent-driven 
sampling. While all informants were sampled through non-probability sampling, 
a mixture of snowballing, purposive and convenience sampling was used, as is 
indicated where appropriate. 
4.3.2 Group discussions
Focus group discussions proved to be a particularly useful method, given the 
research questions, since they enabled collection of data about content and 
process, not about personal attributes (Bernard, 2006). However, instead of 
focus group discussions, here I call them group discussions given the 
convenience sampling method used, that is, grabbing whoever was available 
(Bernard, 2006). Thus, the groups did not have the planned composition and 
restricted number of participants which are key features of focus group
discussions. In total, six group discussions were performed (Appendix 2).
(Focus) group discussions are also useful to obtain a range of responses in 
order to gain overview information on a selected topic, which can later be probed 
using other methods (Gillham, 2000). The discussions helped me gain an 
overview of residents’ narratives about the project implementation process. I 
used these discussions to define questions for individual interviews in and 
around Razaba Ranch, in order to get a better understanding of certain events 
and processes. I also used these discussions to define questions for proponents 
of the investment, in order to get their response to local people’s stories.
In one sub-village where we stopped each time we visited the ranch, we met
with the chair every time. Other residents also usually joined us to discuss the 
current situation. However, the group that gathered had an over-representation 
of male informants and, when women were present, they did not say much. To 
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compensate for that, I deliberately encouraged women to speak and, when we 
stopped along the road for interviews, I mainly selected women as informants. 
All discussions were recorded with the permission of the participants who 
were there at the onset of the discussion. However, due to the nature of the 
discussions, with many people talking simultaneously and sometimes far away 
from the microphone, they proved difficult to transcribe. This meant that I relied 
heavily on interpretation and my personal notes for analysis of this data.
4.3.3 Semi-structured interviews and informal discussions 
In semi-structured interviews, the researcher asks open questions within themes 
that are selected beforehand (Gillham, 2000). Semi-structured interviews are 
commonly used when themes of inquiry are known, but when flexibility is 
needed regarding the order, how and for how long different issues are raised 
(Robson & McCartan, 2016).
Semi-structured interviews were the main technique applied in individual 
interviews and provided an opportunity to probe for detail, for example on issues 
previously raised in group discussions. In total, 57 semi-structured interviews 
were performed (Appendix 2). These interviews also served the important 
purpose of triangulating data from group discussions and other individual 
conversations. Topical themes and sub-questions were identified beforehand but 
applied in a flexible order depending on how the interview developed. If new 
relevant information was provided, the set-up allowed for improvised follow-up 
questions (see Appendix 2 for overarching topical themes for each of the data 
collection phases). 
Semi-structured interviews in Razaba Ranch were performed with village 
chairs, people participating in the company’s training of various kinds and other 
smallholders targeted by investment or outgrower schemes. A limited number of 
semi-structured interviews were also performed with the chair of the sub-village 
who we met more frequently34. The length of the interviews varied, where those 
with informants sampled by convenience tended to be shorter (see Appendix 1).
Semi-structured interviews were also the main method used to collect data 
from proponents of LSAI, since this approach is particularly useful for 
interviews with high-level bureaucrats, where the researcher is in control of the 
topics and can thus make efficient use of their time, but has the freedom to follow 
up leads (Bernard, 2006). Some additional data were obtained through questions 
and answers in email conversations with one Sida officer and one company 
34 Informants and their residency in and around Razaba Ranch have been anonymised in order 
to protect them from repercussions.
97
representative throughout, and brief follow-up interviews over the phone during 
the last phase of data collection (phase 6 in Table 1). 
Another important source of information was more informal discussions, or 
chats. For instance, when travelling between sub-villages in Razaba Ranch, a 
bridge was sometimes being repaired or a tree had to be removed from the road. 
People from a dala-dala (mini-bus) would get out, those on piki-pikis 
(motorbikes) would stop and others would join to observe, or help, which 
provided ample time for informal chats about the investment. Furthermore, we 
sometimes picked up hitchhiking residents within the ranch, which also proved 
to provide important opportunities for short conversations. Altogether, informal 
discussions provided pieces of information which added to my understanding of 
people’s perceptions about the ongoing investment, and actually meant that, by 
the end, I had met people from most sub-villages within the ranch.
Likewise, informal chats proved important in Dar es Salaam and Stockholm.  
For instance, by staying at a hotel that was popular among expatriates in Dar es 
Salaam, I gained valuable information when bumping into key informants and 
other relevant actors in the courtyard. Informal chats with participants at Sida 
and NGO seminars arranged in Stockholm were also a valuable source of 
information.
4.3.4 Observations
In order to understand contradicting materialities, I made observations on the 
project site of, for instance, rural residents who had been employed by the 
company, new houses that had been constructed or substantial charcoal 
production. These observations helped confirm or reject representations from 
informants and guided my understanding of material realities. Most importantly, 
I repeatedly observed that no land preparation had been initiated and no 
sugarcane had been planted, thus empirically confirming the relationship 
between proposed and achieved outcomes, as outlined in Papers I-III.
4.4 Field work in and around Razaba Ranch
The village chair, mwenyekiti, sits next to me and the interpreter. Our sticky, red 
plastic chairs are placed on the grass, under a big tree outside the village council 
offices – two barracks facing each other. I ask about the resettlement process and 
the chair reports that approximately 50 villagers who had moved to Razaba Ranch 
to farm will be resettled by the project. They have been promised that they can 
choose between compensation in kind, that is, new houses on new sites, or 
compensation in cash. However, the villagers have become sceptical about the 
timeline. From watching the progress of a new house in the village, funded by the 
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investor as part of a construction training programme, they could see it took a 
very long time to build. Therefore, the chair tells us, the villagers are not 
convinced that compensation in kind is a preferable option. 
He also tells us that the villagers perceive the 3000 hectares of land in their 
area targeted by the investor as theirs, but the village land use plan, funded by the 
investor, demarcates it as general land. That particular area near the river, he says, 
has more fertile soils, so they would like to keep it. But, he says, when the district 
commissioner comes and you are the village chair, you have no power. ‘We have 
been given orders’.
Later that day, we interview an old lady farming a three-acre plot on the land 
targeted for investment, growing mainly rice and maize. Even though she has 
been encouraged to only grow annual crops, awaiting resettlement, she tells us 
that she and her sister plant mango trees whenever they change plots, for the fruit, 
but also to leave a sign that someone is using the land.
After a while, another (young, male) villager joins our conversation. He works 
as a boda boda (motorbike) driver, and tells us that his father was hired as a forest 
guard in order to keep out residents who cut trees for charcoal production. He 
believes that the investment has been invented by the bordering national park – if 
there was an investor planning to plant sugarcane here, why would they not allow 
the residents to cut trees, he asks. It seems more likely, from his perspective, that 
the park wants to expand its area (which it has done repeatedly in the past).
Field work on and around the project site was carried out by me and 
interpreters35, with two to three visits per year (apart from 2015) during data 
collection phases 1-5 in 2012- 2016 (see Table 1). This enabled me to follow the 
implementation process of the Bagamoyo project over time and compare the 
narratives of project proponents with narratives such as those outlined above by 
people targeted by the investment, and also with observed contradicting 
materialities. 
Since people live dispersed in several sub-villages within Razaba Ranch, this 
made it difficult to get an overview of all aggregations of houses. Moreover, 
certain sub-villages were inaccessible during the rainy season. Therefore, group 
discussions and individual interviews were performed almost exclusively 
through convenience sampling. We therefore met with partly different 
constellations of people representing different social positions each time we 
visited; those who were present and/or joined the discussion when we arrived in 
a sub-village, or when we stopped by a house along the road intersecting the 
estate. Even when using convenience sampling, only individuals who are 
relevant to the study in question are interviewed (Bernard, 2006).
35 Most interviews in Bagamoyo were interpreted by our Tanzanian colleague from Sokoine 
University of Agriculture. On one occasion a district officer assisted with interpretation, and in the 
field work in 2016 a Tanzanian friend helped translate.
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Within the villages adjacent to Razaba Ranch we sampled purposively, for 
instance targeting the village chair because he was most likely to provide us with 
information about the status of the implementation process and the overall 
dynamics between the village, the government and the investor. Furthermore, we 
interviewed people who took part in outgrower training and training to prepare for 
resettlement, with the purpose of understanding their representations of the 
training provided and whether they understood the outgrower programme, its 
potential risks and opportunities. The village chair was often asked to provide us 
with names of these informants, that is, snow-ball sampling was applied. Since 
people in official positions were predominantly male, the gender aspect was 
skewed in the sampling. This is one of the drawbacks of applying convenience 
sample, that subgroups which are more accessible are likely to be over-
represented. As indicated above, I tried to compensate for this in various ways.
4.4.1 The use of interpreters and recordings
Performing field work in another culture and in another language posed major 
challenges in making sense of what people said, how they acted and why. I 
applied three strategies to compensate for this and adapt to local customs and 
norms: First, I took courses in Kiswahili, which enabled me to greet people 
properly (which is a key social feature in Tanzania). Therefore, I was always 
able to introduce myself and pose initial interview questions in Kiswahili.
Rather quickly, I learned enough Kiswahili to recognise whether key parts of 
the informant’s reply were translated. Second, I was careful to adhere to the 
local custom of always initiating our visits by obtaining permit to conduct field 
work from the District Executive Director. On arriving in local communities, 
we always started by greeting the village chair and the village council 
members, showed the permit and carefully presented ourselves and the project. 
Third, I selected some key informants who I revisited on each field work 
occasion, in order to get to know these informants better. While the ideal 
situation would always be to speak the local language fluently, an actual 
benefit with interpreters was that translation allowed time for me to reflect 
upon relevant follow-up questions in the interview situation. 
4.4.2 Note taking
Another benefit with having an interpreter was that it provided space for noting 
down valuable reflections during the interview. These reflections about what the 
informant said, and how, later became an important input to the analysis. In 
addition, since sitting down with one person usually ended with a whole group 
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joining in, I made sure to take notes about whether the response from the key 
informant changed in any way, in order to understand whether the other people 
joining in could have had an impact on the data. In between interviews, I also 
made notes of relevant observations on-site and from informal chats, in order to 
remember a maximum level of details. In the evenings, I went through the notes 
and revised them. As pointed out by Bernard (2006), recording never replaces 
note taking, since notes cover matters that recordings do not, for example
environmental descriptions, the context of the interviews and reactions among 
informants.
4.4.3 Reflections on field work in rural areas
As indicated in the beginning of this Chapter, I performed field work in rural 
Kigoma and rural Bagamoyo. In particular, the 2.5-month field work, living in 
a village in Kigoma confirmed that performing field work in another culture and 
in another language is challenging in many different ways. Therefore, I draw on 
the following anecdote in order to provide some methodological reflections:
After having spent three weeks in the village in Kigoma, we (a Swedish 
Master’s student and I) were informed by one of our interpreters that there were 
rumours about us. Some people thought that we were Belgian inspectors looking 
for land, others thought that we were doctors. One of the more surprising 
rumours was that we were Germans searching for beacons from the time of 
German colonial rule that allegedly marked resource-rich village sites. Getting 
access to this information was valuable for us, for many reasons. 
First, we realised that, despite our sincere and well-planned efforts to 
introduce ourselves and why we were there, these rumours had been sparked and 
spread. Accordingly, we adapted our introduction of ourselves and our research. 
For instance, instead of using the word utafiti, which in Kiswahili means 
research or investigation, we introduced ourselves as wanafunzi, students, to 
avoid the risk of being thought of as investigators of land. All villagers were 
familiar with the word wanafunzi from sending their children to school, and it 
also became clear that students were perceived as having quite low status and 
were not perceived as a threat. For example, one village informant said ‘You are 
only a student, how could you respond to this question?’. 
Second, the information revealed that the relationship between researcher
and informant is rarely unproblematic. The researcher is always recognised and 
trusted by some, taken advantage of by some, and not by others. People may 
want help on an issue, may say what they think the researcher wants to hear or 
exaggerate the negative impacts in the hope of support. I was seen as a teacher, 
a doctor, someone who can give them a voice, and also as ‘only a student’, or as 
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an inspector or land grabber. On many occasions, people’s expectations of what 
I could bring very likely increased due to the fact that I am white. 
What these rumours also revealed was a mistrust of ‘outsiders’. Obviously 
the suspicion towards us stemmed partly from the fact that our questions focused 
on land, access to land and village borders, only a few years after the villagers 
perceived they had been robbed of land by the investor. This story confirmed 
that it takes time to build rapport and trust, and the importance of triangulation, 
since it is important to understand the rationale behind the answers obtained. 
This was particularly important to me as a female Swedish researcher, familiar 
with other norms and ways of seeing. All these insights assisted me in relating 
to data collected in the Bagamoyo case.
Another particularly evident risk as a Swedish person interviewing people in 
Bagamoyo was of course being perceived as aligned with the Swedish investor. 
However, I found that visiting the Bagamoyo site repeatedly over time resulted 
in some informants recognising me and, over time, learning that I was 
independent from both the Tanzanian state and the investor. 
4.5 Interviews in Dar es Salaam and Stockholm
Interviews with key proponents of the LSAI development strategy took place 
almost exclusively in offices in Stockholm, Sweden, and Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, with the main aim of outlining the LSAI narrative, for LSAI in general 
and for the Bagamoyo investment in particular. Key informants included Sida 
officers involved in handling the company’s second (granted) application to 
Sida, and other Sida officers, both at Sida headquarters in Stockholm and at the 
Swedish Embassy in Dar es Salaam. Through our Tanzanian collaboration 
partner, I was privileged to access two state officials positioned close to 
President Kikwete, in top positions within Big Results Now and SAGCOT.
Other key informants included two company executives and three foreign 
consultants they had employed. At least one interview, or often more, with 
informants from Sida, the Tanzanian government and the Bagamoyo company 
was performed in all the first five phases of field work (see Table 1). In phase 6, 
I interviewed a Sida official and a company representative, but was never able 
to obtain an interview with state officials. 
Apart from these interviews, I also performed what I call background 
interviews, with one minister, employees in several ministries and authorities, 
national and international NGOs, university professors and researchers (see 
Appendix 2). This material mainly informed Paper I, Paper IV and the kappa,
and provided important understanding of, for instance, matters related to land.
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In my very first meeting with the managing director of the company, he knew 
who I was and that I had authored the critical Sida Helpdesk assessment. He was, 
understandably, hostile towards me. However, during that interview, I managed 
to improve our relationship by thoroughly describing the scope of the assignment 
from Sida, and described the changes that I had found in the ESIA. He seemed 
surprised and understood why I had been critical, and the atmosphere improved 
substantially. After refusing to let me record interviews, at my third interview, 
he did agree to recording, much owing to the CEO, who also participated and 
wanted to be open with opinions. Most Sida and state officials agreed to 
recording without much discussion.
Interviews with company representatives were performed in Swedish, apart 
from when my Tanzanian colleague or hired foreign consultants participated. 
Just like at Razaba Ranch, I prepared topical themes and sub-questions 
beforehand (Appendix 1), but applied them in a flexible order in line with how 
the interview developed. Informants were usually contacted beforehand via 
email or telephone with a request for interview. As shown in Appendix 1, many 
of these interviews were rather long (2-3 hours) and could thus be considered as 
being of a more in-depth nature. In the few cases where interviews were not 
recorded, I took notes on my laptop during the interview and revised the notes 
directly afterwards. Fewer quotes are presented from these interviews, due to the 
difficulty in remembering exact phrases, but it was still possible to cover the 
essence of the responses. 
As indicated, email correspondence was used, particularly with the managing 
director of the company and one Sida officer, to pose a number of follow-up 
questions in between my Tanzania visits. 
One advantage with performing these ‘policy level’ interviews was that no 
interpreter was needed since they were performed in English, or even Swedish, 
my own and the company executives’ mother tongue.
Reflections on interviews with policymakers 
‘I have been cheated many times. People come here and we have good 
discussions. Then they twist it behind my back’ (interview, top state official, 
March 2016).
As indicated by the quote, interviews with policymakers sometimes entailed 
friction and emotion. This section briefly outlines some related methodological 
implications. 
One interview, with a different top state official than that quoted above, 
illustrates an aggressive response to information perceived as threatening. 
Before the interview, the officer had asked for a project description and I had 
emailed our research application (written three years earlier), which basically set 
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the scene of poorly substantiated statements that millions of hectares of land 
being grabbed and our intention to investigate the actual impacts on the ground. 
While we were critical of the exaggerated statements about grabbed land, the 
state official interpreted the document as though we uncritically believed in these 
numbers. When we came to his office, he was furious and he had invited another 
top state official and two TIC officers to join the conversation. Most of the 
interview comprised his upset monologue about our (outdated) research aim, 
despite my repeated attempts to explain the shift in our research focus. He 
walked around in the room in anger, his face flushed. Given the one-sidedness 
of the interview, with the informant being quite oblivious of any other questions, 
the data at first seemed rather useless. However, when subjected to discourse 
analysis, the interview ended up providing highly relevant data and interesting 
quotes regarding his perceptions about the critique of the LSAI development 
strategy in Tanzania, as outlined in Paper III. Furthermore, this over-heated 
interview situation had made him invite another top state official, whom I 
subsequently met with repeatedly and who provided important data, and it 
provided me with the representations of the TIC staff. 
Furthermore, after the interview, the top state official called the managing 
director of the Bagamoyo company and asked ‘Who are these people?’ (which 
the managing director himself told me when we bumped into each other at the 
hotel courtyard later that day). This provided interesting data about the investor-
state relationship, as discussed in Paper III.
In another heated interview with the state official invited to the interview just 
outlined, my questions about failure provoked him to the extent that he 
aggressively started listing all the ongoing projects within SAGCOT, data I had 
tried to access through more ‘neutral’ questions about the status of LSAIs in 
Tanzania earlier in the interview. In addition, his critical responses to such 
provoking questions also helped me revisit and clarify my arguments.
In summary, provoking questions or information most likely provided more 
elaborate data from the informants and valuable means to scrutinise the solidity of 
my own research questions and claims. However, if information sent beforehand 
is outdated and/or misinterpreted, such transparency can become an obstacle to 
performing constructive and useful interviews, depending on the research aim. 
Nevertheless, even though a detailed description is outside the scope of this thesis, 
relations with some informants have deteriorated and more relationships will 
perhaps be negatively impacted when this thesis becomes public. Perhaps Mosse 
(2006) was right when he stated that ‘what anthropologists know is inseparable 
from their relationship with those they study – the epistemology is relational – but 
ethnographic writing breaks fieldwork relations, cuts the network, and erects 
boundaries: it is necessarily anti-social’ (p. 935).
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4.6 Data analysis 
Data analysis largely consisted of discourse analysis of interviews and policy 
documents (see Appendix 1 and 3), with the main aim of addressing RQ1, 
about how the LSAI narrative was produced and sustained in relation to 
contradicting narratives and materialities, including an analysis of how 
knowledge about the project was produced, circulated and consumed between
the LSAI proponents. In addition to discourse analysis, in this section I 
describe how I analysed the empirical trajectories resulting from simplified 
narratives, interlinked delays and failure.
4.6.1 Discourse analysis 
Discourse analysis was performed, inspired by different approaches to discourse 
analysis and post-colonial and post-development theory, selecting tools and 
concepts I found methodologically relevant to analyse the LSAI narrative and 
the design of the Bagamoyo project in line with RQ1. In summary, I performed 
the analysis of the LSAI narrative along the following three themes: 
1 Analysis of representations. 
2 Analysis of practices and value assumptions. 
3 Analysis of circulation and consumption of knowledge. 
Across these themes, I analysed the influence of the private actor on how 
representations, practices and assumptions were produced and consumed.
Analysis of representations 
A narrative is constituted by representations, statements about what or how 
something or someone ‘is’, produced from social positions. Investigating 
representations is an important part of discourse analysis, since they reveal how 
something is perceived from within a particular discourse (Neumann, 2003). The 
analysis was divided into two parts: i) Investigating representations among 
project proponents in relation to contradicting narratives and materialities from 
past research and experience and ii) investigating representations among project 
proponents in relation to contemporary contradicting narratives and materialities 
at and around the project site.
The first part of the analysis, mainly outlined in Paper III, identified 
contradicting narratives and materialities from development studies, post-
colonial theory and past experience of LSAI in Tanzania. This is referred to in 
Paper III as ‘accumulated academic knowledge’, showing how similar ideas 
have not worked historically, and compared with the LSAI narrative. 
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The second part of the analysis was performed in a similar manner, but 
instead of comparing the LSAI narrative with accumulated academic 
knowledge, it was compared with contradicting narratives and materialities in 
and around Razaba Ranch. Combined, these two parts thus examined to what 
extent past and current contradicting narratives and materialities were reflected 
in project design, and the underpinning LSAI narrative.
There was another particular kind of representation that required further 
inquiry. As shown by Li (2007b) and Ferguson (1990), a core element of 
constructing development discourse includes the process of ‘problem 
description’. This approach to discourse analysis emphasises that discourses and 
their associated policies actively construct problems, they do not passively 
address them (Bacchi, 2009). As outlined in Chapter 2, such ‘problem 
representations’ (Bacchi, 2009:xi) are particularly interesting since problems 
and their assumed causes often ‘determine’ which solutions are presented as 
inevitable. Thus, they form the basis of any development narrative. Paper III 
investigated such problem representations in the LSAI narrative and whether 
these matched academic literature and statements from local people. 
As discussed in Paper III, drawing on Bacchi (2009), to study 
problematisations can be about teasing out the implied problem in a policy, 
where the problem is identified through reading off the suggested solution. For 
instance, when the SAGCOT policy suggests effectivisation of agriculture, it 
implicitly points to inefficiency of existing agricultural practices as the problem. 
Analysis of practices and value assumptions
Discourses are created and sustained through social practices; everyday 
practices, expressions and interactions (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Within this 
theme, I investigated discursive and material practices used to produce and 
sustain the LSAI narrative in general and the Bagamoyo project design in 
particular. It entailed three strands of investigation: i) Analysis of simplifications 
underpinning the LSAI narrative and the Bagamoyo project design. ii) Analysis 
of what I call ‘deflection practices’, used by the LSAI proponents to sustain the 
narrative and the image of the project as an imminent success. iii) Analysis of 
shared value assumptions underpinning the LSAI narrative. 
First, I analysed discursive practices of simplification, written and spoken 
statements reducing complexity. In this analysis, I focused on what proponents 
selected and disregarded in order to create: a) the linear narrative about LSAI as 
a development strategy and b) the project design of the Bagamoyo project. 
To identify simplifications in the LSAI narrative, I iterated between 
literature, policy documents, interviews and observations on-site, progressively 
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identifying simplified representations, as described in Papers II and III. This 
analysis helped confirm a disjuncture between policy and complex contexts.
In the analysis of simplifications in project design, Scott (1998) was 
particularly helpful. As I will return to in Paper II, using this book, I identified 
different types of simplifications in the planning of large schemes, which helped 
me structure my data into themes. Moreover, I drew on findings within the post-
development literature on depoliticising (Escobar, 1993; Ferguson, 1990; Li, 
2007b) in my analysis of what was being selected and disregarded. 
Second, while I explored simplification as a discursive device, I also wanted 
to investigate material practices of simplification, which can provide an 
important complement to linguistic analysis (Wedel et al., 2005). In particular, I 
analysed bureaucratic procedures such as guidelines and assessments and how 
these were used to render socio-political matters technical. Moreover, I analysed 
how they were referred to in order to deflect critique. For example, Sida referred 
to its risk assessment to show that substantial risks facing smallholder farmers 
had been considered (see Paper III). Thus, material practices simultaneously 
reproduce simplified bureaucratic processes, and are shaped by them, by 
conforming to prevailing regulations and norms (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). 
Altogether, the analysis of discursive and material practices contributed to my 
findings about both the simplified and resilient character of the LSAI narrative.
After my analysis of simplification in the LSAI and project narratives, in the 
second strand of my investigation of practices, I wanted to investigate the 
practices used to deflect contradicting narratives and materialities towards LSAI 
as a development strategy and towards the Bagamoyo project. As outlined in 
section 3.1.5, resilient narratives draw on the notion that discourses tend to 
render certain ways of seeing natural and others irrelevant. However, rather than 
just stating that fact, I studied how this resilience was discursively produced and 
sustained. Maintaining the image of dominating representations as natural 
requires a ‘comprehensive discursive effort’ and therefore analysis of how 
certain discourses delimit and dominate others is an important part of discourse 
analysis (Neumann, 2003:57). 
I wanted to investigate this discursive effort, what it consisted of and the 
dynamics taking place. For the analysis performed in Paper III, I extracted main 
points of criticism advanced over the course of planning and implementing the 
Bagamoyo investment. To map the LSAI proponents’ responses to this critique, I 
analysed public statements specifically written in response to criticism and 
statements in media articles and interviews where the proponents had been 
confronted with contradicting narratives and materialities. I identified a range of 
deflection practices, which I categorised into nine categories. I then selected the 
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types of deflection practices used by the proponents to respond to key points of 
criticism, as outlined in Paper III.
The third and final strand of investigation entailed an analysis of another 
pattern discerned in the LSAI narrative, namely patterns of shared value 
assumptions, ‘particular meanings about what is good or desirable’ (Fairclough, 
2003:55) among the proponents. Value assumptions render certain types of 
knowledge irrelevant, while promoting other types of knowledge. They thereby 
facilitate various practices applied to deflect contradicting narratives and 
materialities described above, and help sustain the narrative. Assumptions were 
analysed through teasing out implicit understandings underpinning statements in 
policy documents and interviews, using post-colonial literature and other critical 
studies of development, as will be outlined in Paper III. 
The circulation and consumption of knowledge
All the above helped me understand how certain representations and knowledge 
about the LSAI development strategy, and the Bagamoyo project, were 
produced, and by whom. I then focused on how that knowledge was circulated 
and consumed among LSAI proponents. As stated by Escobar (1993), discourse 
analysis offers a way to explore both the production and consumption of 
discourse. The analysis traced proposed beneficial results of the project and other 
statements about the project’s imminent success back to the initial sources of 
this information, and to what extent and how they had been circulated and 
consumed by other LSAI proponents. The analysis paid particular attention to 
the extent to which production, circulation and consumption of knowledge was 
influenced by the close collaboration with a private actor. 
4.6.2 Investigating empirical trajectories of failure
The findings from the discourse analysis addressing RQ1, how the LSAI was 
produced, formed the basis for investigating RQ2, that is, what role the LSAI 
narrative played in the failure of the Bagamoyo project. The aim of the analysis 
presented in this section was to understand how simplified representations in 
project plans were traversed by unexpected events, how they ‘intersect[ed] with 
other processes, creating particular conjunctures’ (Li, 2007b:1), causing 
unpredictable chain of events, repeated delays in relation to set timelines and, 
ultimately, failure of the investment to materialise. 
Following a case over time is a useful way of comparing what was intended 
with a policy and what was actually established (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). 
Along these lines, my overarching approach was to iterate between interviews 
with proponents of the Bagamoyo investment, on the one hand, and observations 
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and interviews with people on and around the project site, on the other, in the 
course of project implementation (Appendix 2). On each visit to Tanzania, I was 
able to update current promises and timelines from the proponents’ horizon and 
contradicting narratives and materialities on and around Razaba Ranch. One 
finding gradually growing in importance was the repeated delays in relation to 
timelines. While some delays and their causes were mentioned by proponents in 
interviews, other delays and their causes were identified through studying the 
investment over time. 
My iteration between actors and sites over time, triangulating statements within 
and between different groups and individuals, assisted in analysing the 
interlinkages between simplification, delay and failure. With time, delay grew into 
being used as an analytical concept, as outlined in section 3.1.3 and Paper II.
4.7 Research process 
This section describes the research process, with the purpose of providing a 
transparent account of how and why the research focus shifted and narrowed 
down throughout the thesis work, and how I explored theoretical directions in 
line with the iterative research design (see Figure 6 for an overview). In order to 
better explain the logic of the research process, this section also lists some key 
empirical findings that influenced the scope and direction of the thesis. 
4.7.1 Submitting a successful research application
As mentioned, at the time of initiation of this research, few empirical studies of 
the impacts of LSAIs had been performed. Collaboration with researchers at 
SLU and the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala resulted in a successful research 
application in 2011, with the title ‘Large scale agro-investments in Africa -
impacts on land access and food security’. In other words, this project started 
out with the purpose of investigating the impacts on local communities of the 
supposedly huge wave of LSAIs sweeping across Africa. The focus on Tanzania 
was a pragmatic choice, in that there was considerable experience from 
Tanzania, including the planned Bagamoyo project, within the team. Moreover, 
we had Tanzanian collaboration partners with access to important knowledge 
and a network of informants. Importantly, Tanzania was a relevant focus since 
it was one of the main target countries for large-scale agricultural investment 
(Schoneveld, 2014). 
The pilot study (empirical task 1 in Figure 6) aimed to get an overview of the 
status of LSAIs and actors involved, before selecting investment cases. The 
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findings from the pilot study resulted in Paper I and enabled a more 
geographically focused case study approach for later empirical work.
4.7.2 Setting the theoretical direction of the thesis 
After the pilot study and selection of the two cases in Bagamoyo and Kigoma, 
the empirical work in 2013 was performed in an exploratory manner, keeping 
interview questions open and broad (empirical task 2 in Figure 6, see also 
Appendix 2 for an overarching topical interview themes). The aim was to better 
understand representations and actions of LSAI proponents at national level, and 
of rural residents targeted by the investment. One finding that struck me already 
then was the general discrepancy between the perceptions of these two groups 
of what happened and why, and how a wealth of complexities on the ground, 
which contributed to the standstill of the investment, were often completely 
disregarded in the proponents’ narratives. From then on, this discrepancy 
lingered as one potential research theme: How was this gap between the LSAI 
narrative on what LSAI would solve and how, and the complex context into 
which it would be implemented, possible? 
In the work that followed, I explored a number of theoretical directions and 
found that ethnographies of aid focusing on development failure were especially 
relevant to my cases, in particular Li (2007b), Ferguson (1990) and Mosse 
(2005) (theoretical task 1 in Figure 6). While all these helped me to more clearly 
analyse what I observed in the LSAI narrative, and the gap between policy and 
practice, it was another seminal piece of work that caught my main interest at 
that point (late 2013). Scott’s (1998) observations of simplification behind the 
planning of large schemes in previous centuries strongly resonated with my 
findings and helped me identify an abundance of simplifications in the LSAI 
narrative and the design of the Bagamoyo project. The work of Scott (1998), 
combined with ethnographies of aid and other bodies of literature (including land 
grab literature), helped me structure the data, since I was able to identify 
different types of disregards (Paper II; see also Chapter 3).
Later, a more thorough reading of Scott (1998) (theoretical task 2 in Figure 
6) formed the basis for the conceptual ideas behind Paper II. I started to write 
these down and progressively revised them during the research. Eventually, I 
had plenty of empirical data on delays and it emerged that I could use delay as a 
way to empirically describe how the project failed to deliver purported 
outcomes. Consequently, delay became a more central concept in my work and 
increasingly used as an analytical concept. 
Importantly, the more the thesis was directed towards analysing narratives, 
the more its focus was directed towards the Swedish investment in Bagamoyo –
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the case where I had followed the proponents over a long time, in particular Sida, 
and where I had held repeated interviews with proponents and with the target 
population on and around the investment site over time. A review of land grab 
literature at this stage was also helpful in showing that little in-depth analysis of 
why so many LSAIs had failed had been performed.
The relevance to explain failure of LSAI was also tested in conversations 
with other researchers from different international contexts at several conference 
venues. They confirmed that this was a widespread trend in many other African 
countries. Moreover, I developed a network of PhDs in Tanzania and other 
African countries, which was useful throughout the process for a regular status 
check on other LSAIs, among other things. Furthermore, when the research was 
geared towards investigating development failure, the second case in Kigoma
had also stalled, which served to strengthen the relevance of my research focus. 
The Kigoma case also provided me with a helpful reference point for the 
Bagamoyo case that I might not have seen as clearly otherwise. For example, it 
became clear that SEKAB/BEE enjoyed very strong political support, while the 
Kigoma investment did not. For instance, SEKAB/BEE had considerable 
influence in governmental policy processes and was well connected to 
Tanzanian authorities and ministry staff, whereas company executives in 
Kigoma were not part of these processes and sometimes not even known to 
officials in important positions that we interviewed.
4.7.3 Investigating the subjectivity of failure 
The main purpose of my fifth visit to Tanzania in 2016 (phase 5 in Table 1) was 
to investigate how different actors viewed ‘failure’, and if they would categorise 
the stalled investment as a failure. It became clear that not a single actor would 
admit that LSAI in general, or the case investment, had failed, despite its 
standstill for nearly a decade. Rather, it seemed pertinent for proponents to 
discourage me from using that concept and to prove that LSAI, and the project, 
were imminent successes. 
4.7.4 An increasing focus on resilient development narratives
Paper II outlines the ways in which the LSAI narrative and Bagamoyo project 
design were simplified to the extent that this contributed to development failure, 
but it does not address the mechanisms through which the simplified narrative 
could remain resilient over time to contradicting narratives and materialities. 
This became the focus of Paper III, which also benefited from the wide time span 
over which I followed the investment, showing how a series of contradicting 
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narratives and materialities were dealt with over time. A number of empirical 
and theoretical studies were performed to inform Paper III (empirical tasks 4 and 
5 and theoretical task 3 in Figure 6).
An important insight at this stage was that although there is a wealth of 
literature on the resilience of development narratives, less attention had been 
paid to how this was achieved. Moreover, I realised it had been little studied in 
the context of collaboration with a private sector. Another important insight was 
that even though delay was frequently mentioned as a feature in large projects, 
none of the publications I read discussed delay as an interesting factor in itself, 
or related it to development failure. 
In the process of writing Paper III, an event in Tanzania demanded an 
empirical follow-up: The revoking of the investor’s rights of occupancy, a 
decision made public in November that year. Surely, even the proponents would 
call the case a failure at that point? Follow-up telephone interviews with two key 
informants at policy level were performed to further analyse their relationship to 
failure, providing interesting data for Paper III (empirical task 6 in Figure 6). 
Moreover, the data analysis performed for Paper III made clear that post-colonial 
theory was an important overarching theoretical frame for the paper.
At this stage, I realised that, although the fact that most investments failed to 
materialise was increasingly recognised among policymakers and in the land 
grab literature, little attention was paid to the severe impacts of these land deals 
in limbo. Thus, my findings about impacts of the failed project are an important 
contribution of this thesis. One important input came at a Sida seminar. After 
briefly outlining my findings to an attending Sida officer, she said ‘one has not 
heard anything about impacts from something which never happened’. The 
insight was further strengthened by a conference panel on this particular topic, 
describing the topic of impacts of land deals in limbo36 as under-researched. 
Around this time, I was invited to co-author a paper on aggregated impacts 
from different land pressures in Tanzania, where my research could contribute 
empirical findings on impacts of failed investments (Paper IV).
4.7.5 Cover story
In the final seven months, the research process entailed reflections on findings, 
clarification of concepts, development of conceptual and theoretical 
frameworks, and determination of the contributions of the thesis (theoretical task 
4 in Figure 6). During this time, I also revised Paper II, after it had been rejected 
36 For instance, a panel arranged by PhD students Brigitte Youjin Chung and Marie Gagné at the 
African Studies Association conference in Chicago, November 2016, both studying stalled land 
deals in Africa.
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at first submission, and in line with other comments. This revision was very 
helpful for developing the conceptual work for the thesis as a whole, and for
developing the discussion on the role of delay. Moreover, at this final stage, 
emphasis was put on positioning my findings in relation to literature on resilient 
development narratives in the context of private sector collaboration, or, more 
broadly, in a neoliberal context.
4.8 Reflections on research design and process
I believe that applying an iterative case study research design generally served 
well to investigate the research questions. It allowed me to follow the project 
implementation process over many years, and analyse dominant narratives vis-
à-vis contradicting narratives and materialities over time. In particular, it 
allowed me to study repeated delays, including their drivers and effects. Denzin 
and Lincoln (2008) point out that what was intended to be established or put in 
place through a policy will be faced with a multitude of obstacles and that such 
processes can be addressed through qualitative work with a longitudinal 
perspective. While I do not claim to have performed a longitudinal case study, I 
believe that the relatively long time span of my work was important to address 
the research questions.
Nevertheless, had the final research questions been known at the beginning 
of the thesis work, and that I would not include data from the Kigoma case 
(where I performed a much longer field work in the rural areas), I would have 
preferred to conduct longer field work in Bagamoyo. Since the visits to Razaba 
Ranch were almost entirely day visits, these visits offered limited insights into the 
details of local context, at least compared with living on-site for a period. To 
compensate for this, I triangulated the data as much as possible, partly with other 
informants on and around the ranch. Moreover, I repeatedly discussed the data 
with one company consultant and one researcher who, through years of study, 
were well informed about the project, the project site and people living in and 
around it. For instance, through hearing people repeatedly talking about the elders’ 
court case, triangulating this information with the other researcher and gaining 
access to court case documents, I could reliably confirm that a court case had been 
initiated. However, details on exactly what happened within that process, and why, 
varied. This variation also constitutes valid data, since these accounts 
‘demonstrated just how complex and uncertain these kinds of controversies are’ 
(Roe, 1994:ix).
Throughout the research, I actively sought to minimise my influence on the 
trajectory of the project itself. For instance, I have not participated to any large 
extent in the public debate about the project since the onset of my PhD research, 
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even though opportunities have been plenty37. While this was a way to minimise 
my own effects on the project, I also wanted to avoid the risk of being rejected 
by key informants, or even prevented from collecting data altogether. Towards 
the end of the thesis work, in March 2017, when these risks were reduced, I 
published an opinion piece in Development Today.
Another strategy I applied in order to validate my data is that I constantly 
challenged myself to provide evidence for my claims and reflected on possible 
contradicting statements (Bernard, 2006). I often left policy interviews with a 
feeling of having been provoked by ruling techniques, or succumbed to being 
drawn into a debate, starting to express my own opinions instead of continuing 
with the interview as planned. However, reading through transcripts to get a 
picture of what questions I asked, and how, I found that my questions had usually 
been posed in a critical manner, but had remained open-ended and followed the 
topical themes identified beforehand. 
Finally, I only used publically available documents and interviews performed 
since the onset of research, in order to avoid ethical dilemmas with using 
information accessed when employed at the Sida Helpdesk. 
37 I agreed to being interviewed by Ann Usher for Development Today, and in one Omvärlden 
article.
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In this section, I provide a brief review of the four papers on which this thesis is 
based. Each paper builds on empirical and theoretical work carried out during 
the six phases of the research process, and follows the progression of the PhD 
research. 
Paper I builds on a review of reported planned LSAIs in Tanzania, combined 
with a pilot trip to triangulate the review, and was pivotal since it served as entry 
point for outlining the research questions. Papers II and III build on discourse 
analysis and form the core of the thesis, in the sense that they outline the LSAI 
narrative and investigate its character in relation to complex contexts and 
development failure. Paper IV was included with the main purpose to set the 
findings in a wider context of increasing pressure on land in Tanzania, building 
on empirical data collected within a range of research projects based at 
universities in Denmark, Tanzania, USA and Sweden over time.
5.1 Paper I: A critical analysis of practices and dynamics 
of large-scale land acquisitions in Tanzania 
(published)
Paper I paints a broader picture of the status of LSAI, showing that the recent LSAI 
hype, and the criticism of it, was exaggerated and poorly empirically grounded. 
Based on statistics from the Tanzanian state and a review of NGO reports and 
scientific papers, I identified more than 30 planned deals larger than 2000 ha since 
2003. However, the pilot study revealed a striking discrepancy between the extent 
of planned deals and the number of materialised LSAIs – most had never left the 
stage of being a paper product. Moreover, a majority of investors who did require 
land were struggling to start operations. Another important finding was that the 
rush for large-scale biofuel investment had seized completely – all biofuel 
5 Summary of Papers I-IV
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investments had gone bankrupt, left the site or attempted to shift to food 
production, but were still struggling to materialise.
Apart from forming the basis of the thesis, Paper I outlines some of the 
contradicting narratives from rural residents targeted by LSAIs in Bagamoyo 
and Rufiji districts. It also provides important background to rural development 
policy in Tanzania since independence. 
5.2 Paper II:  Land deals in limbo: Exploring 
simplification, delay and development failure in a 
large-scale agro-investment in Tanzania (manuscript)
In order to understand the failure of the LSAI development strategy to fulfil 
proposed outcomes, it was important to examine how the LSAI narrative was 
constructed. Paper II provides part of the answer to this question by investigating 
simplifications in the Bagamoyo project design and in the underpinning LSAI 
narrative. 
Through discourse analysis of key policy documents and interviews, the paper 
outlines how simplification as a tool of governing shapes the LSAI narrative, 
rendering complex contexts legible. More specifically, the paper outlines how 
different types of simplifications, reflected in Bagamoyo project design, interact 
with complex contexts to produce repeated delays in relation to set timelines, 
arising as an effect of simplification. Finally, it shows that repeated delays 
contribute to failure of investments to materialise. Thus, the findings confirm 
claims of a link between simplification and development failure, as shown by, 
for example, Ferguson (1990) and Li (2007), where the implementation process 
is affected by factors that were disregarded in project design and underpinning 
narratives. However, Paper II shows how delay is a frequent but overlooked 
factor in literature on development failure. Thus the paper particularly 
emphasises the importance of delay, its drivers and effects, when understanding 
development failure. 
An implication of the findings in Paper II, given the frequent observations of 
simplification in policy studies, is that simplification of different aspects of 
population and territory is being repeated over time and over socio-political 
contexts. Thus how and why knowledge is produced and consumed among project 
proponents in order to sustain such simplifications in the face of contradicting 
narratives and materialities was investigated in Paper III.
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Table 2. How Paper II contributes to answering the research questions
Research Question Findings
The narrative builds on simplified ways of seeing 
population and territory.
Figures and facts produced by the company are 
severely simplified in order to attract, and 
maintain, political support and funding.
Simplifications in narrative and project design 
interact with complex contexts to produce 
repeated delays, which contribute to the 
investment’s failure to materialise.
RQ1: How and why is the LSAI narrative 




RQ3: What do the findings from RQ1 and
RQ2 contribute to the current understanding
about development failure?
Delay and its drivers and effects need to be given 
more attention in debates on development failure.
Privatisation of development can contribute to 
increased risk of failure.
5.3 Paper III: Conjuring a win-world: Resilient 
development narratives in a large-scale agro-
investment in Tanzania (published)
Paper III shows that the narrative supporting the LSAI development strategy in 
general, and the Bagamoyo investment in particular, is resilient to what we call
counter-evidence (contradicting materialities). Thus, it presents another answer to 
research question 1, on how the LSAI narrative is constructed: apart from being 
simplified, the narrative is also stunningly resilient to counter-evidence (Table 3). 
In addition, Paper III builds on Paper II by taking the investigation one step 
further: Paper II reveals that the Bagamoyo project design and the LSAI 
narrative build on simplifications, which contribute to development failure. 
Paper III shows how it is possible that the LSAI development strategy repeatedly 
fails to deliver proposed outcomes. It also outlines some of the assumptions and 
values that contribute to the simplified ways of seeing presented in Paper II. 
Paper III begins by revisiting findings in development studies literature, 
literature on experiences from past LSAI in Tanzania and post-colonial 
literature, which repeatedly question assumptions and values underpinning the 
LSAI narrative. It then outlines ‘criticism’ and ‘material realities’ (contradicting 
narratives and materialities) in relation to the Bagamoyo project and compares
proposed and achieved outcomes, what we call ‘real-world outcomes’. 
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It then describes how three key proponents of the Bagamoyo project (the 
company, the Tanzanian state and Sida) respond when confronted with such 
contradicting narratives and materialities. These actors are shown to apply a 
striking range of discursive and material practices to deflect this unwanted 
knowledge, rendering it irrelevant through a range of practices. These 
‘deflection practices’ enable the proponents to sustain the image of the 
Bagamoyo investment as an imminent success, despite substantial critique and 
slow progress. They also enable them to sustain the image of the LSAI 
development strategy as a success, even when the Bagamoyo project, and most 
other LSAIs, fail to materialise.
Paper III also identifies some implications of the close collaboration with a 
private actor. For instance, this actor had a very strong position in the production 
of the knowledge about the investment, based on relatively extreme notions of 
superiority and trusteeship. Moreover, this knowledge was rather uncritically 
consumed by other project proponents. Finally, Paper III advances some reflec-
tions on why contradicting narratives and materialities are repeatedly rejected in 
favour of simplified, sometimes inaccurate, notions of population and territory. 
Table 3. How Paper III contributes to answering the research questions
Research Question Findings
RQ 1 How and why is the LSAI narrative 
about the Bagamoyo project produced and 
sustained in the face of contradicting 
narratives and materialities?
The narrative is resilient, immune to counter-
evidence to the LSAI development strategy.
Counter-evidence is marginalised through different 
‘deflection practices’.
The narrative is sustained due to lack of 
knowledge, lack of interest, notion of trusteeship, 
vested interests, structural impositions etc., with 
strong influence from the private actor.
RQ 2 How does the LSAI narrative contribute 
to failure of the Bagamoyo project
The narrative is resilient to experiences that could 
informed project design and facilitate project 
implementation.
RQ 3 What do the findings from RQ1 and 
RQ2 contribute to the current understanding of 
development failure?
Since the narrative is resilient to counter-evidence, 
the LSAI development strategy can be regularly 
‘re-invented’.
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5.4 Paper IV: Between dependence and deprivation: 
The interlocking nature of land alienation in Tanzania 
(published)
Paper IV situates the research findings in a wider context, by presenting an 
aggregated analysis of the quest for land in Tanzania. This is important, since 
smallholder farmers and pastoralists suffer from accumulated impacts from 
agriculture, conservation, tourism and mining. The overall message is that, while 
smallholders are still largely dependent on land-based livelihoods, they are 
simultaneously limited by immense expropriation of land for the purposes 
mentioned above and offered a limited number of alternatives. For instance, data 
on general, reserved and village land in the Tanzanian National Land Policy from 
1995 are highly outdated: Rather than 28 percent reserved land for national parks 
and wildlife management, the figure will soon be more than 50 percent of 
Tanzania’s land.
Paper IV outlines multiple processes of ‘accumulation of rural dispossession’ 
and provides a picture of the complex dynamics, unequal land alienation, 
conflict, migration and marginalisation in rural Tanzania. It also shows that 
landlessness is a growing issue in some regions, particularly among women, and 
that there are no vast tracts of unused, available land for expropriation, as stated, 
for instance, in the LSAI narrative. An important conclusion is that all these 
constraints placed on smallholder farmers deprive them of the opportunity to 
increase production, which in turn can fuel debate on inefficient smallholder 
farming and provide even stronger justification for development strategies such 
as LSAI.
Thus, apart from situating the thesis findings in a wider context, Paper IV 
provides solid empirical support for the claim that the LSAI narrative is 
underpinned by simplifications in relation to land governance and abundance 
(Table 4). My empirical findings proved important, since the initial message of 
Paper IV was that the new wave of LSAI largely failed to materialise and thus 
its impact on land tenure and land use was negligible. Thus, my findings 
concerning impacts on rural residents of stalled or failed large-scale agricultural 
investment was an important addition to the work. Finally, Paper IV includes 
some findings from my second case study in Kigoma. These findings support 
the conclusion in the thesis that failed investments can have widespread impacts, 
since the Kigoma investment was also repeatedly delayed, but nevertheless had 
severe impacts on local communities.
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Table 4.  How Paper IV contributes to answering the research questions
Research Question Findings
RQ 1: How is the LSAI narrative about the 
Bagamoyo investment produced?
The narrative builds on simplifications on the 
availability of land, land tenure and the alleged 
linear development path towards 
industrialisation. 
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This chapter starts with some brief reflections on generalising from a case study 
and then revisits and discusses the research questions in light of the key findings
(outlined as subtitles).
The takeoff point for the thesis was the finding in Paper I that very few of the 
planned LSAIs in Tanzania had materialised. Through a case study approach, 
the overarching aim of this thesis was to contribute to the knowledge about how 
and why this new wave of LSAIs has failed to deliver proposed outcomes. 
I found that the context for the case, a failed large-scale sugarcane investment 
in Bagamoyo, is highly complex and to a certain extent unpredictable. 
Nevertheless, instead of blaming failure on this local context, I argue that the 
proponents of the LSAI development strategy have a responsibility to understand 
the context and address its complexity in their policies and project designs, in order 
to deliver the beneficial results they promise. Therefore, my analysis focused on 
proponents of the LSAI development strategy in Tanzania and the Bagamoyo 
project. The analysis largely revolved around what I have called ‘the LSAI 
narrative’ produced by these proponents in relation to contradicting narratives and 
materialities, in order to understand development narratives and failure in a context 
of close collaboration with the private sector.
6.1 Generalising from a case study
In most instances, cases studies are not performed with the aim of making 
universal declarations. As C. Lund (2014) states:
Generalisation out of the close historical and geographical context is … to enter 
into a dialogue where one’s research resonates with other works. The work of 
others may serve as a basis for a form of triangulation, not in order to establish 
actual validity but to suggest likelihood and probability (p. 227).
6 Discussion and conclusions
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The discussion below is inspired by this approach to generalisation. As 
indicated, this thesis does not tell the complete story about the new wave of 
LSAIs or present the only way to analyse why it failed. Rather, it sheds light on 
one project from one particular angle. Moreover, there are many ways in which 
the Bagamoyo project might not be a representative case of a failed LSAI. For 
instance, as stated by Büscher (2014), whether or not the commodity of ‘success’ 
is actually consumed depends on the seller’s ‘marketing capabilities’ (p. 81). In 
the Bagamoyo case, the seller’s (CEO’s) marketing capabilities were quite 
extraordinary. Moreover, the Bagamoyo project was not representative in that it 
reached beyond being a paper product, which most other planned investments 
have not. Nevertheless, the richer understanding I provide of the dynamics and 
tensions around a delayed and failed LSAI, and the rationales underpinning the 
selling of the Bagamoyo project as a success, add to existing debates on 
development narratives and development failure. 
My findings are important since, even though the landscape for LSAIs has 
changed in Tanzania since the start of this thesis work, the Tanzanian 
government is still struggling to attract investors to mega-farms such as the 
Bagamoyo project, while small- and medium scale farms seem to materialise to 
a larger extent (Jayne et al., 2016). In addition, the pattern of failed LSAIs does 
not seem to be specific to Tanzania, but has been observed in other African 
countries.
6.2 The LSAI narrative is simplified and resilient to 
contradicting narratives and materialities
My answer to RQ 1, how the LSAI narrative is produced and sustained largely 
confirmed claims advanced in some of the important works in post-
development literature. For instance, my finding that the LSAI narrative is 
underpinned by simplified representations, reflecting a strong Eurocentrism 
and an interlinked belief in a linear development path (Papers II and III), 
echoes observations made by Ferguson (1990), Escobar (1993) and Li (2007), 
among others. Moreover, simplification meant that a wealth of environmental 
and socio-political aspects of context was disregarded, confirming the gap 
between policy and context shown in, for instance, post-development and 
policy studies, land grab literature and studies of environmental governance. 
While this is not new, repeating a message emphasises that something needs 
to change. However, my finding that the LSAI narrative is resilient to 
contradicting narratives and materialities highlights the difficulties in 
changing certain representations, assumptions and values.
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The second finding answering RQ 1, is that the LSAI narrative is resilient, 
overlooking various forms of contradicting narratives and materialities. This 
means that development strategies based on simplified ways of representing the 
world that have failed in the past can be re-launched, sometimes slightly re-
packaged38. For instance, I found that simplified value assumptions and 
representations of population and territory underpinning the LSAI narrative 
linger on from colonial, or even pre-colonial times, despite being repeatedly 
questioned or even counter-proven, and despite the ‘new’ packaging as public 
private partnerships. Moreover, in the Bagamoyo project, with visibly few 
achieved outcomes in relation to those promised, many proponents interviewed 
still refrained from calling it a failure. Similarly, Büscher (2014) found that a 
project where only preparatory feasibility studies had been completed was 
nevertheless marketed as a success afterwards, in order to ‘sell’ the particular 
development strategy of Payment for Ecosystem Services as a winning concept. 
While observations of such resilient narratives abound, few studies have 
examined how these narratives are produced, circulated and consumed (Büscher, 
2014), including for land deals (Wolford, 2015).  
My first key finding on this issue is that the private actor in the case studied 
had a very strong position in production of the narrative about the project, based 
on gross simplifications and relatively extreme notions of trusteeship (Papers II 
and III). This was combined with largely uncritical consumption by other actors, 
including the Tanzanian state and Sida, of the company’s stories about project 
design, implementation process and effects.
My second key finding on how development narratives are produced and 
sustained concerns the range of deflection practices used to keep the LSAI 
narrative intact in the face of contradicting narratives and materialities. These 
include discrediting critics and the issues they raised, or re-directing the focus 
towards the grand visions of the project in order to avoid a discussion about 
issues such as substantial risks for smallholders or increased greenhouse gas 
emissions. A range of such deflection practices were used in order to sustain 
the image of imminent success of both the LSAI development strategy and the 
Bagamoyo project, produced in what is called ‘win-world’ in Paper III. 
While the narrative remained robust in its underpinning key assumptions and 
representations such as the backward ‘Other’, or what development entails, I 
identified some changes to the narrative and project support, where contradicting 
narratives and materialities and changing global dynamics played an important 
38 In my case, LSAI is repackaged as new with reference to the public-private character with 
focus on inclusive growth. Similarly, Lund et al (2017) point to the repackaging of community 
based forest management into REDD+, in the paper titled “Promising change, delivering 
continuity”.
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role. For instance, as outlined on page 65, the criticism from Sida Helpdesk 
regarding environmental issues was reflected in Sida’s decision to reject the 
SEKAB application in 2009. Changing global oil prices and criticism regarding 
food versus fuel influenced the EU to change its sustainability criteria, all of 
which forced a change in the LSAI narrative away from promoting large-scale, 
agricultural production of biofuel crops (Paper II). For the Bagamoyo project, 
this led to a shift to ‘selling’ large-scale production of sugar, rather than ethanol. 
However, the overarching way of seeing the world remained intact.
When similar narratives are repeated and few lessons of past, failed attempts 
have been integrated, a repeated gap develops between policy formulation and 
complex contexts. This gap has enabled regular re-launch of the LSAI 
development strategy for rural Africa since the 19th Century. Understanding this 
repeated failure requires some reflections on possible rationales behind 
policymakers’ reuse of previously failed development strategies.
6.3 Multiple rationales behind resilient narratives 
While the section above addressed one part of RQ 1, how narratives were 
produced and sustained, this section addresses the second part of that question, 
why narratives were produced and sustained in the face of contradicting 
narratives and materialities. There is rich literature on the rationales behind the 
production of resilient narratives in development (Paper III, see also page 78 in 
Chapter 3). However, the conclusions in this literature are largely a matter of 
interpretation and speculation, since data on the true rationales among 
proponents of a development strategy are elusive, with rare exceptions (offered, 
for instance, by Mosse (2005)). What simplified and resilient narratives actually 
achieve is discernible, however, providing important input to the discussion on 
possible rationales in this section. Thus, in a way, this section is as much about 
what simplification and resilience achieves, as about why the simplified and 
resilient LSAI narrative is sustained. 
Rationales behind simplified and resilient development narratives include the 
purpose of ‘sweeping people along’ with simplified messages (Wolmer et al., 
2006:10) and gaining legitimacy for intervention in order to obtain political 
support and create/maintain networks (Büscher, 2014; Mosse, 2004, 2005). In 
combination, these played an important role in the Bagamoyo case, where a wide 
network of supporters and contacts was an important result of Carstedt’s mission 
to ‘sell’ the idea of large-scale ethanol production in East Africa. For instance, 
the Minister of Lands and the President in Tanzania bought into the idea, and the 
company developed close relations with both SAGCOT and BRN. In Sweden, 
the Swedish ambassador’s presence at the SEKAB’s first seminar in Stockholm 
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about the East Africa plans signalled support from the Swedish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Tanzanian government, while important Swedish 
authorities, later involved in both financing and performing assessments, were 
also represented. Moreover, the shift in the company executives’ narrative from 
selling ethanol to selling sugar was most likely in order to enable continued 
support. In particular, this shift contributed to Sida’s change of position and 
decision to financially support BEE in 2014.  
As outlined by Ribot and Peluso (2003), the repetition of similar narratives, 
ways of ‘retelling a story notwithstanding counterevidence’ (p. 171), serves as a 
means to ‘maintaining access’ to resources (p. 159). In the Bagamoyo case, as in 
other cases of ‘land deals without investment’ (Hall et al., 2015:6), access to, and 
control over, land has been consolidated with the Tanzanian state reconfirming the 
status of Razaba Ranch as formally general land. This formalisation replaces 
contested terrain, thereby erasing any potential legal claims to land from local 
communities that existed a priori.
An interlinked effect of the above is that the authority of the state is 
strengthened. As pointed out by, for example, Sikor and Lund (2009), there is 
an important relationship between property and authority: authority is required 
in order to grant legitimacy to claims of property, while gaining claims to 
property expands authority. Thus, in processes which include competing claims 
over resources, authority is reinforced, consolidated or eroded between the 
actors involved. In the Bagamoyo case this involved a strengthening of the 
Tanzanian state’s authority and (at least temporarily) the authority of the 
company, at the expense of Razaba residents. 
Apart from consolidation of land, there are other obvious gains in this story, 
not least massive financial flows, largely taking place in spheres far from Razaba 
Ranch and its residents. As argued by Lund et al. (2017), gaining and 
maintaining political support is not only about the support in itself. Rather, it 
serves as a means to justify continued financial flows, where the ‘promise of 
change becomes a discursive commodity that is constantly reproduced and used 
to generate value and appropriate financial resources’ (p. 124). For instance, the 
company executives’ monthly salaries (25 562 and 27 798 USD) amounted to 
10 million USD over the course of the project, a highly ‘real’ effect of 
simplification and of sustaining a vision of imminent success for over a decade. 
This influx of funding benefited a wide range of actors, including Swedish and 
Tanzanian authorities, researchers and consultancies tasked with performing 
ESIAs, quality checks and assessments. Not least, it benefited the Tanzanian 
state (largely via SAGCOT and BRN). While I did not investigate in detail the 
financial flows created by the LSAI hype in general and the Bagamoyo project 
in particular, these findings point to substantial financial gains for many of the 
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actors involved. In brief, although proposed benefits largely failed to materialise, 
one could say that the Bagamoyo project and the narratives supporting it have 
been highly successful in selling success, thus making simplification profitable,
mainly for LSAI proponents.
While Sida appears to be one of the losers in the deal, it is reasonable to 
believe that, at least for a time, it enjoyed enhanced diplomatic leverage in 
Tanzania when involved in such an ‘iconic’ and ‘state-of-the-art’ investment 
supported by the President and his nearest circle of government officials. So far, 
little public debate has surfaced in Sweden about Sida’s loss of 54 million SEK 
from the Swedish development budget. Such a debate could well harm Sida’s 
reputation. However, Sida still has a chance to regain this money, should the 
ICSID rule in favour of the company. 
As regards plausible reasons why Sida decided to support the Bagamoyo 
project financially – the puzzle mentioned at the very beginning of this thesis 
– a number of rationales can be discerned. Apart from diplomatic gains, the 
trend among other development agencies to emphasise private sector 
collaboration was an important driver which fitted well into the ideology of 
the Swedish government at the time. Moreover, the project enjoyed strong 
support from the Tanzanian president and key ministers. Another important 
contributing rationale derives from the endeavour to make narratives appear 
apolitical and functional, for instance through referring to impersonal and 
neutral scientific knowledge. As outlined on page 64, when the project was 
‘sold’ to a wider audience, the CEO, but in particular the SEI professor, 
leaned heavily on scientific data on, for instance, productivity increases in 
tropical climates and greenhouse gas emission savings in their presentations. 
Buying into, and reproducing, this naturalised, technical narrative may have 
offered an efficient means for policymakers to distance themselves from the 
people targeted by the policy or project. Furthermore, leaning on solid 
scientific data and well-known researchers could have served as a means to 
justify the lack of target people’s perspectives in project design and Sida’s 
assessments. However, a key mechanism at play, which enabled the near 
complete lack of target people’s perspectives in project design and the few 
visits of development staff from the African Development Bank and Sida to 
Razaba Ranch, was a notion of trusteeship (see p. 84). This enabled the 
investor to design policies and projects without having to understand the 
people or places that would supposedly benefit from them, a gap that was not 
addressed in any significant way by Sida. This notion of trusteeship entailed 
marginalisation of any potentially contradicting narratives. In other words, 
there was no need to ask, for instance, the smallholder farmers about their 
views on the problem, its causes and potential solutions. 
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To understand why an individual Sida officer decided to approve, or at least 
not oppose, Sida support to the Bagamoyo project, it is necessary to also consider 
what happens when development workers themselves raise internal criticism. As 
stated by Neumann (2003): ‘To understand why a certain sequence of practices 
take place, one needs to look at the sanctions should a deviating representation 
be advanced’ (p. 48). In this context, it is important to recognise that 
development practitioners, just like any other actor involved in producing and 
reproducing simplified narratives, are both ‘masters and slaves of language’ 
(Barthes, 1982 in Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002:17). Indeed, one reason for 
development officials to reproduce an image of imminent success in the face of 
non-implementation, or at least not contradict it, could be to simply adhere to 
social structures in order to sustain their careers, as suggested by, for instance,
Büscher (2014). The criticism advanced at one important Sida meeting in 
relation to the project, related, for instance, to the displaced Barabaigs in 
Hanang, was not mentioned in Sida’s decision to support the project in 2014. 
Thus, while I did not investigate any potential implications for that particular 
officer, her argument was marginalised. Based on that example and other 
indications of a similar kind, it may have been the case that Sida staff who 
wanted to question, or did question, Sida support for the project were restricted 
by social structures, such as political pressure, bureaucratic procedures and 
vested interests among people in prominent positions.
Another reason why donors may comply with, and reproduce, simplified 
and resilient policies could be that it has the effect of making them 
‘indispensable’, providing opportunities to justify their continued support 
and operation, in a sense another means to sustain careers. For instance, both 
Sida and the African Development Bank referred to the ongoing trend for 
LSAIs, partly created by the development apparatus itself, in order to justify 
their support for LSAIs and related issues, referring to the need to adapt to 
ongoing developments (Faye et al., 2013; Sida, 2012a). At a more general 
level, decades of neoliberal structural adjustment drove development where 
the state was hollowed out, inviting other actors, increasingly from the 
private sector, to partake in an increasingly complex governance of resources 
(Büscher, 2014; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Wolford et al., 2013). This is another 
reason for not uncritically blaming the context for the failure of investments, 
since many of the proponents of LSAI have pushed for a form of 
development that has created the current situation of unclarity and 
complexity in the governance of land.
With all these plausible reasons for the engagement of Sida and other 
proponents in the Bagamoyo project, one can ask whether lack of knowledge 
is still a plausible contributing factor to them ‘buying into’ a simplified 
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project design. The role of knowledge in relation to supporting previously 
failed development strategies has been widely discussed in the aidnography 
literature. According to Hobart (1993), there is no lack of knowledge, only 
deflection of other knowledge than that naturalised within the domain. 
Ufford (1993), on the contrary, claims that policymakers do lack knowledge 
about the context, since their ‘world’ where policies are designed is so far 
away from the context in which projects are implemented. Two decades after 
these conclusions, Harwood (2013) was not as tolerant of lack of knowledge 
among development practitioners. He argued that knowledge about repeated 
failures of previous very similar development strategies must have been 
available to those proposing ‘new’ interventions and concluded that the 
problem is broader than a lack of knowledge – it is indifference. I argue that 
one does not exclude the other. In the Bagamoyo case, certain knowledge 
was certainly lacking, such as basic knowledge about Tanzanian land 
governance or context in general (Paper III), partly due to the relatively short 
contracts of Sida officials at the embassies. In particular, interviews with 
Sida officers and the Swedish company executives showed that they did not 
possess such knowledge beforehand, but described the past decade as a 
learning process (Papers II and III). Other knowledge initially lacking at Sida 
was understanding of complex financial reports and conditions, as outlined 
in Sida’s internal audit (Sida, 2015). However, in interviews with project 
proponents, certain knowledge, for instance about conflict and uncertainty in 
Razaba Ranch, was deflected in various ways. For lack of knowledge about 
context to remain an issue over decades, it seems reasonable to argue, in line 
with Harwood (2013), that it is underpinned by a lack of interest and lack of 
incentive to find out. Importantly, however, structural impositions play an 
important role in sustaining lack of knowledge and restricting critical 
discussion. Thus, this thesis describes simplifications performed in 
ignorance and simplifications performed as a means to achieve certain ends, 
with blurred lines between the two.
A final reflection on why Sida supported the project is that, towards the end 
of the project, it had economic gains at stake. Overall, the rationales to support, 
maintain support and reproduce the image of imminent success seem to have 
changed over time. 
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6.4 Delay an important link between simplification and 
failure
In order to answer RQ 2 about the role of the LSAI narrative in the failure of the 
Bagamoyo project, the thesis emphasised the role of simplification. In particular, 
it showed how complicating factors in context – the ‘excess’ (Li, 2007a:277) –
were disregarded, but would later interfere with the implementation process. 
However, in order to understand the link between simplification and failure, the 
thesis identified a need to consider delay, which constitutes an important effect
of simplification, which can produce failure. Thus, delay is an important 
empirical descriptor of how a development project fails to deliver proposed 
outcomes. Moreover, delay can be a useful analytical concept to understand 
actions taken or avoided, and effects of a stalled or failed development project. 
For instance, as outlined on page 11 in Paper II, BEE’s application to Sida in 
2012 was a direct consequence of delays and the company’s fear of losing 
support. Thus, the current debt of 54 million SEK owed to Sida is also indirectly 
an effect of delay. Delays in the Bagamoyo case produced action, such as the 
Sida decisions just mentioned. Another example is that the time lag between 
announcement of the project and the company gaining its formal right of 
occupancy provided space for elders in one sub-village to sell land to outsiders, 
and later sue the company and the government in a time-consuming court case. 
Moreover, delay produced non-action, contributing to ‘protect’ the investment 
from scrutiny of various kinds, because it seemed irrelevant to assess the 
outcomes of a project while it was not fully operational. Again, as outlined on 
page 11 in Paper II, the monitoring of socio-economic impacts of the project, 
which was mentioned as a mitigation measure in the risk assessment, was never 
initiated, with reference to ‘nothing is happening’. This is highly problematic, as 
it renders stalled projects, and their substantial effects, invisible.
Meanwhile, this thesis and other studies of the impacts on people awaiting 
resettlement on Razaba Ranch show that they have been severe. For instance, 
some people have invested less in farm land and houses, some have become 
increasingly dependent on charcoal and some have followed the 
recommendation from the company to shift from farming perennial crops to 
annual crops (Paper II), even though perennial crops are often a fallback when 
annual crops are flooded (Kjellin, 2015). Furthermore, local people have 
suffered from increasing uncertainty about when and where to move and the rate 
of compensation. Finally, the lack of information and mixed messages about the 
upcoming resettlement have been ‘psychologically and emotionally debilitating’ 
for people dependent on land on and around Razaba Ranch (Chung, 2017:116). 
Thus, despite delays having severe impacts on the target people, these impacts 
were not monitored (due to delays) and thus given little attention by project 
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supporters. These findings show that while delay is in itself an effect of 
simplification, as an analytical concept it helps in identifying more effects of 
simplification. All the above improves understanding of development failure, its 
immanent dynamics and effects. 
Interestingly, while conditions set by the funding development agencies 
constituted a major share of positive project outcomes for residents in and around 
Razaba, such as training, alternative livelihoods and better information flows, 
many delays were also caused by these conditions. For instance, as outlined in 
Paper II, the demand that the project adhere to international best practice 
severely complicated resettlement, by causing intra-state conflicts and 
demanding detailed socio-economic investigations. The requirement on the 
investor to find a strategic partner to invest a large share of the equity is another 
example. Thus, the ambition to achieve project sustainability contributed to 
important positive outcomes, but simultaneously produced delay, which in turn 
produced failure.
I have shown that, even though simplification has been widely discussed, the 
phenomenon of delay has been little discussed in post-development literature, 
even though delay is portrayed as a frequent feature of development projects (Li, 
2007b; Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2017), including LSAIs (Burnod et al., 2013; 
Folster, 2001; Klopp & Lumumba, 2014). 
The purpose of this thesis was not to scrutinise other bodies of literature 
discussing delay. However, in other bodies of literature on disparate topics such 
as migration, conflict mediation and planning, delay is described as a conscious 
strategy to influence a policy or project, either by those supporting the policy, 
by those targeted by it, or both (Paper II, p. 7; see also section 3.1.3). In the 
Bagamoyo case, however, project proponents, in particular Swedish Sida 
officers and company executives, did not seem to anticipate or plan for repeated 
delays (Paper II). It is more likely that delay was used as a strategy by rural 
residents, since actions taken by them had direct, delaying effects on the 
implementation process. 
Delay also had effects on the company, although more indirectly, for example 
it had time to gain more experience of Tanzania and avoided being hit severely 
by the financial crisis. Overall, however, delay was ultimately detrimental for 
the company, since it led to reduced support in general, including halted 
payments from Sida. Thus, delay was detrimental for both the company and rural 
residents, but in very different ways. Company executives continued to retain 
their 25-27 000 USD monthly salaries, money they now stand a chance of
recovering in the ICSID lawsuit, but many rural residents lost livelihood 
opportunities and many families split up while waiting in uncertainty. Although 
they might now have a chance to stay on the land, given the withdrawn land title 
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of the company, the status of this land has now been re-confirmed, or re-
formalised, as general land, and part of the area (10 000 ha) has been allocated 
to a domestic investor.
A final interesting observation in relation to delay is that there could be a link 
between repeated delay and the increasing discursive effort needed to sustain the 
image of imminent success. There is also a reverse relationship: one reason why 
the project was described as ‘only’ delayed (proponents maintained their will to 
implement it), and not closed down, is that project proponents could thereby 
sustain images of imminent success, notwithstanding their accumulated know-
ledge about, for instance, soil salinity, ongoing land conflicts or smallholder 
farmers becoming dependent on charcoal production for their livelihoods. Thus, 
delay can also be seen as an effect not only of simplification, but also of the 
resilience of the narrative, selling success in the face of non-implementation. 
Thus, in this thesis, I argue that delay is not necessarily neither unexpected, 
inevitable nor innocent. 
6.5 Delay and privatisation of development has important 
implications
The answer to RQ3, what the findings from RQ1 and RQ2 contribute to the 
current understanding of development failure, largely draws on the discussion 
about delay above. All the implications outlined above emphasise the role of 
delay in understanding development failure, its immanent dynamics and effects.
They also show how delay can contribute analytically to understand actions 
taken, or not taken, in relation to failed investments.
Another finding that could shed new light on development failure, and 
interlinked development narratives, concerns how knowledge about the 
Bagamoyo project was produced, circulated and consumed following the 
paradigm shift in development assistance towards unprecedented influence of 
the private sector. This is a rather new focus in studies of development. Most 
ethnographies of aid so far have analysed development practitioners and, to a 
minor extent, state representatives, when studying narratives underpinning 
development projects (Ferguson, 1990; Hobart, 1993; Li, 2007b; Mosse, 2005; 
van Ufford, 1993). However, the Bagamoyo case involves a private actor. In the 
emerging body of literature studying ‘success narratives’ in a neoliberal setting 
(Büscher, 2014; Green, 2015; Lund et al., 2017; Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2017),
there are few detailed accounts of how knowledge is produced, circulated and 
consumed. In particular, it seems few studies are available where a private actor 
was responsible for project design and production of primary information about 
the project. Moreover, this thesis is based on narratives from three different 
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proponents, which permitted comparison of the private actors’ narrative in relation 
to the others.
This thesis contributes to the debate on privatised success narratives through 
two key findings, concerning: i) Production of a relatively extreme narrative by 
the private actor, and ii) uncritical consumption of this narrative by other actors, 
which made this narrative highly influential.
Company representatives, with no previous experience of Africa, expressed 
extreme colonial values of the undeveloped ‘Other’ in describing smallholder 
farmers as ‘living in a black hole’ (of ignorance) or in repeated comparison with 
Sweden as a model for development (Paper III). In general, company 
representatives showed striking resilience to past and present contradicting
narratives and materialities, instead disseminating a narrative of linear 
development towards industrialisation and modernised, large-scale agriculture. 
In that process, they represented smallholder farmers as in need of assistance to 
pursue a linear path towards progress and fortune, where outgrower schemes 
would transform subsistence farmers into businessmen (see Figure 4). This could 
be seen as reflecting the kind of development knowledge emphasised in 
neoliberal ideology, where references to growth, industrialisation and 
modernisation are perceived as adequate and trustworthy (Green, 2015). 
Thus, the private company in the Bagamoyo case was very close to the 
‘joystick’ and had pivotal influence in identifying and implementing the project, 
a recurring feature of the current neoliberal shift in development assistance 
(Green, 2015; Omvärlden, 2017). Not least, the company designed the large 
project on Razaba Ranch, the seed cane farm and the outgrower scheme, and 
was given the responsibility to implement all these. 
The above could indicate regression towards a more simplified, extreme 
narrative, influenced by colonial representations of population and territory, 
Western economic models and notions of development, and a stronger notion of 
trusteeship. That could create a growing gap between policy and context, and an 
enhanced risk of (repeated) failure. Such regression is particularly problematic 
in light of the findings in this thesis on the implications of close private sector 
collaboration – the company’s substantial influence over project design and over 
narratives about its future outcomes and current status. This influence was 
largely due to uncritical consumption of this knowledge by a range of other 
actors sharing the company’s way of seeing the world. From producing 
simplifications to achieve legibility, produce potent messages and gather and 
maintain support, it had become a matter of making simplification profitable, 
selling success rapidly to a wider audience, forming an epistemic community. 
While the case involved a charismatic and skilled salesman, the project was also 
situated in a context permitting closer relationships between private interests and 
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bilateral donors (Green 2015). Thus, while uncritical consumption of knowledge 
by, for instance, development actors has been observed elsewhere (Büscher, 
2014), this thesis shows the potential influence of a private actor on the narrative 
being sold. 
In the Bagamoyo case, the distance from the investor to Sida, or the 
Tanzanian state, was very short. Indeed, sometimes they were only an informal 
phone call away (Chapter 4, p. 104), a situation that does not necessarily apply 
in other cases. The close relationship between Sida and other Swedish authorities 
and consultants and the investor in this particular case was facilitated by the 
company’s Swedish origin, with a CEO contributing to disseminate the LSAI 
narratives on biofuel production in Sweden, Europe and Tanzania in the mid-
2000s. Moreover, the CEO paid regular visits to Sida in Stockholm and the 
Swedish embassy in Dar es Salaam from the onset.
As pointed out in Omvärlden (2017), the influence of a company in selecting, 
and in this case even designing, a development project is problematic, since it 
renders the overarching aim of profit-making, perfectly legitimate. On a 
continuum from public to private, from non-profit organisations to for-profit 
NGOs and for-profit private actors, supporting private investors logically shifts 
the emphasis towards profit-making, or even profit-maximising, as the primary 
aim. This ‘new’ dimension of (private-run) development projects could have 
contributed to the uncritical consumption by Sida of knowledge produced by the 
company. Sida seemed not to have the capacity to handle complex financial 
deals (at least initially) or to consider that the private actor had a great interest 
in repeatedly presenting the project with highly optimistic timelines and rapid 
deliveries. 
While the private actor had substantial influence on the narrative and while 
other actors consumed this knowledge uncritically, this does not necessarily 
mean that the project had different practical implications than for instance, a 
project designed and implemented by an NGO, apart from a theoretically 
increased risk of failure as indicated above. My findings resonate with other 
scholars who reported manipulation of local communities, delays, a primary 
focus on economic growth and making promises to states and smallholder 
farmers they do not fulfil. For example, Büscher (2014) found that South African 
consultants made the initial positive interpretation of the non-materialised 
project, not a private company, but these consultants still needed to produce 
success and sell it as a commodity. In Lund et al. (2017), projects were mainly 
donor-funded, but involved a range of actors such as conservation NGOs, 
ministries and private investors. 
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Regarding differences concerning the practical implications of private-run, 
rather than public/NGO-run, development projects, I see at least three 
problems with the neoliberal ‘paradigm shift’ in development assistance: i) 
There are issues of transparency, as observed in this thesis and by Büscher 
(2014) and Omvärlden (2017). For instance, in the Bagamoyo case, certain 
company documents had to undergo confidentiality checks before being made 
public, which contravenes the ambition of Sida, and many other bilateral 
agencies, to encourage transparency (DFID, 2011). ii) Public-private 
partnerships and other forms of close collaboration with private actors could 
entail new ways of gaining from development projects, for new actors and in 
new amounts. For instance, the total salary of company executives in the 
Bagamoyo case amounted to 10 million USD, one-fifth of the total amount 
allegedly spent on the project since the onset. Employing private executives at 
high salaries could be a major cost to development projects. On the same 
theme, the public-private partnership hype has generated huge financial flows 
benefiting the Tanzanian state. While I did not perform a wider analysis of the 
sums of money allocated to NGO- or state-led development projects, financial 
flows to the Tanzanian government associated with programmes advocating 
public-private partnerships, such as the New Alliance, seem massive. For 
instance, the G8 disbursed 367 million USD to the Tanzanian state (BRN) 
between 2012 and 2013, as part of a commitment to contribute 894 million 
USD between 2012 and 2015 (NewAlliance, 2013). Moreover, SAGCOT 
expects 2.1 billion USD in private investment between 2010-203039 and the 
Grow Africa partnership committed to over 10 billion USD, of which 1.8 
billion USD had been paid by 2016 (WEF, 2016). On the same theme, the 
planned loans for outgrowers entailed large sums of money that were difficult 
to imagine for the farmers themselves, as outlined in Paper III. iii) Public 
private partnership-led investment involving foreign investors, as opposed to 
NGO or state-led development projects, can have a substantial impact on 
bilateral relations. Through the ICSID case, longstanding bilateral relations 
between Sweden and Tanzania could be jeopardised. This is the first lawsuit 
stemming from the new wave of LSAIs but it might not be the last, given the 
shift in Tanzania’s political agenda towards supporting domestic companies as 
opposed to foreign, and the problems many materialised investments have in 
making a profit, due to, for instance, challenges in expanding onto village land 
or an unruly sugar trade. Importantly, although privatisation of development 
seems problematic, it was used both by economists and state officials to justify 
the new wave of LSAIs, since it differentiated it from past attempts to 
implement LSAI in Africa.
39 www.sagcot.com Accessed 31 May 2018.
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The above shows possible implications of close collaboration with private 
actors in development assistance, which might not pose as great a challenge in 
other development projects. While collaboration with profit-seeking private 
companies is purported to deliver more efficient development aid, the Bagamoyo 
case contradicts this. Moreover, while it confirms that private sector 
collaboration could bring more resources, the financial flows identified have 
largely benefited the already resourceful, rather than achieving more 
development impact. Importantly, however, should BEE lose the ICSID case, 
this thesis shows that all actors involved will have suffered losses.
6.6 General conclusions
In this section, I revisit the thesis aim to contribute to the knowledge about how 
and why the new wave of LSAIs in Tanzania failed to deliver proposed 
outcomes, and to contribute to our general understanding of development failure.
The thesis has shown that core representations, assumptions and values 
underpinning the LSAI narrative and the associated LSAI development strategy 
are simplified and resilient to past and present contradicting narratives and
materialities about territory and population. Combined, this creates a gap 
between policy and context that is likely to contribute to the widespread failure 
of LSAIs to deliver promised outcomes. Thus, in order to understand the trend 
of LSAI failure, we need to consider the way in which resilient and simplified 
narratives interact with context in producing failure.        
By identifying the interlinkages between simplification, delay and failure, 
and emphasising the role of delay, this thesis makes a novel contribution to our 
understanding of development failure, its immanent dynamics and effects. The 
thesis has shown that delay can be an important, but overlooked, effect of 
simplified development narratives and a pivotal factor in producing development 
failure. Consequently, timelines should be carefully designed, in particular given 
the severe impacts of delay on target rural residents. The study also reverses the 
gaze regarding responsibility for failure from the context, instead emphasising 
the responsibility of proponents of the policies and projects.
The thesis has pointed to some new dynamics following the paradigm shift 
in development towards closer collaboration with private sector actors, which 
partly also relate to development failure. For instance, company representatives’ 
narratives about population and territory were more simplified and resilient than 
those of other proponents, underpinned by strong notions of trusteeship.
Combined with an uncritical consumption of these narratives by a wider 
audience, this created a larger gap between narrative and context and a greater 
risk of development failure. Because of that, and other potential impacts, major 
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influence of private actors in identifying, designing and implementing 
development projects, and their influence on development narratives, could add
problematic dimensions to development. 
The study indicates that land deals without investment may pose a greater 
threat to local people than exploitative materialised investments, since they 
tend to hover below the radar, with little incentive among proponents to 
prevent, monitor or manage impacts of delay, or provide compensation for 
these impacts.
Finally, it has also become obvious that the notion that ‘nothing is happening’ 
around a land deal without investment is far from adequate. Rather, the impacts 
of these deals require more attention, both in academic and policy-orientated
debates.
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Since the early 2000s, large-scale agricultural investment has been promoted as a 
development strategy for rural Africa. These investments have been promised to bring, 
for instance, efficient agricultural production of biofuel crops or food, employment, 
poverty reduction, and reduced import costs for African countries. However, in many 
countries, few investments have delivered promised results. The overarching aim of this 
thesis is to contribute to the knowledge about how and why this ‘new wave’ of large-
scale agricultural investment failed to deliver promised results. This is done by exploring 
the failure of a planned public private partnership, a large-scale sugar-cane investment in 
Bagamoyo, Tanzania to deliver promised outcomes.
I interviewed actors who support this development strategy in general, and the 
Bagamoyo project in particular, including development agency staff, state officials and 
company representatives. I also interviewed people living on the 20, 374 hectares of land 
targeted for investment, including smallholder farmers and herders. I then compared their 
perceptions about the investment and its implementation process. I found that the people 
supporting investment used simplified statements about the complex contexts in which 
the project was planned to take place. This made it difficult for the project to materialise, 
because many of the overlooked factors delayed the implementation process, and 
eventually contributed to that the investment failed to materialise. For instance, different 
views on who had the right to use the land resulted in land conflicts that delayed the 
project repeatedly. One important finding was that the project had significant impacts on 
the people living on the land, although it was at a standstill. For example, farmers were 
advised to stop growing certain important crops, and some people stopped farming and 
took jobs with little payment while waiting for resettlement. 
The thesis shows that project supporters did not want to admit to these problems, and 
other criticism. Instead, they used many different ways to make criticism appear 
irrelevant. Overall, the company had a strong influence over the design, planning and
implementation of the project. It also had a strong influence over the stories about how 
the investment would soon become successful, all of which is becoming more common 
due to the new trend of development agencies closely collaborating with private actors 
to achieve poverty reduction. This thesis shows how such close collaboration can be 
problematic in several ways. 
Popular science summary
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Finally, this thesis shows that those designing development strategies and projects in 
rural Africa have a responsibility to learn about the context, and integrate this 
information, into policies and projects in order to deliver promised outcomes and avoid 
negative impacts of failed projects, instead of neglecting available experience or blaming 
the local context. Finally, the thesis shows that delayed or non-materialised large-scale 
agricultural investments can have substantial impacts on smallholder farmers and 







28 Mar 2012 Group Rural residents Razaba Ranch 61 Swahili Yes
28 Mar 2012 Group Rural residents Village adjacent to Razaba Ranch 63 Swahili Yes
28 Mar 2012 Semi Bagamoyo district officers Bagamoyo town 79 English No
26 Mar 2012 Semi TIC officer, land officer investment facilitation Dar es Salaam 97 English No
26 Mar 2012 Semi TIC officer, agricultural investment promotion Dar es Salaam 72 English No
27 Mar 2012 Semi Commissioner for Lands Dar es Salaam 68 English No
27 Mar 2012 Semi Officials at Ministry of Energy and Minerals Dar es Salaam - English No
26 Mar 2012 Semi Company executive and employed consultant Dar es Salaam - English No
26 Mar 2012 Informal Haki Ardhi employee Dar es Salaam - English No
27 Mar 2012 Semi Seed cane, Farm manager Seed cane farm - English No
27 Mar 2012 Informal Seed cane, Human resource officer Seed cane farm - English No
20 Mar 2013 Semi Researcher, University of Dar es Salaam Dar es Salaam - English No
15 Apr 2013 Semi TIC officer Dar es Salaam 46 English Yes
15 Apr 2013 Semi TIC officer Dar es Salaam 27 English Yes
15 Apr 2013 Semi TIC officer Dar es Salaam 97 English Yes
16 Apr 2013 Semi Action Aid employee Bagamoyo town 91 English Yes
17 Apr 2013 Semi Commissioner for Lands Dar es Salaam 82 English Yes
17 Apr 2013 Semi Lawyers' Environmental Action Team Dar es Salaam 107 English No
18 Apr 2013 Semi Sida officers Dar es Salaam 74 English Yes
19 Apr 2013 Semi
Bagamoyo company 
executive and employed 
consultants
Dar es Salaam - English No
20 Apr 2013 Semi Bagamoyo district officer Bagamoyo town - English No
20 Apr 2013 Group Rural residents Razaba Ranch sub-village - Swahili No
21 Apr 2013 Group Rural residents Razaba Ranch sub-village - Swahili No
22 Apr 2013 Semi Bagamoyo company consultants Bagamoyo town - English No
22 Apr 2013 Semi Bagamoyo district head of department Bagamoyo town 49 English Yes
23 Apr 2013 Informal NORAD officer Dar es Salaam - Swedish No
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16 May 2013 Semi Sida officer Stockholm - Swedish No
27 Jan 2014 Semi Bagamoyo company executive  Dar es Salaam - Swedish No
26 Jan 2014 Informal Sida officers Dar es Salaam - Swedish No
27 Jan 2014 Informal Researcher, University of Dar es Salaam Dar es Salaam - English No
28 Jan 2014 Semi Rural residents Razaba Ranch roadside - Swahili No
28 Jan 2014 Informal Seed cane plantation, Human resource officer Seed cane farm - English No
28 Jan 2014 Informal Seed cane, Farm manager Seed cane farm - English No
02 Apr 2014 Informal Sida officers Dar es Salaam - Swedish No
08 Apr 2014 Semi
Official, Ministry of 
Agriculture, former member 
of NBTF
Dar es Salaam 74 English Yes
10 Apr 2014 Semi Head of Haki Ardhi and employee Dar es Salaam 102 English Yes
10 Apr 2014 Semi
Deputy CEO BRN **, 
SAGCOT CEO, two TIC 
officers
Dar es Salaam 124 English Yes
10 Apr 2014 Semi
Bagamoyo company  
executive and two 
employed consultants
Dar es Salaam 180 English Yes
11 Apr 2014 Semi TIC officer Dar es Salaam 66 English Yes
11 Apr 2014 Semi Head of IDC*** and employed consultant Bagamoyo town 131 English Yes
12 Apr 2014 Semi Two male rural residents from adjacent villages
Razaba Ranch 
roadside - Swahili No
12 Apr 2014 Semi Two female rural residents Razaba Ranch roadside - Swahili No
12 Apr 2014 Group Rural residents Razaba Ranch sub-village 91 Swahili Yes
12 Apr 2014 Semi Bagamoyo district officer Bagamoyo town - English No
12 Dec 2017 Semi Sida officer Stockholm - Swedish No
1 July 2014 Semi Bagamoyo district former head of department Bagamoyo town - English No
1 July 2014 Semi AfDB officer Dar es Salaam - English No
2 July 2014 Semi SAGCOT Chief Executive Officer Dar es Salaam - English Yes
2 July 2014 Semi Bagamoyo company executive Dar es Salaam - Swedish Yes
4 July 2014 Semi Head of IDC consultancy, hired by BEE Bagamoyo town - English Yes
5 July 2014 Semi Village Executive Officer Village adjacent to Razaba Ranch - Swahili No
5 July 2014 Semi Village Executive Officer Village adjacent to Razaba Ranch - Swahili No
5 July 2014 Semi Rural resident Village adjacent to Razaba Ranch - Swahili No
11 July 2014 Informal Sida officer Dar es Salaam - Swedish No
12 Feb 2015 Semi Sida officer Stockholm - Swedish No
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16 Apr 2015 Informal Sida officer Stockholm - Swedish No
9 Mar 2016 Semi Researcher, University of Dar es Salaam Dar es Salaam - English No
14 Mar 2016 Semi Sida officer Dar es Salaam 75 Swedish Partly
15 Mar 2016 Semi SAGCOT Chief Executive Officer Dar es Salaam 75 English Partly
16 Mar 2016 Semi Bagamoyo company executives Dar es Salaam 120 Swedish Partly
17 Mar 2016 Informal PhD student studying same case Bagamoyo town - English No
18 Mar 2016 Informal Head of IDC and employed consultant Bagamoyo town - English No
18 Mar 2016 Semi Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (male) Seed cane farm - Swahili No
18 Mar 2016 Semi Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (male) Seed cane farm - Swahili No
18 Mar 2016 Semi Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (male) Seed cane farm - Swahili No
18 Mar 2016 Semi Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (male) Seed cane farm - Swahili No
18 Mar 2016 Semi Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (male) Seed cane farm - Swahili No
18 Mar 2016 Semi Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (female) Seed cane farm - Swahili No
18 Mar 2016 Semi Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (female) Seed cane farm - Swahili No
18 Mar 2016 Semi Rural resident, employee seed cane farm (female) Seed cane farm - Swahili No
19 Mar 2016 Semi Sub-village chair Razaba Ranch sub-village - Swahili No
19 Mar 2016 Semi Village chair Village adjacent to Razaba Ranch - Swahili No
19 Mar 2016 Semi Rural resident Village adjacent to Razaba Ranch - Swahili No
19 Mar 2016 Group Rural residents Village adjacent to Razaba Ranch - Swahili No
3 Oct 2016 Informal PhD student studying same case Skype - English No
29 Nov 2016 Informal PhD student studying same case Skype - English No
13 Jan 2017 Email Sida officer Swedish Embassy - Swedish
31 Mar 2017 Semi Sida officer, Stockholm Phone interview - Swedish No
20 Apr 2017 Semi Bagamoyo company executive, Stockholm Phone interview - Swedish No
*Group = Group discussion; Email = Email correspondence; Semi = Semi structured interview; Informal = Informal discussion; - = Not recorded
** Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the Presidential Delivery Bureau, which oversees BRN's implementation on behalf of the government




Field work phase Informant(s) Overarching interview themes*
I (Mar 2012) State officials ** What is the status of large-scale agro investment (LSAI)?
What is the status of land available for LSAI?
What kind of outcomes do you expect from LSAI?
Which are the key policies regulating LSAI?
What are the roles of various actors involved?
Is there unused land in Tanzania?
District staff in three 
districts What is the status of investments in the district?
Are there any issues regarding land in the district?
What is the process of investment?
What is your perception of the Bagamoyo project?
Are there any impacts by the investment(s)?
Is there unused land in Tanzania?
Rural residents in three 
districts Are there any LSAIs using land nearby?
Have there been promises made by the investor?
Has your access to land changed in any way?
Are there local impacts, benefits or risks?
What is happening related to the investment?
Is there unused land in Tanzania?
Investors Why did you invest in Tanzania?
When, what, how, for how long did you get access to land?
What are your expectations from the investment?
What is happening next?
Is there unused land in Tanzania?
NGO/CSO staff What are the main issues in relation to LSAI?
Describe the roles of the actors involved
What are the regulations and how do they work in practice?
Is there unused land in Tanzania?
II (Mar-Apr 2013) Bagamoyo company What is the status of the implementation process?
State officials Why is your government promoting LSAI?
Where did it start, by whom?
Appendix 2. Interview guide
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Rural residents in and 
around Razaba
What contacts do you have with the investor? District? Central 
government? Other actors?
What potential and risks do you see with the investment?
What is happening in relation to the investment at the moment?
Sida (in between field 
work 2 and 3) *** What does Sida's guarantee entail?
What benefits and risks do you see with the outgrower programme?
Did you consider the controversies around the ESIA in your assessment?
What do you think about the financial support and loss in the 
municipalities?
III (Jan-Apr 2014) Bagamoyo district staff What are the key current issues in relation to Eco Energy's investment?
What is the dynamics around/status of the resettlement process?
How many people and sub-villages are there in Razaba Ranch who will 
be resettled?




What are the main issues in relation to the investment?
What are the dynamics around the court case?
What is your perception of the outgrower schemes?
Does Eco Energy comply with international best practice?
Investor What is the status of the implementation process?
What is the current timeline?
What is the outline for the AfDB loan and Sida's guarantee?
Where are you looking for additional land and what is the status of that 
process?
What is the status of the Land for Equity deal?
What is the status of the outgrower scheme?
What is the status of the resettlement process?
When the context is so different and complex, why do you promote such 
a policy?
Rural residents in Razaba What are the key current issues in relation to Eco Energy's investment?
What is the dynamics around property counts, land use, compensation?
What do you know about the company and their project?
Why do you think they invest here?
Would you be interested in working for the company?
Rural residents in 
outgrower villages What is the status of outgrower schemes?
What is the process around identification of land for the schemes?
What benefits and risks do you see?
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Sida How do you perceive the difficulties in determining who in Razaba is legible for compensation?
In what way can outgrowers avoid common risks associated with such 
arrangements?
How do you perceive the difficulties for BEE in attracting workers?
IV (July 2014) African Development Bank officer What will be the outcomes of the LSAI development strategy?
What is the status of you financing the Bagamoyo project?
Did you anticipate the unintended consequences?
Do you see any risks with the project? With AfDB supporting the project?
Would you say LSAI failed in Tanzania?
Why was the Due Diligence report delayed?
State officials and Sida What will LSAI bring to Tanzania?
What challenges do you see?
Did you anticipate the unintended consequences?
Do you think the smallholders understand the LSAI idea?
Is the new wave of LSAI different from historical ones? How?
What in the villages do you seek to change?
What does SAGCOT do to mitigate complications on the project site?
How do you respond to criticism expressed in a range of reports?
Bagamoyo company What is the process of identifying land for outgrowers?
What do you seek to change in the villages?
Why did some elders sell Razaba land to outsiders?




What is the current status and timeline for resettlement?
Sida What is the current status of your payments to Eco Energy?
What are your conditions for future payment?
Did you discuss historical experiences of LSAI in the assessment of Eco 
Energy's application?
Did you expect delays?
Who are expected to win from a win-win policy?
How do you weigh those who lose versus those who win?
Do you see this slow progressing of LSAIs as a failure?
Is too much responsibility left to the company?
Rural residents in 
outgrower villages What is the status of outgrower schemes?
What is the land being used for currently?
How will land be identified?
How do you understand the benefits and risks with outgrower schemes?
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Rural residents in Razaba What is the status of project implementation?
What are the impacts of investment?
What are the dynamics on the Ranch at the moment?
12 Dec 2014 Sida (in between field work 4 and 5) What is the status of fulfilment of conditions posed by you and AfDB?
If conditions are not fulfilled, will Sida stop its payments?
What is the status of the Land for Equity policy?
What is the status of resettlement process?
What is the status concerning the financial agreements?
What has happened since last time?
What are the upcoming plans?
What are the possibilities for outgrowers' payback of loans, reap of profit 
etc.?
12 Feb 2015 Sida (in between field work 4 and 5) What is the status of fulfilment of conditions posed by you and AfDB?
What is the status of Sida's payments to the company?
Which actors are expected to win, in line with the win-win narrative on 
LSAI?
What is your view on that some people lose, others win?
What is the ideal relation between risks and benefits?
Has the LSAI development strategy failed?
What does development mean, and in what way will LSAI bring 
development to Tanzania?
Has Sida discussed historical experiences of LSAI in Tanzania?
Does the company's business perspective pose a problem?
How do you see the implications with tax relief etc. for foreign investors?
Has any assessment of those performed influenced Sida's work in any 
way?
What is your view on the severe shifts in market dynamics that have 
impacted the project?
V (Mar 2016) Bagamoyo company What is the status of investment, funding, court case, resettlement etc.?
Is LSAI failing?
Is your project failing?
Did you discuss historical experiences of LSAI ?
What is your response to criticism from residents in Razaba?
When will you start paying land rent?
What did you win or lose so far?
Rural residents in Razaba What does it mean to you if the investment fails?
What did you win or lose so far?





Why did you quit your employment with Eco Energy?
What is the status of resettlement process?
Are there any wins from the investment so far?
Did you expect delays?
Do you think the investor and government expected delays?
Is LSAI failing?
Is the Bagamoyo project failing?
Sida Can you confirm details about the financial deal with the company and AfDB?
Do you think there is a risk that plans based on economic models could 
be simplified?
What is your comment to that some people on Razaba are critical to the 
project?
Did anyone win from the project so far?
What is the status of sugar imports, agreements, Land for Equity, tax 
incomes for Tanzania?
24 Aug 2016 Sida (in between fieldwork 5 and 6) Why does Sida support LSAI?
Why did Sida halt the payments to the company?
Did you expect delays?
How do you perceive the risks for smallholders engaging in outgrower 
schemes?
Do you still believe that the company can achieve its outcomes?
VI (Mar-Apr 2017) Bagamoyo company Why do you think the President revoked the land right?
Has LSAI in Tanzania failed?
How do you see all the impacts on people and land since the onset of the 
project?
From where have you gained information about what happens in 
Razaba?
Why did Eco Energy fail?
Which actors were you main collaborators in this project?
Sida Why do you think the President revoked the land right?
Has LSAI in Tanzania failed?
How do you see all the impacts on people and land since the onset of the 
project?
Could you have used past experiences better?
What is Sida's policy for support to LSAI in the future?
Which actors were you main collaborators in this project?
*Overarching interview themes constitute the main topical themes used during that specific field work.
**State officials is a simplified category including central, region and district government officials, ministry 
employees and authority staff.
***As mentioned in Chapter 4, interviews with Sida officials were performed within the field work phases, 
and in between, as indicated where relevant.
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ABSTRACT Through a case study of a public-private partnership (PPP) for development in which the Swedish
development agency Sida supported a Swedish company trying to implement a large-scale agro-investment in
sugarcane in Tanzania, we unpack the underpinnings of what we call ‘win-world’, a resilient development
narrative maintained by actors promoting the investment. Rich empirical descriptions show that this narrative
was highly resilient to accumulated academic knowledge and current real-world problems. We found that the
privatisation of development increased the resilience of the narrative to evidence of its own shortcomings.
1. Introduction
To identify how the actors behind a development project manage to produce and sustain a narrative
that is counter-proven by history and current real-world problems, and how close collaboration with
private actors influences this narrative, we performed a case study of a public-private partnership
(PPP) for development between the Tanzanian government and a Swedish company. The PPP, which
was supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), planned to
invest in sugarcane production in Bagamoyo, Tanzania, a so-called large-scale agro-investment
(LSAI). A Memorandum of Understanding between the government and the company was signed in
2006, and ever since, the company’s plans were strongly supported by key Tanzanian ministers. In
total, 1374 local people were identified as affected by the project (AfDB, 2012, p. 85). Most of these
were smallholders, residing or working on the 20,374 hectares of land targeted by the investment and
scheduled for resettlement in line with international best practice. Moreover, approximately 70
Barabaig pastoralists would be compensated with land within the estate.
In May 2012, Sida received an application from the company for a 94 million USD credit
enhancement guarantee (940 million SEK1), which was Sida’s largest ever. Sida’s decision on this
guarantee was still pending when the Tanzanian government revoked the company’s land title in 2016.
However, in 2014, Sida granted a smaller guarantee of 16.2 million USD from its regular development
budget (of which 6.2 million USD [54 mSEK] was disbursed) (Sida, 2015). That decision was based
on various appraisals, which were important documents for our analysis. The investment planned to
bring 2000 direct and 10,000–12,000 indirect jobs to the area and engage 1500–2000 local farmers in
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outgrower schemes that would make an annual income of 13 million USD (Sida, 2014b). The initial
aim of the investment, biofuel export to Europe, was later shifted to sugar production for the domestic
market. From 2006, the company struggled to secure funding. It did not plant a single sugarcane on the
designated land in the decade before the Tanzanian government revoked the land rights.
Events in 2008–2017 were studied by analysing documents and conducting interviews with three of
the main proponents of the project and with local community members, in order to compare the
proponents’ narrative with social realities on the ground.
Resilience (immunity to counterevidence) of narratives has been observed in a wide array of
development policies that fail to deliver expected outcomes, for example within rural development
(Ferguson, 1990; Li, 2010; Mosse, 2005; Roe, 1991; van Ufford, 1993) environmental policies (Leach
& Mearns, 1996), land reform (Edelman & León, 2013; Wily, 2012), green revolution (Harwood,
2013) and conservation (Büscher, 2010, 2014; Lund, Sungusia, Mabele, & Scheba, 2017; Svarstad &
Benjaminsen, 2017). Regarding LSAI, strong resilience has been reported for narratives in Africa
(Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013), Latin America (Edelman & León, 2013) and globally (White, Borras Jr,
Hall, Scoones, & Wolford, 2012).
The present case study is interesting for three reasons: 1) it contributes to an emerging body of
literature on how constructions of success are ‘produced, distributed and consumed’ (Büscher, 2014, p.
79), an issue rarely addressed in ethnographies of development, and examines development narra-
tives in close collaboration with a private company, another under-researched issue. 2) It provides
novel insights on contemporary land deals, since insufficient attention ‘has been paid to ways in which
different forms of knowledge are mobilised and circulated in defence of large scale land allocations or
in support of alternatives’ (Wolford, 2015, p. 226). 3) The project received unprecedented support
from powerful stakeholders, despite limited progress, permitting interesting discussions about domi-
nant win-win narratives. In summary, this case demonstrates how resilient narratives are produced and
sustained in privatised development and LSAI.
In the following sections, we introduce the case and review relevant literature on development studies
and historical investments in Tanzania (what we call ‘accumulated academic knowledge’).2 We then
provide an empirical description of how accumulated academic knowledge and knowledge about current
realities were lacking in project design and the LSAI narrative and how other types of knowledge were
mobilised and circulated instead. We analyse the resilience of dominant narratives to criticism, including
how various practices are used to deflect challenging counter-narratives to sustain its dominance. In a final
section, we discuss how privatisation of development led to an especially resilient development narrative
(‘win-world’) in the case and provide some brief reflections on why failed policies are repeated.
1.1. Privatisation of development
The sugar investment in Bagamoyo falls within a ‘business for development’ agenda re-emerging
among development bodies in which private sector collaboration is viewed as a way to increase
‘development impact’ (Sida, 2012). Private sector support was heavily promoted in Africa as part of
Structural Adjustment Programmes back in the 1980s (Stein, 2010), but now development agencies are
actively partnering with private actors to achieve poverty reduction (Kindornay & Reilly-King, 2013).
Privatisation can be seen as a process whereby activities and resources are transferred to private
ownership or control (Swyngedouw, 2005). The current privatisation agenda in development is a core
element of neoliberal ideology aiming for a ‘reduction of the state’, making more space available for
private actors to influence policy (Corson, 2010). Involvement of market actors is assumed to promote
more efficient, flexible management, counteracting the inefficiencies of state operation (Swyngedouw,
2005). However, PPP is based on the assumption that it is a win-win-win-win solution for recipient
states, the private sector, donors and civil society (Kindornay & Reilly-King, 2013). In the Bagamoyo
case, the state was expected to gain, for example, dividends through piloting a new government ‘Land
for Equity’ policy to increase state revenues from LSAIs.3
In the socialist period following independence, the Tanzania government prohibited state involve-
ment in private enterprise, keeping public and private sectors segregated (Coulson, 2013). In recent
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years, however, privatisation of development has had a major influence on agricultural policy in
Tanzania, not least the PPP ‘Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania’ (SAGCOT) invol-
ving development agencies and multinational corporations (Bergius, Benjaminsen, & Widgren, 2017).
The SAGCOT development model builds on ideas that more profitable economies of scale must be
achieved, for example through PPPs with funding from development agencies (Maganga, Askew,
Odgaard, & Stein, 2016). While privatisation of development is proposed as a means to accelerate the
fight against poverty, critics point to the risk of further marginalisation of local communities through
consolidation of land and other assets by powerful private and public actors (Peluso & Lund, 2011).
2. Background to the case: a decade of delays and failure of an LSAI
Our case LSAI was conceptualised as a development project with three key proponents: a Swedish
company, the Tanzanian state and Sida. Other important actors included the African Development
Bank (AfDB), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and local businessmen.
The three key actors supported the project from the outset and consistently presented a positive vision
in which different beneficiaries (investors, local communities in and around the investment site and the
Tanzanian state) would all ‘win’ from the project. Moreover, supporting this PPP was in line with aid
politics in Sweden at the time, which favoured collaboration with the private sector. Table 1 sum-
marises the benefits proposed to accrue to the three beneficiaries, compared with real-world outcomes.
From the outset, the project was criticised in both Sweden and Tanzania. One serious criticism was
that the company had altered the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), to the extent
that the Swedish consultant in charge of the process distanced herself from it (Helpdesk, 2009). She
claimed that conclusions in the report had been ‘substantially altered’ and ‘wrote the conclusions in the
best light’ (Usher, 2009). She also claimed that her signature had been forged on the final version
submitted to the National Environmental Management Council (NEMC) in order to obtain the
environmental permit. The international NGO Action Aid accused the company of land grabbing,
chasing people away and failing to obtain free, prior, informed consent from affected communities
(Curtis & Mbunda, 2015). In an opinion piece published in Sweden and Tanzania, the company was
accused of, for example, dispossessing smallholders and threatening valuable forests, risking increased
carbon dioxide emissions (DN, 2009).
Nonetheless, the project retained strong support from key actors, even when the grand visions failed to
materialise (see Table 1). On 15March 2016, the government revoked the company’s land title, stating in a
letter to the company that it had ‘different plans for utilizing the land’ (BEE, 2017).4 At that time, no sugar
cane had yet been planted. Nevertheless, the project had many consequences. A 200-hectare seed cane farm
was established, but the cane plants it produced had to be burnt each year (from 2007), since the land on the
estate could not be prepared for planting and no processing plant had been built. Moreover, local people had
been waiting for over five years to be resettled, a delay which caused great loss of livelihood opportunities.
At the time of writing, people are still waiting to see what will happen. However, around 300–400 villagers
benefited from working on the seed cane plantation, some people were trained in a pilot irrigation project
and some received livelihood training and health screening. Overall, the company achieved few of the
proposed benefits and suffered severe financial losses (although three company executives were paid
between 25,500 to 27,800 USD monthly) (Sida, 2015). The Tanzanian state as a whole gained little benefit
and in September 2017 the company filed for arbitration at the International Centre for Settlement for
Investment Disputes, a World Bank organ based in Washington, D.C. The company wants compensation
from the Tanzanian state for 52 million USD in costs since the project onset (BEE, 2017).
3. Resilient narratives
Development narratives are stories that typically say what will happen, provided a certain sequence of
events occurs as described (Roe, 1991). As indicated above, many accounts of narratives show that
they are resilient in different ways, however, the term ‘resilient narratives’ is rarely used. Instead,
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Table 1. Proposed and real-world outcomes from the project for three main beneficiaries (the investing company,
local people affected and the Tanzanian state)
Proposed outcome Real-world outcome
Investor
Produce 130,000 tons sugar and 10 million litres
ethanol annually
No sugar or ethanol produced
Launch a 450 million USD investment with a 300
million USD loan from African Development Bank
Credit enhancement guarantee obtained from Sida,
cancelled in 2015 (after 6 million USD [54 million
SEK] had been paid)
Make profit In 54 million SEK debt to Sida, claims to have lost a
total of 50 million USD
A ‘long-term, stable, peaceful and beneficial
relationship with communities and local
government’
Court case against investor and state by elders living on
estate.
Local people affected
Reliable electricity supply to 100,000 rural households No production or delivery of electricity to rural
households
Employment of 2000 people and 10,000–12,000 jobs
as spin-off effects
A few permanent positions, approx. 300 seasonal farm
jobs, small number of farmers gained low-paid jobs
while awaiting resettlement
25–35 companies registered as outgrowers One company in the process of registering in 2014
1500–2000 farmers engaged in outgrower programme 100 people trained and engaged in pilot outgrower
schemes for rice production, 59 farmers active in 2014
13–18 million USD in annual revenue for outgrower
farmers
Outgrower members dropping out, or waiting due to
problems in expanding schemes
Communities managing 3000–4000 ha of modern
irrigated farms ‘with greatly improved standard of
living’
Some village level irrigation infrastructure in place, less
than 8 hectares of rice harvested in 2014 from pilot
rice project
‘Become businessmen’ and ‘create wealth’ through
outgrower schemes
One company registered in 2014, some entrepreneurial
training provided, a few settlers gained by selling land
to speculators
1374 people resettled but amply compensated No resettlement materialised, resettlement delays cause
frustration, uncertainty and serious impacts on
livelihoods
Local livelihoods enhancement through dedicated
programmes
Some people received health screening, literacy classes
and livelihoods training, for example for driving and
construction. Lost livelihood opportunitiesa
Access to infrastructure Apart from irrigation infrastructure for some, this has not
materialised
More generous legislation for resettlement
compensation
No changes in national compensation policy
Investment targets ‘unused’ land Conflicts over land between and within villages and
between villagers and the state
Tanzanian state
Get benefits in line with ‘Land for Equity’ policy ‘Land for Equity’ policy process delayed.
Company pays tax (6 years after production starts) and
land rent
Company produces no sugar – no tax revenue. No land
rent paid, since land not free from encumbrance
Company produces sugar to reduce Tanzanian sugar
import expenses
No sugar produced, import dependency still high
Company produces ethanol to replace 10% of
Tanzanian gasoline imports
No ethanol produced
Tax incomes, for example from imported equipment Some equipment imported for seed cane plantation
Rural development/poverty reduction Stalled development at investment site, local people
frustrated, conflicts over land with villagers.
Access to loans for extensive infrastructure
development
None, since the investment never materialised
(continued )
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development intervention is described as repeatedly disregarding historical experiences (Ferguson,
1990), or, as argued by Roe (1991, p. 287), ‘development narratives persist through time and
frequently in spite of evidence learned in the field’. More recently, resilient development and
conservation narratives have been framed as being about ‘constructing value’ (Büscher, 2014) and
where the promise of ‘change’ becomes a ‘discursive commodity that is constantly reproduced’ (Lund
et al., 2017, p. 125).
Two previous studies use the concept ‘resilient narrative’ in a way that is relevant for the present
analysis. Cairns, Sallu, and Goodman (2014, p. 14) describe resilient narratives as promising ‘win-
win-outcomes’ backed by powerful actors and persisting over time. They claim that the ‘resilient
narrative’ about the Galapagos Islands being pristine and uninhabited, although people have lived
there for centuries, is applied in order to justify conservation activities (2014, p. 14). In a study on
‘surplus populations’, Li (2010) notes ‘the repetition of some remarkably resilient narratives about
agrarian transition that assume a linear pathway’. She argues that the ability to sustain the image of
producing policy for protection, while simultaneously causing dispossession, stems from ‘quotidian
practices of compromise that enable [. . .] a monstrous disavowal’ (p. 80). Thus, both these studies
portray resilient narratives as simplified, even inaccurate, truth-claims that disregard empirical realities.
Development narratives build on knowledge mobilised in order to define development ‘problems’
and justify interventions to solve them (Ferguson, 1990; Li, 2007). The fact that knowledge is
inseparable from power and politics is now widely acknowledged in the social sciences (Sumberg,
2017). Thus, individuals or groups selectively produce or use knowledge to ‘establish, maintain or
enhance their vested interests’ (2017, p. 10). Consequently, conflicting perspectives on development
reflect the different types of knowledge underpinning them or lacking in them.
The following sections summarise crucial background knowledge to the case study project obtained
from development studies, previous LSAIs in Tanzania and the current context. We then examine how
this knowledge was addressed in the LSAI narrative and in project design.
4. Literature review: relevant findings within development studies
There have been some key advances in development studies since the first development projects were
launched after the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. Below, we summarise some findings of
relevance for the case project.
4.1. Solutions based on evolutionary development thinking do not work
A key lesson in ethnographies of aid concerns the ‘disjuncture’ between ‘the “ideal worlds” that
development actors aim to bring about through the execution of proper policy and project design’ and
‘the social reality they have to relate to’ (Lewis & Mosse, 2006, p. 2). This lack of attention to context
Table 1. (Continued)
Proposed outcome Real-world outcome
Partnership between foreign company and government Conflict between ministries over land within the estate.
Company threatening to sue Tanzanian state to recover
costs.
Note: aSee Chung (2017) for a detailed account of livelihoods impacts.
Sources: Based on interviews and the following documents and websites: http://www.ecoenergy.co.tz/outgrower-
programme/outcomes/ Accessed 2 May 2017; http://www.ecoenergy.co.tz/outgrower-programme/outgrower-areas/
Accessed 2 May 2017; http://www.swedenabroad.com/Pages/StandardPage.aspx?id=70052&epslanguage=en-GB
Accessed 2 May 2017; Sida’s Relevance Assessment 20140226, http://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/cash-rich-
nssf-ppf-invest-billions-risky-joint-venture Accessed 18 May 2017; Master’s theses: Kjeller (2015) and Ohlsson
(2015); IDC Q1 Newsletter March 2015.
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emanates from a lingering Eurocentrism and cultural imperialism where experts tend to view the
people and practices they aim to ‘develop’ as inferior in various ways (Escobar, 1993; Scott, 1998). Li
(2007) defines development workers as trustees, ‘a position defined by the claim to know how others
should live, to know what is best for them, to know what they need’ (p. 4). Interventions therefore
often start with Western ‘experts’ assuming they know how to improve life in poor countries through
referring to their own country’s development path, implementing various schemes out of a ‘will to
improve’ (Li, 2007). This often leads to problematisations of the local context that are inadequate (or
even incorrect) and ineffective solutions, ultimately causing interventions to fail to deliver expected
outcomes (Ferguson, 1990; Scott, 1998).
Eriksson Baaz (2005) describes the history behind the idea of ‘evolutionary development’, which
holds that every society goes through development stages in a linear way, climbing up a ladder of pre-
determined developments, eventually ending up on top with a ‘developed’, rich, capitalist system like
that in the ‘West’. She shows that, although long since deconstructed in development studies, this
belief still lingers in many conceptions about development in Tanzania. Indeed, this simplified idea is a
core element in an agrarian transition narrative which assumes that small-scale farming in Africa today
is similar to that which prevailed in Europe before the Industrial Revolution and that measures which
led to ‘effectivisation’ of European agriculture can be successfully applied to modernise African
agriculture today, with the same result. This narrative misunderstands or disregards factors such as
radically different soils, geology, climate, infrastructure and social, cultural and agricultural practices
of various African regions, not to mention the radically different global context today, with interna-
tional trade relations, tariffs and so forth (Patnaik, Moyo, & Shivji, 2011). The step on the ladder
whereby farmers leave their land and get jobs in industry has also been repeatedly questioned (Li,
2011). Indeed, industry in Tanzania offers few employment opportunities for dispossessed farmers
(Wuyts & Kilama, 2016).
Moreover, the idea that small-scale agriculture is implicitly inferior to large-scale agriculture has
been repeatedly questioned. As pointed out by Coulson (2015), small-scale agriculture can outcompete
large-scale agriculture in many contexts. Coulson refers to the seminal work by Chayanov (1986)
describing important advantages small, relatively resource-poor farmers can have over large-scale
agriculture. These include the smallholder practice of ‘exploiting’ the whole family as free labour in
tasks such as building stone walls or irrigation canals, instead of having to hire expensive manpower
(Coulson, 2015). Moreover, small-scale farmers can work in cooperatives, utilising technologies that
are difficult to implement at large scale and avoiding costs of supervisory labour. However, the issue
for smallholder farmers is not only efficiency and profit, but also the many other roles agriculture plays
in their diversified livelihoods and overall lives.
4.2. Top-down interventions rarely work
As mentioned, the agrarian transition narrative is permeated by a lingering notion that ‘underdeve-
loped’ states and people are somehow inferior. Consequently, aid recipients are seen as ‘passive’,
‘lazy’, ‘backward’ and not sufficiently ‘entrepreneurial’. However, smallholders have been found to be
strategic and innovative in dealing with risk and unpredictability in their socio-economic and environ-
mental contexts, which means they do not always opt for maximising profit (Hajdu, Jacobson,
Salomonsson, & Friman, 2012). According to Eriksson Baaz (2005), the often-discussed passivity
on the part of recipients is usually a sign of resistance to interventions that are rarely attuned to their
most pressing needs. It can also be a sign of unequal relationships between development workers and
local communities, with the latter risking more if projects fail.
Although the idea of participation in development has a long history, there was a significant shift
in development policy in the 1990s as funding bodies increasingly started requiring participatory
processes (Groves & Hinton, 2013). The idea that development interventions should be based on
the needs expressed by local people and should ideally be ‘bottom-up’ and designed in a
participatory manner has proven more difficult to implement than initially expected. One of the
difficulties is finding out what people really want and need, rather than making assumptions. A
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basic understanding of local contexts and local practical knowledge is also critical to success
(Kragelund, 2004; Scott, 1998). In order to find out what people need and to understand local
contexts, project designers would need to repeatedly visit project sites and develop close, trustful
dialogue with local people.
5. Literature review: lessons learnt from historical LSAIs in Tanzania
The current wave of LSAIs in Tanzania is not the first. Support has shifted between plantation
agriculture and smallholder farming in Africa, including Tanzania, since colonial times (Coulson,
2013; Iliffe, 1979). In Tanzania, three different waves of LSAI can be discerned.
In the early twentieth century, sisal, rubber and cotton were promoted as plantation crops by the
German colonial power (Iliffe, 1979). Of these three, rubber and cotton failed within a few years due
to, for example, falling global prices, while sisal proved highly suitable for the soils and precipitation
patterns in the target regions and, despite fluctuations, is still a top agricultural export commodity
(URT, 2016).
The second wave of LSAIs took place around 30 years later, under British colonial rule. It included
the 8000-hectare Northern Provinces Wheat Scheme, ‘a relative success’ (Coulson, 2013, p. 79), and
the notorious Groundnut Scheme of 1946, which was ‘an abject failure in all three locations,
technically and economically’ (Coulson, 2013, pp. 79–80). This failure was mainly due to uncritical
faith in large-scale agriculture and gross simplifications in project planning, for example, no thorough
soil or rainfall analyses were performed and untried machinery was used.
A third, more extended wave of LSAI took place after independence, when the World Bank and the
Tanganyikan government promoted a ‘Transformation Approach’ entailing various initiatives for rural
development, with irrigation farming being the model most similar to contemporary LSAI initiatives.
These irrigation schemes had little success due to delays, lack of interest from donors and highly saline
soils (Coulson, 2013). In the 1970s, the Tanzanian state decided to nationalise large farms and set up
parastatal organisations such as NAFCOs (National Agriculture and Food Corporations) to produce
maize, wheat and rice (Bernstein, 1981). For decades, the Canadian-supported scheme in Hanang
produced much of Tanzania’s domestic wheat demand, but was heavily criticised for displacing
Barabaig people from their prime grazing land, with severe negative social and ecological impacts
(Lane, 1994). It has been concluded that this wave of LSAIs in sub-Saharan Africa ‘largely failed’
(Deininger & Byerlee, 2012).
To conclude, the track record of large-scale agriculture in Tanzania is ‘to say the least, mixed’
(Coulson, 2015, p. 63). Many projects have had difficulties achieving expected outcomes and the
majority of plantations have contributed little to the local economy beyond the wages paid (Hall,
Scoones, & Tsikata, 2017) and have caused serious displacement of local communities. Our case study
encountered several of the problems listed, so knowledge about these previous investments would
clearly have been valuable for the actors involved.
6. Data collection and analysis
We analysed the narratives of three main actors (the investing company, the Tanzanian state5 and Sida)
in the case study investment, who together constructed the LSAI narrative. We then compared the
results with observations on the project site and the narratives of affected local communities.
Information about the main actors’ viewpoints was obtained through analysis of policy documents
and plans, repeated interviews between 2012 and 2017 (36 interviews), media articles and public
statements. Two company executives and several company employees were interviewed, as were
influential, high-level state officials in Dar-es-Salaam. Sida programme officials based in Stockholm
and at the Swedish Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam were also interviewed. Information about real-world
problems was gained through five field visits (2012–2016) with repeated interviews with people on
Razaba ranch who were to be resettled, people in surrounding villages targeted for outgrower schemes
Conjuring ‘win-world’ 7
and who worked on the seed cane plantation, village and sub-village leaders and other villagers
employed by the company (20 interviews).
In the work, we treated narratives as stories within the wider discourse. Through analysis of these
more specific narratives, we can observe how overarching discourses ‘filter through to the everyday’
(Doughty & Murray, 2016, p. 304). Using different concepts from discourse analysis and ethnogra-
phies of aid, we analysed patterns in texts and statements from LSAI proponents. We also performed a
critical evaluation of certain statements.
As shown by Li (2007) and Ferguson (1990), a core element of constructing development discourse
includes the process of ‘problem description’. By critical analysis of our data, we investigated the
‘problem representations’ (Bacchi, 2009) that underpinned the narrative and whether these matched
‘problems’ described in academic literature and by local people.
We also examined assumptions underpinning the LSAI narrative, that is, ‘meanings which are
shared and can be taken as given’ (Fairclough, 2003, p. 55). Social communication by powerful actors
is geared towards framing a certain ‘common ground’ (p. 55), based on such assumptions. Fairclough
outlines different types of assumptions, for example ‘value assumptions’ as ‘particular meanings about
what is good or desirable’ (p. 55). A particular narrative can be supported by various actors, in order to
‘universalize particular meanings in the service of achieving and maintaining dominance’ (p. 58). In
the study case, the view that agrarian transition is about economic progress and should proceed in pre-
determined steps was based on certain value assumptions about development shared by the actors
promoting the LSAI development strategy. Our analysis examined how well academic knowledge was
reflected in project design, the LSAI narrative and the underlying assumptions.
We also analysed the data for discursive and material practices applied by the proponents to
deflect certain knowledge and create ‘resilience [. . .] in [the] face of contrary evidence’ (Mosse,
2008, p. 121), what we call ‘deflection practices’. We systematically identified criticisms in
published articles and reports and the practices applied by the three main actors in their responses
to these criticisms in interviews and official statements. Finally, we examined how proponents
gained and shared knowledge about the project, by analysing how they referred to each other and
other sources of information.
7. Findings: little consideration of academic knowledge and lessons learnt
Below, we examine whether the knowledge outlined above, that is, lessons learnt in development
studies, knowledge about previous LSAI in Tanzania and current realities, were applied in the LSAI
narrative and project design for the Bagamoyo investment.
7.1. Lacking: knowledge about development studies
We found that lessons learnt in development studies over the past 50+ years were ignored. The actors
seemed to have no knowledge about these lessons or dismissed them using various deflection
practices.
The analysis revealed several problematic problem representations within the LSAI narrative and in
the knowledge produced about the Bagamoyo investment. Indeed, a policy proposing LSAI as a
modernisation of agriculture implies the ‘problem’ that smallholders’ land use practices are out-dated.
In a podcast, a Sida official framed the ‘problem’ as being smallholders’ ‘ancient’ agricultural methods
and equipment (Omvärlden, 2015). Moreover, the foreword to the SAGCOT Blueprint stated that:
‘Tanzania’s agriculture is predominantly small holder, characterised with very low productivity due to
very limited use of modern technology and techniques of production.’ (SAGCOT, 2011, p. 4).
Another, interlinked, problem representation was that of local people being undeveloped, passive or
lazy, with the wrong attitude and clearly not in a position to know what was best for them, which was
repeated more frequently and in more extreme forms by company representatives. In one interview, a
company employee seeking to explain the company’s ‘way of conceptualizing things’ stated that it
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wanted to help local farmers ‘rise up’ and that farmers in the planned outgrower villages currently live
in a ‘black hole’ from where ‘you cannot see straight’. He added:
You can look up and you might see an object moving, and we know it’s an airplane, but if you
were just in that hole you wouldn’t know it’s an airplane, you would just see pshht! You know
what I mean? Cause you can’t fill in the gaps (personal interview, 10 April 2014).
Therefore, he continued, one has to start from the basic things, and ‘in the village context, simple
things are food production, building a shelter, making children’. In a similar vein, one company
executive stated that ‘we need to change the mentality of the Tanzanian farmer, from subsistence to
business man’. The same company executive said in another interview:
The people down there, it is actually in general, but especially coastal people, they are often more
lazy, because they work with fishing. They go out to fish and then they live on fishing and they
don’t need to work every day.
and ‘I experience difficulty making people want to work – I know, on our seed cane farm, in the
surrounding villages, they were not interested, it was too hard work’ (personal interview, 2 July 2014).
However, our interviews with local employees revealed that the ‘problem’ as perceived by the farmers
was that they earned more working for their neighbours in the village than on the seed cane farm,
which was one reason why they refused jobs on the farm. In this case, the problem representation of
passive farmers was based on what the company representatives perceived as a problem, reflecting the
top-down approach in project design.
Sida officials did not as bluntly describe people as lazy, but several statements indicated a
perception of people needing to be moved up, in line with the evolutionary pathway: ‘To move
from subsistence to being part of a company in a relatively short time period is of course a great
challenge. If you want to lift them to another level’.
If it had been based on existing knowledge about top-down interventions, the project would have
considered the perceived problems and needs of local people, their local economy and livelihood
strategies from the outset. This would have recognised findings emphasising the importance of paying
attention to local context. In the absence of such a bottom-up approach, the next best thing would have
been a participatory approach, where the actors visited the project site independently to discuss
people’s needs and how these matched the project plans. Instead, the intervention was designed by
the company, based on its own perceptions. The outgrower scheme was a clear example of a top-down
design, since taking 1.2 million dollar loans and risking their land was not the idea of local people.
Asked whether local people actually want to run companies, one company representative said: ‘Yes, I
believe so. Some, I think. Well, we’ll see. I think that they want to. I think many people [. . .] many
today maybe don’t even know what a company is [. . .]’ (personal interview, 2 July 2014).
Furthermore, officials at Sida and the AfDB visited the area infrequently, if at all, and generally had
little or no experience of rural areas. Moreover, when Sida representatives did visit, they were often
accompanied by company representatives, reducing the likelihood of them forming an unbiased
opinion.
During an interview with a farmer in one of the villages targeted for outgrower schemes, it emerged
that he did not understand the size of the loan he needed. The interpreter translated the sum involved
(2 billion Tsh) into a much smaller number and, when corrected, explained that the farmer would not
understand ‘billion’, so he said ‘million’ instead. It was therefore evident that the farmer did not
understand the financial deal. Thus, local people were portrayed as ‘backward’, but the project plan
still assumed that they could operate in the same way as a Swedish businessman. In an interview, a
company representative revealed a very distinct ‘business is business’ perspective:
Q: What is your ‘worst case scenario’ then, if they do this and [. . .] take a loan, what if they fail,
then what?
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A: They have [. . .] it is a risk they are taking. That is a fact. And the question is then: do they
place all eggs in one basket, or what else do they do? How do they survive – but it is a business
they are doing! It’s not a grant.
This provides a good example of why privatisation in development is problematic. When small-
holders become outgrowers, they are suddenly perceived and treated as equal partners to the company,
when it is obvious that they are far from equal. This might be unproblematic from a ‘business
perspective’, but is highly problematic from a development perspective where the aim is improving
people’s lives, not introducing great financial risk and unequal partner arrangements.
Reference to other ‘modernised’ countries was made by all actors, especially company representa-
tives. One company executive compared the case with land consolidation in Sweden:
They just have to get modernised agriculture going. Part of that is what we did in Sweden in the
1860s. You need to create larger units. If you have one or two acres per person, you are locked in
structural poverty.6
This view was also expressed at Sida, but not as often or as extremely. One Sida official stated:
It’s hard to imagine Tanzania in 10 years remaining in a situation where every family lives on 0.5
acres. Just like Sweden changed with land consolidation. It goes hand-in-hand with natural
development. Of course it cannot be forced.
As indicated above, this reasoning assumes an evolutionary, linear pathway, disregarding the radically
different real-world environmental, social, political and global context of African agriculture today.
Moreover, it is underpinned by assumptions on what is inferior and superior. Lastly, there are serious
real-world environmental and social challenges as a consequence of large-scale agricultural systems,
including in Sweden.
In summary, we found that all actors were lacking knowledge about, or were unwilling to adhere to,
relevant findings in development studies.
7.2. Lacking: knowledge about previous LSAI in Tanzania
The actors also appeared to lack knowledge of lessons learnt in previous LSAIs in Tanzania, where
many of the problems encountered in the project had already arisen. For example, late discovery of
saline soils forced the company to reduce the planned plantation size and seek more land outside the
estate, which delayed the investment, following similar trajectories as the Ground Nut Scheme. Plans
were also repeatedly delayed because rainy seasons were not always considered in the time-line. From
previous LSAIs, the company could have learnt about basic agronomy and poor commercial viability.
Sida could have considered the overwhelming evidence that the LSAI development strategy has
repeatedly failed to achieve expected outcomes and poses serious challenges for displaced pastoralists
and smallholder farmers.
None of the company’s core project documents mentions learning from previous LSAIs in Tanzania,
apart from stating that sugarcane has been cultivated in Tanzania since colonial times (PIM, 2010, p.
19) (although not in the area targeted for investment). In interviews, Sida representatives mentioned
their own lack of experience in Tanzania as a problem in handling the company’s application. One
Sida official repeatedly mentioned lack of previous experience of Tanzania and lack of time to gain
insights into the complex case. Thus, in addition to lack of experience, there was a perceived lack of
time to gather sufficient knowledge. When asked if there had been any discussion at Sida about past
LSAIs, the reply was ‘No, I guess we haven’t [. . .] no, I can’t say that we have’ (personal interview, 12
February 2015).
The Sida official mentioned that a colleague had raised the issue of displaced Barabaigs in the
previous Hanang scheme and a Sida document states that the experiences from Hanang should be
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taken into account (Sida, 2013, p. 3). However, the issue was not addressed in Sida’s decision to
support the company, despite the Barabaigs again being at risk of losing access to grazing land and
water.
In contrast, representatives of the Tanzanian state were well aware of previous LSAIs in Tanzania.
In fact, one key SAGCOT documents begins:
The large-scale mechanization schemes developed in some African countries in the 1960s and
1970s have been substantial failures; often only the roads survive to show that something was
done. And the massive failure of the colonial Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme provides an
immediate and eloquent example of large-scale agricultural development gone seriously wrong.
(SAGCOT, n.d., p. 7)
The same document justifies the re-ignited belief in LSAI by claiming that supporting smallholder
agriculture in Tanzania has also had very limited success. Interviews revealed that the SAGCOT
design was perceived to provide ‘very different guiding principles’ with which investors had agreed to
comply. In essence, there were two main, loosely defined, SAGCOT guidelines: i) Inclusiveness – by
including smallholders as contract farmers and partners in PPPs, Tanzania can achieve equal growth;
and ii) attracting private investment and the right kind of private actors, ‘in a way that maximises
social gains and allows smallholder farmers to become profitable producers and entrepreneurs’
(SAGCOT, 2011, p. 12).
While the availability of large amounts of land for immediate agricultural development is described
as ‘not true’ in a SAGCOT strategy document (SAGCOT, n.d., p. 2), it remained a core assumption, as
shown by this quote from a high-level state official:
For us in Tanzania we don’t know anything about land grabbing. Because we’ve got so much
land. If you try to grab our land, that’s a big task. There’s so much land which is unutilised. So we
don’t have any problem of land grabbing, as far as we are concerned.
Indeed, reports of vast tracts of land available for exploitation persist in the agrarian transition
narrative (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013). This ‘truth’ stems from colonial times and assumes that land
with no people is unused, disregarding real-world practices such as rotation cropping, seasonal grazing
or villages’ reservation of land for future generations. However, this ‘truth’ has frequently been
challenged (Bergius et al., 2017; Maganga et al., 2016). In fact, there is evidence of increasing land
scarcity (Börjeson, Hodgson, & Yanda, 2008; Tsikata, 2003), conflicts over land (Peters, 2004) and, in
some areas, widespread landlessness (Stein & Maganga, 2017). Nevertheless, a company executive
had strong convictions about the availability of land:
There is no lack of land, dear Linda! If you have travelled so much in this country now, you have
been here so many times and will be here this time for a month. If you travel around by car
everywhere and fly over the country, you can see that there is no lack of land! (personal interview,
16 March 2016)
While deciding to support the initial loan with a guarantee, Sida took a rather critical stance on this
issue, stating that ‘there is no such thing as unused land’, and suggesting in its final appraisal that
the purported availability of land should be assessed later (for the larger credit guarantee) (Sida,
2014a, p. 1). Many studies of LSAI, both early (Lane, 1994; Shivji, 2006) and recent (Anseeuw,
Alden, Cotula, & Taylor, 2012; Locher & Müller-Böker, 2014), have shown that conflicts over land
are one of the major impacts of LSAIs. In our study case too, land conflicts became a major source
of delays and frustration.
To conclude, more knowledge about, or willingness to seriously consider, past experiences of LSAI
in Tanzania could have helped at two different levels, by prompting the questions ‘Is the LSAI
development strategy appropriate, given its historical difficulties?’ and ‘What is important to consider
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in order to avoid past mistakes?’ The latter question was indeed posed, by SAGCOT. It was also
touched upon by Sida, but not elaborated upon in the decision to support the company. However,
despite having different starting points, with the state showing more awareness of past experiences of
LSAI and Sida showing near complete lack of knowledge, they both ended up with the same vision of
LSAI as the solution. Where relevant knowledge did exist, mainly among state representatives, it was
deflected, for example, by referring to privatisation in agriculture as novel.
7.3. Lacking: consideration of current project realities
While the LSAI narrative disregarded ‘accumulated academic knowledge’, it also failed to consider
current realities at the project site. Such social realities included conflicts over land resulting in two
court cases (one against the government and the other against both the government and the company)
initiated by the local communities, conflicts over water and severe impacts of delay on people’s
livelihoods, such as losing out on planned state agricultural services because of planned resettlement
(Jimwaga, 2017). Where knowledge of these problems existed, there was a strong tendency to deflect
it through different practices and produce conclusions that maintained the image of future success. In
particular, company representatives were given space to select the knowledge produced and circulated
to other actors, giving them great influence over this image.
One leading character in the project was the charismatic CEO of the company, a former car
salesman from northern Sweden. As the former CEO of the Swedish company SEKAB (until 2009),
one of Europe’s leading ethanol players, he had been a strong promoter of Swedish ethanol production
and import. On initiation of the Bagamoyo project, he made spirited presentations in Sweden and
Tanzania about the need for LSAI in a world plagued by climate change, poverty and population
growth. Indeed, one Sida official stated that he had ‘charmed Sida’. His persuasiveness may partly
explain why Sida decided to trust the company’s knowledge to a large extent. As pointed out by
Büscher (2014), capturing the interest of donors and policy-makers is about ‘selling success’ (p. 79),
portraying projects and ideas as valuable. Naturally, the company representatives needed to produce
strong justification for the project and to depict the implementation process as smooth, which they did
in interviews we held before visiting local communities. However, the contrast between the image
presented at the company’s office in Dar-es-Salaam and that observed on site was quite striking. For
example, in March 2014, company representatives claimed that land use planning in one of the
outgrower villages would be finished in July 2014 and that the land earmarked for outgrower schemes
was currently lying idle. In fact, land use planning to prepare for the schemes was still not finalised by
March 2016, while the village chairperson reported that the land intended for outgrower schemes was
currently used for food crops.
Sida officials handling the company’s application showed a striking lack of knowledge about the
Tanzanian context. They did not know Tanzania had been a German colony, or basic facts about
village and land governance. It also became clear that, despite the project being perceived by many
Sida officials as ‘complex and time consuming’ (Sida, 2015, p. 7), officials allocated little time to visit
the communities affected. Consequently, Sida largely lacked first-hand information about current
project realities, and instead relied mainly on information produced by the company. For example,
regarding the current use of land for food production, Sida had received the same information from the
company as we did, but without cross-checking it with villagers. Moreover, Sida appeared to rely
heavily on information from the company in both its socio-economic and financial assessments.
Indeed, when asked about their main sources of information on practical realities for local commu-
nities, a Sida official listed the company itself, the government and IFAD. Regarding the financial
dimensions of the project, an internal audit concluded that Sida had relied on the company’s informa-
tion about its own financial status and that of other companies in the corporate group, without making
an independent assessment (Sida, 2015, p. 2). Other actors placed similar trust in the company, for
example, when we asked the AfDB for their basic data supporting a contested statement about the
company in the ESIA, they referred us back to the company for information. This provides evidence of
the close relationship between them, with AfDB trusting the company to provide information.
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Most importantly, the vision that the investment would create 2000 direct jobs and 10,000–12,000
indirect jobs for local communities was produced by the company, in cooperation with AfDB and
IFAD. These figures were subjected to independent verification by Sida and deemed ‘justified’
compared with ‘similar projects in the region’, although with no details about these projects or any
assessment of the quality of the jobs to be provided (MED, 2013). The envisioned influx of 13 million
USD to the area was questioned in the consultancy report, but this figure was still used in Sida’s
decision to justify funding for the company (Sida, 2014b).
The project was designed to reduce the risk to the company, while there were huge risks for
smallholder farmers, in particular those targeted for the outgrower schemes. Sida was aware of these
risks and, in line with standard procedure, made a risk assessment:7 ‘We made the assessment that of
course there were a lot of risks in many different areas, but still the potential benefits outweighed the
perceived risks’ (personal interview, 12 February 2015).
One of the more striking risks mentioned in the assessment was that households engaged in
outgrower schemes could become indebted and lose their land:
Every business unit of approx. 30–50 farmers will need to borrow 1.25 million USD, that is
20–30,000 USD per person/household. The loans are intended to be taken at local banks under
commercial terms. The farmers will not have a guarantee if they can’t pay. If their businesses for
any reason would go bankrupt, or if the company for any reason is not able to buy their
sugarcane, then these people will be severely indebted. USD 20,000–30,000 is very far from
the assets a normal family in the area has today. Given the costs of loans and interest, it can be
several years before there is a net income. Since their land is going to be used as collateral for this
loan, there is also an uncertainty about the farmers’ land ownership should the loans not be paid
back. Weighed together, the planned outgrower model entails considerable risk-taking for the
farmers. There is a risk that the capacity of the farmers is insufficient for forming and running
their own companies. (Sida, 2014a, p. 35).
These serious risks were ‘accepted’ by Sida, with reference to two mitigation measures: i) clear
instructions to the company that these risks must not materialise since ‘a sound outgrower approach is
key to Sida’s support’ and ii) close monitoring by Sida (with external support) to ensure that these
risks were ‘managed in an adequate manner’ (Sida, 2014a, p. 36). Thus, a purely technical approach
was taken, with the assessment appearing to be a checklist exercise to fulfil bureaucratic regulations
rather than a true engagement to avoid harmful impacts on local people.
So far, our findings show that the LSAI development narrative was based on skewed problem
representations, for example about ‘backward’ agricultural production and passive farmers living in a
‘black hole’. They also reveal that the narrative largely excluded knowledge of 50 years of develop-
ment studies, previous LSAIs in Tanzania and current realities. In general, the main actors deflected
such knowledge, using various practices, underpinned by certain assumptions, to produce a highly
resilient narrative.
8. Producing a resilient narrative
The design of the project and the narrative underpinning it did not reflect what we call ‘accumulated
academic knowledge’ or current realities. In fact, the narrative proved stunningly resilient to counter-
evidence. For over a decade, the three proponents, including a development agency aiming ‘to create
opportunities for people living in poverty [. . .] to improve their living conditions’,8 maintained an
intact vision of the project as an imminent success.
Disregard for accumulated academic knowledge has played a key role in enabling regular re-
emergence of the LSAI development strategy since colonialism. However, the problem extends far
beyond lack of knowledge. Below, we outline value assumptions and deflection practices that were
crucial for producing and maintaining the resilience of the narrative.
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The resilience to counter-evidence in the case was underpinned by actors sharing strong value
assumptions, particularly regarding how agrarian transition should take place, with implicit percep-
tions of smallholder farmers needing to ‘move up the ladder’ and of LSAI being more efficient than
subsistence farming. Company employees in particular very explicitly expressed the notion of
smallholders not knowing what is best for them. Moreover, the proponents portrayed themselves as
knowing how to remedy this, that is, they showed a strong sense of trusteeship. Some of the value
assumptions implicit in the LSAI narrative stem from neoclassical economics, for example that of
equal access to, and understanding of, information and that of the rational, self-maximising person
(Kanbur, 2002). These value assumptions were implicit in the world view of the three LSAI
proponents who, instead of being receptive to academic knowledge reproduced their own ‘self-
legitimating knowledge’ (Goldman 2005 in Wolford, 2009). Such assumptions are particularly inade-
quate in a cultural context that emphasises the collective over the individual and where poverty entails
lack of information and choices. Poverty makes people want to optimise use of their scarce resources,
rather than taking large risks to maximise incomes as required in the ‘effectivisation’ of agriculture.
Value assumptions render certain types of knowledge marginalised, while promoting other types of
knowledge. They thereby facilitate various quotidian practices applied to deflect counter-evidence and
help maintain the narrative. Below, we outline the deflection practices applied by the LSAI proponents
in relation to the main criticism mentioned above.
In the Bagamoyo case, the high risks for targeted smallholders were frequently deflected by the
actors using technical standard procedures. A practice of rendering problems technical (non-political),
excluding political-economic structures (Li, 2007, p. 7) was strongly pursued by all actors. Through
performing risk assessments, and referring to guidelines and best practice, the actors depoliticised the
issue of risk, rather than addressing it. As the debate around the investment was highly politicised, the
deflection practice of ‘rendering technical’ proved highly important in keeping the narrative intact.
In risk assessments, the practice of rendering technical was combined with the deflection practice of
transferring responsibility to business in general, and the company in particular, as a key implementer
of best practice and other risk mitigation measures. For example, Sida’s risk assessment stated that the
company should be given clear instructions to prevent the high risks for outgrowers, but without
specifying the type of instructions. Furthermore, state representatives claimed that previous LSAIs in
Tanzania should not be confused with the current wave of land deals. They described PPP as
something new, creating opportunities to avoid past mistakes, and took the sustainability guidelines
signed by partner companies as a guarantee for their practices. These are two examples of how
privatisation of development influenced the deflection practices used to shield the LSAI narrative.
When accused of having downplayed potential negative impacts in the ESIA (and even forging the
Swedish consultant’s signature) to obtain one of the key permits for investment, the company rendered
the issue technical. In a public statement, it deflected these accusations by stating that it had simply
followed the regulations in letting a Tanzanian consultant make changes to the document in line with
comments from NEMC. While that may be partly true, compliance with regulations is a complex
issue, and often a matter of interpretation. In this specific case, judging from the nature of the changes
made in the final ESIA, which comprised systematically downplaying or even deleting critical points
and forging the signature of the Swedish consultant, it seems highly unlikely that all regulations were
followed. Reference to compliance with regulations was nevertheless one of the most frequent
deflecting practices, especially in interviews with company executives and state officials.
Sida acted quite differently in relation to the ESIA criticisms, which influenced the decision by Sida
to refuse the first application for a credit guarantee (in 2009). However, an application from the
company a few years later was granted. In the interim, a few key changes had taken place. Most
importantly, the company had changed its main end-product from ethanol to sugar, which removed it
from the ‘biofuel versus food’ debate. Moreover, the geographical focus of the investment was shifted
away from ecologically highly sensitive areas. When asked about the criticisms of the ESIA, one Sida
official said: ‘Sida judges every project on its own merit, what it can do today. History is not so
important’ (personal interview, 16 May 2013). Thus, Sida combined responding to criticism with
rendering history irrelevant.
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When challenged by local people on Razaba ranch (via our questions, the media or reports), one
frequent deflection practice was to divert the focus to the vision, the bigger picture. This practice
effectively rendered perfectly legitimate concerns irrelevant. For example, one Sida official said that
some local people will always be affected when land is allocated for investment but, given the low
population density in general, there was room for effectivisation of agriculture, which the project
would achieve. The same practice was used by the company in a public statement written in response
to the opinion piece. Instead of discussing the issue, that is the risk of dispossessing farmers, the
company referred to ‘biased’ criticisms which they saw ‘no reasons to discuss’ and instead described
the win-win vision they shared with the Tanzanian government. This effectively shifted the focus away
from the real-world problems. This statement also exemplifies yet another deflection practice, namely
discrediting the message, or the messenger. The deflection practice of ‘discrediting’ was most
frequently applied by state and company representatives. For example, criticism from NGOs about
the LSAI development strategy threatening food security was deflected by a state official as ‘dis-
turbance’, communicated with evil intent, or as ‘misinformation’ (The Daily News, 2015). Similarly,
questions we raised in interviews were dismissed as ‘not professional’. When the critical Action Aid
report was published in 2015, accusing the investor of land grabbing among other things, this report
was also grossly discredited by the government as ‘highly flawed’ (The Daily News, 2015). Another
practice used by the government in this instance was a more explicit show of power, where Action Aid
staff were called to a meeting with more than 20 state officials and strongly encouraged to change their
conclusions through talking to a range of government-related authorities and ministries. Moreover,
Action Aid staff were banned from visiting the Bagamoyo site.
In summary, the three main actors used a remarkable range of deflection practices to nullify
criticisms from other actors, while at the same time sustaining the LSAI narrative and the vision of
the Bagamoyo project as an imminent success. There were some instances where critical voices had an
impact, especially at Sida, but the vast majority of criticisms were deflected in some way by all three
actors.
The ultimate proof of the resilience of the LSAI narrative is perhaps provided by how the three
actors reasoned when the company’s land rights were revoked by the Tanzanian government. The new
Tanzanian president offered the land to another (domestic) investor, so the national strategy to support
LSAI remains. In interview, a Sida official was reluctant to call the project a failure and instead used
the deflection practice to transfer the responsibility to someone else, in this case the government for
withdrawing the land title. This implied that the company and the project had actually not failed. In the
same interview, the official stated that Sida still supports a combination of LSAI and support for
smallholder productivity to alleviate poverty. A company executive had no problems with us calling
the project a failure. However, when it came to the future of LSAI as a development strategy, he
immediately mentioned the vision and claimed that future LSAIs are still needed to ‘lift up’ small-
holders from subsistence farming and provide them with a market. Thus all three main actors sustain
their faith in LSAI as a development strategy, thereby deflecting important experiences gained in the
past decade from the case project.
9. Conjuring win-world and shielding it from contestation
On examining how a development narrative can be produced and sustained in the face of very strong
counter-evidence and criticism, and the influence of private sector collaboration, we found three major
mechanisms at work: 1) lack of certain types of knowledge among project proponents or inability to
take such knowledge seriously; 2) deflection of criticisms using certain value assumptions and material
practices and a wide range of deflection practices; and 3) ‘accepted knowledge’ about current realities,
largely produced by a company seeking to portray the investment in a profitable light, was circulated
and consumed by the other proponents of the project. Together, these three mechanisms produced a
highly resilient development narrative that we call ‘win-world’.
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The idea of a development narrative becoming a world in itself has been observed by others. For
example, Ferguson (1990) notes that ‘development discourse seems to form a world unto itself’ (p.
259) and Lewis and Mosse (2006) describe the ‘disjuncture’ between the ‘ideal worlds’ that policy-
makers want to create and ‘the social reality they have to relate to’ (p. 2).
Win-world was co-produced by the main actors in our case and strongly influenced by the ‘win-win’
vision. This bubble of co-produced ‘truth’ was shielded from outside contestation through a range of
everyday practices effectively applied to deflect criticism and real-world outcomes such as court cases and
livelihood impacts. The company’s influence on risk-taking by smallholders was especially evident. In
win-world, the assumption that smallholders can take on a 1.2 million dollar loan in order to join an
outgrower scheme and operate in the same environment as the company seems reasonable, or even
necessary. In the real world, there is a striking difference in context between well-paid executives
(regardless of success) and smallholders with limited resources who would bear the main risks.
Moreover, misleading problem representations, for example of farmers as passive, produced inadequate
solutions. For example, the company blamed a poor work ethic among local people, rather than
uncompetitive wages, for labour problems. Together, biased value assumptions, skewed problem repre-
sentations and persistent deflection practices created a project largely detached from real-world problems,
which resulted in failure of the project to materialise and deliver proposed benefits.
What sets this case apart from many other ethnographies of aid is the privatisation of develop-
ment context whereby development agencies closely collaborated with private actors. This resulted
in specific new problems. While private business interests cannot be assumed to automatically
coincide with the best interests of rural smallholders in a development perspective, Sida did not
question much of the information provided by the company. Indeed, a Sida official listed the
company and the Tanzanian government as Sida’s main collaboration partners, together with IFAD
and AfDB. The company identified the Tanzanian government as its closest partner. Thus rural
smallholders were clearly not a first-hand source of information or seen as close collaboration
partners. Instead, the project proponents formed an ‘epistemic community’ where sharing of values
encouraged them to take one another’s knowledge at face value (Büscher, 2014, p. 80). This, in
combination with lack of time for investigations and lack of academic knowledge among staff,
made Sida susceptible to selected and biased knowledge, filtered mainly through company
representatives.
It is important to note that the disjuncture between ideal world and real-world problems is not unique to
this project. Rather, project designers have repeatedly failed over time to integrate even the most basic
facts about local context (Coulson, 2013; Li, 2007). However, the strong influence of the company on the
narrative and project design strengthened this disjuncture and was particularly problematic in two ways.
First, it allowed company representatives to sustain persistent elements of evolutionary thinking, which
influenced the project’s top-down design and the knowledge produced. Second, this knowledge contained
more extreme expressions of these elements that were often based on Eurocentrism, a top-down attitude to
local communities and a strong notion of trusteeship. As a private actor, the company had an implicit
interest in, and talent for, producing figures proposing huge benefits and a smooth implementation process
and in maintaining the image of success until the very end, in order to maintain political support and the
interest of funders. Most importantly, this idealised knowledge was circulated by the company to other
actors. A private actor has a different type of visioning than a development agency, since: ‘in speculative
enterprises, profit must be imagined before it can be extracted; the possibility of economic performance
must be conjured like a spirit to draw an audience of potential investors’ (Tsing, 2000, p. 84).
Exaggeration or outright deception may be necessary, as ‘conjuring is supposed to call up a world
more dreamlike and sweeter than anything that exists’ (p. 85). In our case, this dreamlike world was
conjured up through relying on economic models and the company’s knowledge produced to ‘selling
success’, rather than knowledge about real-world problems.
Plans launched from within the win-world bubble do not take real-world complexities into account,
but are instead based on the models and values that underpin win-world, where processes are
simplified and predictable. An alternative is possible, for example the actors can portray a vision in
which this unproblematic investment will succeed, but must simultaneously be aware that they will
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need to navigate many different problematic hurdles in order to achieve it (van Ufford, 1993). Our
impression is that Sida officials and the company strongly believed in the simplified narrative, but we
also concluded that at some level, all three actors were aware that giving problems and criticisms too
much space would question their legitimacy.
This leads us from discussing how the resilient narrative was produced and sustained to advancing
some reflections on why the narrative was so resilient. The overall rationale behind a development
narrative is of course that there are winners when a development strategy is being launched or re-
introduced. Finding common ground on a joint vision was facilitated by the three key actors all
standing to gain from the project and to lose if the project was perceived as a failure. One Sida official
stated that Sida did not envision gaining anything from the project, but it is reasonable to assume it
would in fact gain from supporting such a ‘state-of-the-art’ investment, not least through enhanced
diplomatic connections. In addition to legitimacy, prestige and money also risked being lost, not least
for Sida officials, while the investor was devoted to selling success to maintain financial and political
support. By rendering political issues technical and furnishing the image of a smooth implementation
process, all actors gained from creating a sense of manageability (van Ufford, 1993).
One strong reason for the Tanzanian state to re-ignite the LSAI development strategy was the potential to
attract financial resources. Similarly to Lund et al. (2017), we observed that particular kinds of activities
where state actors are able to attract significant external financial support had been promoted. For example,
evaluations, feasibility studies and task forces to develop policies have been funded by development
agencies such as Sida, the Norwegian Development Cooperation Agency and AfDB. Our findings are
therefore much in line with Mosse (2004), who argues that the ‘gap between policy and practice is
constantly negotiated away’ in order to sustain policy models and the resources they attract (pp. 663–664).
As Fairclough (2003) states, a particular narrative can serve to ‘achieve and maintain dominance’ (p. 58).
Authority is produced and reproduced when actors confirm each other’s positions. One other crucial
outcome of the LSAI development strategy is the consolidation of land under state management, regardless
of whether the investment materialises or not. In other words, there are a range of ‘wins’ for proponents of
the LSAI development strategy when it re-emerges on the political agenda. However, detailed data on the
‘true’ wins for different proponents of the LSAIs are elusive and further research is needed.
There are two general implications of our findings. First, if partnering private actors create a stronger
resilience to accumulated academic knowledge and real-world problems, and thus a greater disjuncture
between this knowledge and project design, it could increase the risk of development projects failing to
materialise and to deliver proposed outcomes. Second, the privatisation of development has implications
not only for the character of the narrative and risk of failure, but clearly also for how these investments are
implemented. For example, smallholders are given exaggerated promises and involved in more serious
risk taking, potentially devastating for their livelihoods, and their training is more permeated by a business
agenda. Thus, the resilience of win-world is not only a theoretical technicality, but has real-world
consequences for the people targeted by privatised development interventions.
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Notes
1. Sida used an exchange rate of 10 SEK per dollar at the time (Sida, 2015).
2. In ‘academic’ knowledge, we include knowledge gained by practitioners such as agronomists and development officers.
3. In a deal where the company would get land ‘free from encumbrance’ directly from the Ministry of Lands, the government of
Tanzania would stepwise acquire 25 per cent of the shareholding and two board positions: it would get 10 per cent of ordinary
shares once financing for the project had been secured, entitling it to 10 per cent voting rights and one board member. An
additional 15 per cent of dividends, 15 per cent of voting rights and another board member would be granted after 18 years of
operation (Nshala, Locke, & Duncan, 2013).
4. The company was not informed about this decision until 9 November 2016 (BEE, 2017).
5. We recognise that the state is not one monolithic actor although it is often treated as such, including in this paper. ‘The state’,
or ‘government’ referred to in this paper are individuals who are by profession official representatives of the Tanzanian state/
government, for example ministry staff, district government officials and employees at government authorities, and their
actions.
6. All quotes from interviews and documents in Swedish were translated to English by the authors.
7. As part of the Relevance Assessment in the Final Appraisal of Intervention (Slutgiltig beredning av insats) 20140226.
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Abstract
Studies of accumulation by dispossession in the Global South
tend to focus on individual sectors, for example, large‐scale
agriculture or nature conservation. Yet smallholder farmers
and pastoralists are affected by multiple processes of land
alienation. Drawing on the case of Tanzania, we illustrate
the analytical purchase of a comprehensive examination of
dynamics of land alienation across multiple sectors. To begin
with, processes of land alienation through investments in
agriculture, mining, conservation, and tourism dovetail with
a growing social differentiation and class formation. These
dynamics generate unequal patterns of land deprivation
and accumulation that evolve in a context of continued land
dependency for the vast majority of the rural population.
Consequently, land alienation engenders responses by
individuals and communities seeking to maintain control
over their means of production. These responses include
migration, land tenure formalization, and land transactions,
that propagate across multiple localities and scales,
interlocking with and further reinforcing the effects of land
alienation. Various localized processes of primitive accumu-
lation contribute to a scramble for land in the aggregate, pro-
viding justifications for policies that further drive land
alienation.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
It appears that Tanzania is now facing a potential crisis of internal displacement in which people are
shunted from place to place as valuable natural resources are appropriated from communities for
conservation, commerce, and increasingly both together (Igoe & Croucher, 2007, p. 553).
There has been significant attention to the so‐called African land rush (Hall, Scoones, & Tsikata, 2015; Scoones,
Hall, Borras, White, & Wolford, 2013), that is, the surge of foreign agricultural investments in Africa that started
in the early 2000s. Many see Tanzania as an ideal country for large‐scale agricultural land investments due to its
record of liberal economic reforms and high growth rates in the last two decades. Tanzania's government has
actively embraced this international interest in its land through the introduction of investment‐friendly policies
and institutions. The Tanzania Investment Centre was created in 1997 to facilitate foreign (and domestic) invest-
ments in, among other things, land. Several attempts were undertaken at creating a land bank of demarcated, titled,
and investment‐ready tracts of land with agricultural potential. In 2009, the Government of Tanzania launched the
“Kilimo Kwanza”—or “Agriculture First”—initiative aiming to modernize the agricultural sector through public and
private investments. Shortly thereafter, Tanzania's president at the time—Jakaya Kikwete—launched the Southern
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) initiative at the 2010 World Economic Forum Africa summit.
In the SAGCOT investment blueprint, Kikwete asserted the official and widely circulated government position that
“Tanzania has immense opportunities for agricultural development. There are 44 million hectares of arable land,
only 24 percent of which is being utilized. … [T]he country's huge agricultural potential remains unutilized”
(SAGCOT, 2011).
This classic narrative of “unused land” also circulates in other parts of the African continent and dovetails with a
discourse of neoliberal economic development and growth through land tenure formalization, modernization and
commercialization of agriculture, and animal husbandry (Geisler, 2012; Lunstrum, 2016; Nalepa, Short Gianotti, &
Bauer, 2017). However, the narrative is at odds with continual reports of land conflicts across Tanzania. Drivers of
such conflicts are many and include stalled or entirely failed land deals in large‐scale agriculture, growth in human
and livestock populations, patterns of displacement and migration, various conservation and tourism initiatives, infra-
structure development, domestic land acquisition for speculation and cultivation, land tenure formalization and tree‐
planting initiatives, and mining. Indeed, against official narratives of “unused land,” government authorities have
threatened land owners of large estates with expropriation, accusing them of not properly “developing” the land,
calling for their property to be given back to poor or landless farmers in light of widespread land conflicts across
the country (DailyNews, 2013; Guardian, 2016b). The narrative of “unused land” is also questionable in light of
growing concerns raised by Tanzania's environmental‐conservation complex (see Brockington, 2006) over an
allegedly growing number of incursions by pastoralists into national parks and game reserves (Ministry of Natural
Resources and Tourism, 2016; Shekighenda, 2016).
In this article,1 we go beyond exclusive attention to the agriculturally driven African land rush. Instead, we create
an overview of the totality of land alienation processes inTanzania by focusing on investments in agriculture, mining,
conservation, and tourism. Given their mutual reinforcement, these different processes should not be studied in iso-
lation (Hall, Hirsch, & Li, 2011; Hunsberger et al., 2017; Lunstrum, Bose, & Zalik, 2016). We show how land alienation
processes take place in a context of continued land dependency by Tanzania's rural population and how these pro-
cesses are reinforced by a growing social differentiation and class formation. We also show how rural people respond
to land alienation and dispossession to maintain their means of production, such as through migration, land tenure
formalization, and land transaction, and how these responses, in turn, further reinforce the effects of land alienation.
1This article is based on an extensive reading and analysis of relevant literature, decades of cumulative research experience on land
issues, and years of field presence in rural areas across several of Tanzania's regions, including Dodoma, Iringa, Manyara, Mbeya,
Mtwara, Lindi, Kigoma, Arusha, and Ruvuma.
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We provide important evidence to policy debates about land inTanzania and elsewhere, thereby countering paradox-
ical claims over “unused” or “undeveloped” land amidst growing pressures on rural livelihoods by various drivers of
land alienation.
2 | AGRARIAN CHANGE AND LAND ALIENATION
Our contribution speaks to debates on agrarian change (Bernstein, 1977; Li, 2014; Moyo, 2008) and primitive accu-
mulation, what Marx famously coined a “historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production”
and enabling the appropriation of this freed labour for capitalist production (Marx, 1976, p. 875). David Harvey and
many scholars after him built on this historical and still ongoing process of land enclosures in demonstrating how cap-
italism continues expanding its reach, creating new markets and property regimes, and changing social relations in the
process of accumulation by dispossession (Glassman, 2006; Hall, 2013; Harvey, 2003).
2.1 | Different forms of land alienation
Accumulation by rural dispossession takes many forms. It requires neither changes in formal property rights nor phys-
ical land grabbing by “extra‐economic means” (Akram‐Lodhi, 2007; Hall, 2013). Rather, dispossession can be the
result of more subtle processes of land control grabbing (Margulis, McKeon, & Borras Jr., 2013; Peluso & Lund,
2011) whereby access to use land for certain purposes is restricted. Conservation interventions, commodification
of seeds,2 contract farming, juridical capture, land use planning and demarcation, and land transactions can all result
in land control grabbing (Bluwstein & Lund, 2018; Stein & Cunningham, 2017; Borras Jr, & Franco, 2012; Huggins,
2014; Oya, 2012; Prudham, 2007). Although none of these processes necessarily imply formal challenges to local
land rights, they can have an effect similar to implying the loss of land altogether (Cáceres, 2015). Furthermore, accu-
mulation by dispossession does not only involve the expropriation of land into private hands. It can also involve the
transferral of customary or communal land ownership into the public domain (e.g., a national park), if third‐party
actors (such as conservation non‐governmental organizations [NGOs] or tourism investors) can profit via this act
of enclosure (Kelly, 2011).
Accumulation by dispossession can also involve the appropriation of labour of those who lose their land‐based
means of production. However, in the Global South and specifically in theTanzanian context the appropriation of sur-
plus labour through proletarianization—what could be called labour grabbing (Stein & Cunningham, 2017)—is limited
to informal sectors where casual labour under highly exploitative arrangements is common (Mueller, 2011). Current
patterns of land appropriation create only few formalized wage–labour opportunities (Meagher, 2016). Put differ-
ently, there may be no “proletarian future” for landless or land‐deprived people in many parts across the Global South
(Li, 2011, p. 296). Thus, many smallholders join the ranks of a growing landless labour reserve (in the Marxian sense),
that is, they are rendered a surplus population without a prospect for employment (Ferguson, 2013; Li, 2010; Peters,
2013). Shivji (2009) conceptualizes this process of accumulation by dispossession in the Tanzanian context as a
“disarticulated” accumulation, introduced through colonial or neoliberal regimes, and perpetuated by the state's dis-
regard for the peasantry. Indeed, Marx's concept of primitive accumulation rests on the integration of the new labour
force into circuits of capitalist production, which is a deeply transformative process (Glassman, 2006; Wood, 2002).
In Tanzania, this process is ongoing and incomplete. Moreover, accumulation and dispossession are entangled with
patterns of internal class formation, social differentiation, and social reproduction (Chung, 2017; Greco, 2015;
Mueller, 2011). In the course of various processes of land (control) and labour grabbing, societies become stratified
into (predominantly male) landlords and owners of large livestock herds who can extract rents and surplus labour,
and land‐deprived farmers (especially women) and impoverished pastoralists who must offer their labour, struggling
2“Tanzanian farmers are facing heavy prison sentences if they continue their traditional seed exchange”. Ebe Daems, 7 December
2016. (http://www.mo.be/en/analysis/tanzanian‐farmers‐are‐facing‐heavy‐prison‐sentences‐if‐they‐continue‐their‐traditional‐seed).
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to survive. These agrarian transformations are not new to Tanzania (e.g., see Iliffe, 1979; Shao, 1986; von Freyhold,
1979) and continue even when recent foreign‐led large‐scale land deals stall or entirely fail to materialize (Hall, 2013;
Oya, 2013).
In response to the growing land squeeze underpinned by different forms of land (control) or labour grabbing,
rural people turn to migration, or occupation of land enclosed as protected area (Charnley, 1997; Hall, 2013; Hall
et al., 2011; Moyo & Yeros, 2005). Migration can create new forms of exclusion and increase land pressure elsewhere
in the country where the arrival of migrants may contribute to land tenure formalization, as residents seek to protect
their land against newcomers, whom they may be inclined to evict. Hall et al. (2011) refer to this interlocking nature
of different processes of land alienation as primitive accumulation “from below.” Another response in the face of land
alienation is livelihood diversification (Hodgson, 2001; Mueller, 2011). Socio‐economic diversification can be
underpinned by production declines in agriculture or livestock husbandry (McCabe, Leslie, & DeLuca, 2010; Ponte,
2001) and tends to increase social differentiation and to promote informal sectors of wage labour (Bryceson,
2002; Lyimo, 2014; Peters, 2004).
2.2 | Tanzania, a land‐dependent nation
Agriculture in Tanzania can be broadly characterized by a stagnant agricultural labour productivity (Korotayev &
Zinkina, 2015), and since the 1990s, a growing number of studies have reported a declining soil fertility (Baijukya,
de Ridder, Masuki, & Giller, 2005; Kangalawe, Christiansson, & Östberg, 2008; Lindberg, 1996; Ponte, 2001; Snyder,
1996). This development was initiated by ill‐conceived and coercive resettlement policies of the 1970s (villagization)
that led to agricultural intensification (Kjekshus, 1977; Shao, 1986). It was then compounded by structural adjustment
and liberalization policies of the 1980s and 1990s, which deprived a growing number of smallholders of agricultural
inputs necessary to maintain or increase production (Bryceson, 2002). Lokina, Nerman, and Sandefur (2011) report
that with the exception of rice, average yields of maize, sorghum, and beans—key food staples—declined in the
2000s, and total output could only be stabilized through agricultural area expansion. Food and Agricultural Organiza-
tion of the United Nations (FAO) highlights that “with the exception of rice, the country has… remained a net importer
of food staples during the period 2007–2013.” FAO attests that Tanzania has “one of the lowest levels of productivity
in sub‐Saharan Africa” due to a lack of irrigation and improved seeds and fertilizers (FAO, 2014, p. 1). Coulson (2013)
points out that the present growth in agricultural outputs (around 4% per year) exceeds population growth (around
3% per year), yet he is sceptical that this level of growth (which is largely based on agricultural area expansion) can
be maintained in the future. The competition for farmland across many parts of Tanzania is therefore set to increase.
Despite ongoing processes of deagrarianization or depeasantization (Bryceson, 2002) that echo social differen-
tiation and socio‐economic diversification, we contend that Tanzania's growing peasantry remains highly dependent
on land and environment. A majority of income for rural livelihoods across sub‐Saharan Africa and specifically in
Tanzania is sourced from agriculture, livestock, environmental resources (forest and non‐forest), or casual labour
on other people's farms. Land and environmental dependency cuts across wealth, gender, and education, although
poorer, less‐educated, and female‐headed households tend to be more dependent (Angelsen et al., 2014; Lund &
Treue, 2008). Tanzania's population is expected to reach 137 million in 2050, having already grown from 10 to 53
million people in 1960–2015 (Figure 1).3 Although Tanzania has seen substantial macroeconomic growth of late,
the country remains a predominantly agriculture‐based smallholder economy (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2015). Industri-
alization has been limited and uneven, and economic growth has not resulted in greatly expanded opportunities
for formal employment (Gray, 2013; Wuyts & Kilama, 2016). Although rural–urban migration will continue to shift
the Tanzanian demographic landscape in the coming decades, in absolute terms, more people will likely have to live
off the land in the future. In the absence of mass industries that provide employment opportunities (Wuyts & Kilama,
2016), urbanization and deagrarianization will not change the fact that land and land‐based resources will remain the
3World Bank Health Nutrition and Population Statistics, accessed April 27, 2017.
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main means of (re)production for tens of millions of smallholders in the foreseeable future (see also Hall et al., 2011;
Moyo & Yeros, 2005).
To further contextualize Tanzanian dynamics of agrarian change and land alienation, we present findings from
two studies conducted across Tanzania by some of the authors of this article. The research project “Transformations
in Poverty and Property Rights in Rural Tanzania”4 randomly sampled 1,600 households in 33 villages between 2010
and 2016, yielding average rates of landlessness (understood as owning 1 acre of land or less per household) from
9.4% to 22.2% across the regions Kigoma, Mbeya/Songwe, Manyara, and Dodoma. This range illustrates the geo-
graphically uneven effects of different drivers of land alienation as they intersect with population density and growth
and local land markets. Another, larger dataset, collected under the auspices of a research project on rural livelihoods
and conservation,5 illustrates that landlessness is also thoroughly gendered. On the basis of a sample of 945 female‐
and 1,924 male‐headed households interviewed in 2014–2015 across the regions Arusha, Manyara, Ruvuma, and
Lindi, female‐headed households evince a fourfold prevalence in being landless (following the same definition as
above). In the following sections, we illustrate how in the context of continued rural land dependency, and an uneven
and gendered geography of landlessness, different drivers of land alienation interlock and jointly advance an ongoing
and yet incomplete primitive accumulation.
3 | GOVERNANCE OF LAND IN TANZANIA
From colonial rule, Tanzania inherited a system of state‐sanctioned land alienation through land laws (United Repub-
lic of Tanzania [URT], 1994). From a legal perspective, all land in Tanzania is public land, vested in the president as
trustee for and on behalf of all Tanzanian citizens. Three overarching land categories are defined to govern land
use and land control: reserved land, village land, and general land. General land includes urban areas and large‐scale
investments. It falls directly under the Commissioner for Lands and is defined in Land Act No. 4 as “all public land,
which is not reserved land or village land, and includes unoccupied or unused village land” (URT, 1999, p. 10, our
emphasis). General land is therefore an ambiguous residual land category for lands that either are not clearly catego-
rized otherwise (Sundet, 2005) or can be claimed as “unused,” “unoccupied,” “undeveloped,” and so forth. Such claims
are enabled by the lack of a national cadastre and inaccurate and disputed records of village and reserved land
boundaries, and they are generally underpinned by unequal power relations that render migrants, women, and pas-
toralists particularly vulnerable (Odgaard, 2002).
Reserved land is governed by various statutory bodies. Forest reserves are for example governed by the
Tanzanian Forest Service in accordance with the Forest Act 2002. The vast majority of reserved land in Tanzania is
4https://www.udsm.ac.tz/node/492.
5https://www.ucl.ac.uk/pima/.
FIGURE 1 Population growth in Tanzania. Recorded until 2015, estimated beyond 2015
Source: World Bank Health, Nutrition and Population Statistics.
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set aside for conservation and tourism purposes. Village land is governed by democratically elected village councils
under the Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999. The act formally recognizes customary land rights and has legal provisions
to prevent discrimination against women and vulnerable groups. Smallholders are encouraged to further secure their
land rights by obtaining certificates of customary rights of occupancy (CCROs), and male‐headed households are
encouraged to register land titles jointly with their wives (Odgaard, 2006), yet progress towards more equitable land
registration is slow (Pedersen, 2015). For instance, only 3.4% and 5.8% of issued CCROs in Babati and Bariadi
Districts were jointly received by a man and his wife (URT, 2010). Preliminary results from a 2014–2016 study show
similar trends across the districts Chamwino, Kongwa, and Kasulu. On average, 11.4% of CCROs were held jointly by
a man and a woman (Askew & Odgaard, in review). Through CCROs, rural people are expected to avoid land disputes,
increase agricultural productivity, and become integrated in the formal banking sector, with the CCRO acting as
collateral to receive a loan. CCROs are technically not to be issued before the village has obtained a certificate of
village land from the Commissioner of Lands, which is conditioned upon the successful surveying and demarcating
of village boundaries, an approved village land use plan and a village registry (Stein et al., 2016).6
Village land use planning (VLUP) has attained a prominent role in land tenure formalization policies that aim to
identify “freely available” and “unoccupied” village land for large‐scale agricultural investment or community‐based
conservation. VLUP exercises invite several actors to influence the process: They are sometimes facilitated by out-
siders interested to acquire land, and they must be reviewed by district land and planning officers before approval
by the National Land Use Planning Commission is sought (Walwa, 2017). Although ostensibly aimed at secure land
rights and empowerment for village communities, VLUP processes have, in practice, resulted in physical or economic
displacement and reinforced the very same farmer–herder conflicts that they proclaim to mitigate (Walwa, 2017).
VLUP processes have been observed to enable a shift of authority into the hands of political‐bureaucratic and eco-
nomic elites and have furthered land alienation at the expense of both farmers and pastoralists in favour of invest-
ments in commercial agriculture, conservation, and tourism (Greco, 2016; Maganga et al., 2016; Stein &
Cunningham, 2017). Farmers and pastoralists who are deemed migrants are particularly vulnerable to be rendered
landless through VLUP exercises that do not recognize their residency in the village (Bluwstein, 2017; Walwa,
2017). Pastoralists with recognized claims are also vulnerable in land use planning exercises that fragment rangelands
(Goldman & Riosmena, 2013) or result in limitations of livestock mobility to particular districts or villages (usually
through branding of livestock) and/or forced sales of “excess cattle” (URT, 2013b, p. 193). The practice of land use
planning therefore challenges provisions under the Land Acts that aim to protect people's customary land rights by
recognizing their claims to village land vis‐à‐vis external investors, even when smallholders do not have a title or
other forms of registration. When village land is acquired by outsiders under a granted right of occupancy that is
governed by statutory law, local people's customary land rights and land claims can be overridden, because “unequal
power relations lead to unequal recognition of customary and statutory law” (Locher, 2016, p. 393).
Given the evidence so far, it is therefore not surprising that the promises of land tenure formalization have been
elusive, even in cases of countermapping of communal resources by local people (Hodgson & Schroeder, 2002;
Maganga et al., 2016; Stein et al., 2016). Importantly, once land has been identified for commercial investment
through village land use planning exercises, the land undergoes a legal shift out of village land status and village con-
trol to general land status and control by Tanzanian Investment Centre (TIC). TIC secures a Certificate of Occupancy
for the land and in turn subleases it to the investor for up to 99 years. Consequently, power over land control shifts
from village to TIC (central government), regional authorities, and investors, and it remains in these hands even if
the investment does not materialize. A draft of the 2016 National Land Policy proposes to limit leases to 33 years
(URT, 2016a, p. 41) but suggests to allow investors to purchase “Unit Titles” in village lands that would further
facilitate land alienation through highly capitalized investment (URT, 2016a, pp. 40–41). Therefore, we contend that
6According to a 2016 National Land Policy draft, out of roughly 12,500 villages (nobody really knows the exact number), 80% have
their boundaries surveyed and 13.1% have a village land use plan (URT, 2016a).
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dispossession by formalization continues to be inscribed in official land policies from the outset, rather than being an
unintended outcome.
Having situated the dynamics of agrarian change in the contemporary context of land governance through land
use planning and land formalization in Tanzania, we now present evidence of multiple drivers of land alienation,
starting with investments in commercial agriculture, continuing with mining, and finishing with conservation.
4 | INVESTMENTS IN COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE
Table 1 provides a historical overview of land alienation through commercial agriculture and ranching. The data
reflect a poor state of information, showing an inconsistent and at times conflicting picture (Sulle, 2015; URT,
1994). Official data from 2008 suggest that around 1.5% of Tanzania's terrestrial land is under commercial large‐scale
investments (>100 ha) and 6.6% under medium‐scale farming (5–100 ha, see Table 1). Locher and Sulle (2014) esti-
mated around 10,000 km2 of new land deals above 200 ha by foreign investors7 for agricultural production8 at the
height of the land rush by the end of 2012. Locher and Sulle emphasized that only 10 deals with a total area of
1,450 km2 could be considered concluded. Focusing on agrofuel investments since 2003, Abdallah, Engström,
Havnevik, and Salomonsson (2014) identified 32 mostly foreign investors that had requested 11,000 km2 of land
above 2,000 ha. Yet only nine investors acquired land, totalling 2,000 km2. A majority have gone bankrupt or have
shifted to food production and are still struggling to become operational.
The recently updated Land Matrix database covers recent deals (contract size) amounting to 2,725 km2, consid-
erably less than initially reported (Table 1). These deals spatially correlate with the SAGCOT designation (Figure 2).
The SAGCOT initiative envisages the development of 350,000 ha of land into large‐scale agriculture and
330,000 ha into outgrower schemes within the corridor (NewAlliance, 2014; SAGCOT, 2011). This would entail
the recategorization of village into general land, which is a declared objective of the SAGCOT initiative. In a 2012
presentation aimed to advertise the SAGCOT initiative to potential investors, the Minister of Lands, Housing and
Human Settlement indicated that around 9,000 km2 of village land in the SAGCOT corridor had already been
identified (“freed up”) for potential investments on the basis of a review of village land use plans (Ministry of Lands,
Housing and Human Settlements [MLHS], 2012).
In addition to foreign‐led investments, smaller land deals and leases by domestic investors for investments in
agriculture or forestry are taking place in different parts of the country (Olwig, Noe, Kangalawe, & Luoga, 2015).
In a commissioned study for the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlement, the University of Dar es
Salaam evaluated agricultural land holdings (>50 acres) in mainland Tanzania in 2013 (URT, 2013a). Out of a pur-
posive sample of 691 farms covering 3,651 km2 across Tanzania, ownership of 666 farms could be determined.
Tanzanian individuals owned by far the most farms (455), followed by Tanzanian companies (72). However, given
the differences in average farm area between domestic and foreign property owners, proportionately few
foreign individuals and companies (45 out of 666) owned more than a quarter of all sampled land area
(Table 2).
Table 2 may already reflect a growing urban class of Tanzanian elites who drive investments in medium‐scale
commercial agriculture, seeking to reinvest their wealth in land (Jayne et al., 2016). Official Tanzanian statistics
indicate that 28% of urban residents are engaged in agricultural activities (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014).
Jayne et al. (2016) report a rise in Tanzanian land ownership by urban households from 11.8% to 32.5% of national
landholdings in only five years from 2005 to 2010. Within the same period, urban households increased their share
of landholdings of 20 ha or above from 17.2% to 78.9% (Jayne et al., 2016). This development disproportionally
affects rural women in negative ways (Knapman et al., 2017), may “exacerbate land scarcity in rural areas” (Jayne
7Or in collaboration between foreign and domestic investors.
8Including food, biofuels, timber plantations, and forestry carbon credits.
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et al., 2016, p. 197), and may also reconfigure social relations of property and labour. Land accumulation for pro-
duction and speculation by urban elites is in some cases followed by the subsequent leasing of this land to
the previous owners—often poor smallholders who cannot afford to cultivate their own land—who now find
themselves as tenants working for the new landlords or co‐owners. These gendered dynamics of class
formation and labour grabbing tempted The Economist to blame the urban elites for “Africa's real land grab”
(Economist, 2016).
To conclude, attempted, successful, and failed investments in large‐scale land deals for agribusiness may all
contribute to land alienation. Land tenure reconfigurations for medium‐scale cultivation and speculation without
any involvement of foreign investment constitute another important process of land alienation in Tanzania that is
underpinned by and produces new dynamics of class formation and social differentiation. Importantly, agricultural
investments—foreign or domestic—that do not materialize and might be excluded from official data and statistics,






German rule (1880s–1916) 5,261 0.6 URT (1994)




NAFCO farms as of 1984 (34 farms) 700 0.1 Chachage and Mbunda (2009)
Ex‐NAFCO farms as of 2009 (29 farms) 595 0.1 Chachage and Mbunda (2009)





Land under “large‐scale” farming (1992, “under
granted right of occupancy”)
3,247 0.4 URT (1997)
Land under “large‐scale” farming (1992, “under
granted right of occupancy”)
10,927 1.2 URT (1994)
Land under “large‐scale” farming (2002/2003,
including livestock ranching)
11,051 1.2 URT (2012)
Land under “large‐scale” farming (2007/2008,
including livestock ranching)
11,131 1.3 URT (2012)
Land under “large‐scale” farming (>100 ha, 2008
Agriculture Sample Census)
12,940 1.5 Jayne et al. (2016)
Land under “medium‐scale” farming (5–100 ha,
2008 Agriculture Sample Census)
58,610 6.6 Jayne et al. (2016)
New large‐scale land
deals since 2000s
Land Matrix (>200 ha, since 2000s, “reliable,”
April 2012)
20,000 2.3 Anseeuw et al. (2012)
Land Matrix (>200 ha, since 2000s, “contract
size,” July 2017)
2,725 0.3 landmatrix.org
New land deals since 2000s (>200 ha, announced,
ongoing, or concluded, data from end of 2012)
10,000 1.1 Locher and Sulle (2014)
New land deals since 2000s (>200 ha, concluded,
data from end of 2012)
1,450 0.2 Locher and Sulle (2014)
New land deals since 2003 (>2,000 ha, requested,
data from end of 2013)
11,000 1.2 Abdallah et al. (2014)
New land deals since 2003 (>2,000 ha, acquired,
data from end of 2013)
2,000 0.2 Abdallah et al. (2014)
SAGCOT plans Village land with a land use plan within SAGCOT
(391 villages as of 2012, out of planned 700)
62,000 7.0 MLHS (2012)
Village land already identified for potential land
investments within SAGCOT (as of 2012)
9,000 1.0 MLHS (2012)
Planned large‐scale agricultural production within
SAGCOT by 2030
3,500 0.4 SAGCOT (2011)
Planned outgrower schemes for agricultural
production within SAGCOT
3,300 0.4 NewAlliance (2014)
Note. NAFCO = National Agriculture and Food Corporation; NARCO = National Ranching Company; SAGCOT = Southern
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania.
a100% = 885,800 km2, Tanzania's terrestrial area excluding main water bodies, including islands Mafia, Pemba, and Zanzibar
(source: World Bank 2016, Tanzania; accessed online at http://data.worldbank.org/country/tanzania).
8 BLUWSTEIN ET AL.
can have severe impacts on land access and control for both farmers and pastoralists. Overlapping claims to land and sub-
sequent conflicts abound around investments that are initiated with little regard for local context, legal pluralism, and
locally specific and gendered power relations around access to land. Because land must be acquired by the investor rela-
tively early in the process, processes of resettlement, evictions, or fencing happen in advance of production. If the invest-
ment implementation is delayed or abandoned, land is alienated from smallholders even though nothing is being produced
by the investor (Engström, 2013; Maganga et al., 2016; Stein & Cunningham, 2017).
5 | MINING
Mining has also increasingly affected land tenure inTanzania in the past years. The government of Tanzania considers
90% of the country's terrestrial area (800,000 km2) as potentially having mining resources (URT, 2015). Recent esti-
mates suggest that 680,000 people are engaged in artisanal and small‐scale mining (ASM) in Tanzania and another
15,000 in large‐scale mining (Bryceson & Geenen, 2016; URT, 2015). Although artisanal mining is dominated by
men, local economies built around mining also attract women (Bryceson & Geenen, 2016). In the wake of the 1998
Mining Act, which strongly promoted foreign direct investment, Tanzania has experienced a mining boom, and gold
has become a major export commodity (Bryceson & Jønsson, 2010; Schroeder, 2012). International mining companies'
TABLE 2 Farm ownership and size, compiled on the basis of URT (2013a)
Farm owner Number of farms Average farm size (ha) % of total area
Tanzanian institution 63 829 16
Tanzanian company 72 1,203 27
Tanzanian individual 455 114 16
Tanzanian and foreign company (joint ownership) 31 1,251 12
Foreign company 31 2,550 24
Foreign individual 14 1,031 4
FIGURE 2 SAGCOT (2011) and land deals for large‐scale agriculture in Tanzania (Landmatrix, 2016)
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large‐scale investments and extraction methods are barely taxed by theTanzanian state,9 generate little employment,
have led to displacement of hundreds of thousands of artisanal miners, and have polluted the environments of farmers
and pastoralists living close to mines (Emel, Huber, & Makene, 2011; Holterman, 2014; Kitula, 2006; Magai &
Márquez‐Velázquez, 2011; Schroeder, 2012). Tanzanian mining laws are ambiguous and vest much power in the Com-
missioner of Mining, whereas villagers have little say in mining concession allocations (Lange, 2008). Once minerals are
discovered, mining laws take precedence over land laws, challenging existing customary land rights of rural people
(Pedersen & Jacob, 2017). At times, mining investors work with outdated maps, sweeping aside claims to land own-
ership and control by small‐scale miners, pastoralists, and farmers, and even entire villages (Kulindwa, Mashindano,
Shechambo, & Sosovele, 2003; Lange, 2008). The Geological Survey of Tanzania10 maps 482 mines across the coun-
try, including 125 gold mines. According to the national mining cadastre, an estimated total area11 of almost
140,000 km2 (15% of Tanzania's terrestrial land area) is designated for prospect licenses for potential exploration
(Figure 3).
Where mining interests collide with conservation and tourism interests, these geographic and economic intersec-
tions can lead to further expansion of conservation on village lands to compensate for mining activities in protected
areas, as the example of Selous Game Reserve illustrates. Uranium mining in Selous was permitted on condition that
the UNESCO World Heritage Site should not be reduced in size. Consequently, boundary changes to excise the
mining area from the reserve have been proposed to include land outside the game reserve to compensate the losses
9But see Pedersen and Jacob (2017) for the most recent changes to Tanzania's mining legislation.
10http://www.gmis‐tanzania.com/.
11Own estimate, based on http://portal.mem.go.tz/map/.
FIGURE 3 Different mining concessions in Tanzania, overlaid with an incomplete selection of protected areas.
Screenshot from FlexiCadastre. Accessed January 10, 2017
Note: ASM stands for Artisanal and Small‐scale Mining.
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to mining.12 In return for potentially highly hazardous activities, the mining company is expected to support anti‐
poaching operations in and around the game reserve (Tairo, 2014). These novel intersections and alliances between
conservation and mining interests can jointly challenge local land and resource control.
6 | CONSERVATION
Tanzania's colonial and post‐colonial history is deeply intertwined with efforts to set aside land held in common
for biodiversity conservation that would benefit tourism activities such as game viewing and hunting (Neumann,
1998). This fortress conservation approach (Brockington, 2002) was initiated in the end of the 19th century by the
German colonial occupation, continued under the British rule and after independence, and was supplemented by
community‐based conservation initiatives since the 1990s in the course of neoliberalization of conservation (Igoe
& Brockington, 2007). These two paradigmatic regimes of conservationist land control have produced an extensive
network of protected areas (Figure 4). Since the late 1990s, conservation approaches in the Global South have
morphed into what big international NGOs and their donors call landscape conservation,13 a claim to vast territories
spanning different conservation interventions and protected area categories, ecosystems and habitats, people,
villages, and communities (Bluwstein, forthcoming; Clay, 2016). In the following, we show how large parts of
Tanzania's land are to different degrees taken out of local control and production through the advancement of
different conservation regimes.
6.1 | Community‐based forest management
The first community‐based forest management (CBFM) schemes on village land were reserved in the 1990s, and
since then, implementation has proceeded under donor financing (Lund et al., 2017). By 2012, 1,233 villages were
involved in CBFM, and the area of village land under reservation was estimated at 23,667 km2 (URT, 2012b).14 This
estimate also includes CBFM areas in various planning stages (Lund et al., 2017). In reality, the area where CBFM has
changed smallholder's access to land and land‐based resources may thus be much smaller. Yet conservation “work in
progress” may also imply “land alienation in progress.”
Through CBFM, village councils are granted administrative powers to manage and benefit from forest reserves
on village land, whereas the state can no longer exploit them and waives all royalties generated from them (Blomley
& Iddi, 2009). However, with the reservation, village councils foreclose the possibility of changing land use away from
it being a “forest.” Farming and settlements are banned, as is livestock grazing in some areas. This change in property
relations and land control implies that the forest bureaucracy gets a permanent say in determining the land use,
whereas the village councils lose the right to independently change it (Sungusia & Lund, 2016). Yet, in terms of access
to forest‐based livelihoods, CBFM, in principle, enables villagers to exclude others, such as urban elites, from
exploiting their forest areas. Villagers gain legal access to retain all benefits from the use of the forest under the con-
straint that it is managed in accordance with the Forest Act 2002. In practice, this access is curtailed by various other
pieces of legislation and bureaucratic procedures (Sungusia & Lund, 2016). Thus, it took 20 years since the initiation
of CBFM in Tanzania before the first larger volume of timber was harvested in a CBFM forest and substantial
revenues started flowing (Khatun et al., 2015).
12Interview with Ministry official, November 2016. Relevant United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
decisions and documents available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/4814 and http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/199/documents/.
13For example, African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS), The
Nature Conservancy, (TNC), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
14We do not mention Joint Forest Management here as it only applies to reserved forests under state authority (see Table 3).
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Formalization of villagers' rights to access forests, but also the responsibility to maintain them, has led to restric-
tions, increased enforcement, and policing of fellow villagers (Lund & Treue, 2008; Vyamana, 2009). This has
constrained and criminalized the livelihoods of poor and forest‐dependent smallholders while giving a small elite of
village‐level forest managers the possibility of benefiting from allowances and associated income opportunities
(Green & Lund, 2015; Lund & Saito‐Jensen, 2013).
6.2 | Wildlife management areas
Since the early 2000s, around 20 wildlife management areas (WMAs) have been established on around 30,000 km2
of village land across Tanzania. This has happened under the auspices of the Ministry of Natural Resources and
Tourism, supported by various international donors,15 and several international conservation NGOs, most promi-
nently WWF, AWF, WCS, and FZS. A WMA consists of a contiguous village land area set aside by several
neighbouring villages for wildlife conservation purposes. Often, WMAs are established in areas that are believed to
serve connectivity or corridor functions for the movement of wildlife between core protected areas (Goldman,
2009). In WMAs, agriculture, settlements and, in some places, livestock grazing are banned or heavily restricted
through village land use planning. Many other land‐dependent activities, such as production of charcoal or the collec-
tion of firewood or construction materials, are also restricted or banned altogether. In return, villages are promised
revenues from tourism investors who are invited to operate in WMAs under a contractual agreement with the com-
munity‐based organization (CBO). A CBO manages the WMA jointly with a board of trustees16 on behalf of the
15For example, United States Agency for International Development, Danish International Development Agency (Danida), German
Development Agency (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ) German Development Bank (Kreditanstalt
für Wiederaufbau, KfW) Agence Française de Développement, and Global Environmental Finance/United Nations Development
Programme.
16That includes district government representatives.
FIGURE 4 Conservation territories in Tanzania. Geographic information system (GIS) shapefiles are sourced from
the recent World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA) dataset (see Table 3) and from several known protected
areas that are missing in WDPA (seven game reserves, four wildlife management areas, and one forest reserve),
provided by World Wildlife Fund. Community‐based forest management is not mapped for lack of geodata
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member villages. The land administration powers bestowed on village councils by the Local Government Act of 1982
and reinforced with the 1999 Village Land Act No. 5 are thereby handed over to these newly established and weakly
accountable institutions, resulting in often overly restrictive land use and management plans that foreclose alterna-
tive land use in WMA territories into the future (Bluwstein et al., 2016). CBOs are generally not willing to allow
changes in WMA land use planning, and it is virtually impossible for dissenting communities or even entire villages
to undo a WMA in practice, once it is established (Bluwstein et al., 2016; Bluwstein & Lund, 2018). WMAs thus, in
many cases, erode the progressive features of land reforms inscribed in the Land Acts of 1999.
In many instances, the implementation of WMAs has spurred land and boundary conflicts, evictions, and displace-
ment, despite the rhetoric of community‐based participation and ownership. Restrictive WMA regimes tend to
recentralize land and resource control, offering few employment opportunities in return (Benjaminsen et al., 2013; Green
& Adams, 2014). Female‐headed households are particularly vulnerable toWMA interventions, especially if they are poor
(Homewood, Nielsen, & Keane, in review). Contrary to CBFM arrangements that allow village councils to protect village
land against external interests and to keep revenues from resource use, inWMAs new actors—conservation NGOs, tour-
ism investors, and local economic and political elites—are invited to control village lands in the name of community‐based
conservation. This undermines elected village councils and leads to the emergence of new forms of authority over land
control, while promoting elite capture of WMA benefits (Bluwstein, 2017).
There are a few cases where local residents have chosen to create a WMA to protect their land rights against
actual or perceived outsiders who may want to establish themselves in these villages (Bluwstein, forthcoming). Often
the ones excluded are landless migrants searching for land, farmers in need to expand their activities but lacking
inputs to intensify production, or urban or rural elites looking for capital investment opportunities. These cases of
exclusion, too, tend to contribute to the growing land pressure across the country when communities or entire
villages succeed in taking land out of production or investment.
6.3 | National parks and game and forest reserves
Most of Tanzania's core protected areas (national parks and game and forest reserves) were initially declared many
decades ago, often involving evictions (Brockington, Sachedina, & Scholfield, 2008; Sunseri, 2009). However, their
protection status and territories have not remained stable, often leading to recurring incidences of physical and eco-
nomic displacement (Brockington & Igoe, 2006). Displacement reconfigures the gendered intrahousehold dynamics in
complex ways, in many instances creating new burdens for women, but to some extent also offering opportunities to
renegotiate entrenched gender roles (Brockington, 2002). Many parks and reserves have consolidated or expanded
their existing territories in the past decades, often animated by the landscape vision of conservation NGOs and their
donors (Bluwstein, forthcoming). With the introduction of GPS technology in the 2000s, several national parks have
resurveyed their boundaries, which led to new claims against adjacent villages (Boerstra, 2017; Sachedina, 2008).
Calls to resettle rural people or to relocate entire villages in order to “resolve” protracted boundary conflicts with
protected areas are common and continue until this day.17
Similarly, forest reserves in Tanzania have been gazetted, expanded, diminished, or entirely degazetted over the
past century since the German colonial period (Hurst, 2004; Sunseri, 2009). Furthermore, changing regulations and
waxing and waning patterns of enforcement have implied that the role of forest reserves in rural livelihoods has been
in constant flux. The forest reserve estate has grown throughout the post‐colonial period, especially in the 1980s
and 1990s (Hurst, 2004). Today, according to different sources, Tanzania features around 450–700 forest reserves
(see Table 3). Since the formation of the state agency Tanzania Forest Service in 2010, there has been an increased
emphasis on revenue generation from forest reserves, which has led to more enforcement and evictions, as well as to
16That includes district government representatives.
17For example, nine villages adjacent to Ruaha National Park are to be “removed completely.” IPP Guardian, June 15, 2017 (http://
www.ippmedia.com/en/news/act‐environmental‐degradation‐samia‐orders‐dcs).









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14 BLUWSTEIN ET AL.
renewed efforts to re‐establish firm reserve boundaries. Thus, rural people who in the past benefited from access to
poorly defined, demarcated, and enforced reserve boundaries now find themselves under increasing scrutiny and
policing.
6.4 | Hunting concessions
There are around 140 hunting blocks in Tanzania. A hunting block is neither a protected area nor a land category,
but a concession to hunt in a bounded area inside a core protected area (game reserve [GR]), a game controlled
area (GCA), an open area (OA), or a wildlife management area (WMA). GCAs and OAs have overlapped with com-
munal lands since their establishment during colonial rule. The Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Tourism can allocate a hunting block within a GCA or an OA, thereby challenging game viewing
tourism activities on village lands that may have been agreed on with the approval of village governments. The
Wildlife Division favours professional hunting outfitters' interests against the interests of village governments
because—unlike game viewing activities—hunting concessions directly fund the Ministry's coffers, and rents can
be captured directly by Ministry officials (Benjaminsen et al., 2013). However, OAs are not codified as a land cat-
egory in land or wildlife laws. Similarly, many GCAs de jure also ceased to exist as a land category after the 2009
Wildlife Conservation Act declared that GCAs cannot overlap with village lands (URT, 2009, § 16(5)). Nonetheless,
until this day, the liminal category of GCAs—more so than of OAs—is used to assign hunting blocks against the will
of village councils (Gardner, 2016) or to impose restrictions on settlement and livestock keeping (URT, 2013b).
GCAs and OAs continue to be invoked in official government and NGO reports and statistics (World Database
on Protected Areas; URT, 2013c). If villages are opposing the often highly restrictive hunting operations on their
lands (Wright, 2016), the Wildlife Division might impose a false choice on village governments to either accept a
restrictive WMA scheme or to see their land being reassigned as exclusive hunting grounds under a GCA or a GR
regime, as the long‐standing and ongoing conflict in Loliondo demonstrates (Gardner, 2016).
Most hunting blocks are controlled by foreigners (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2006), and some
are directly linked to ultra‐rich U.S. or Arab oligarchs or Asian–Tanzanian nationals (Wright, 2016), whose wealth and
exclusive access to government authorities can corrupt individuals at all levels of government down to elected village
officials (Packer, 2015). The U.S.‐based Friedkin Conservation Fund alone claims an area of 6.1 million acres
(24,685 km2)—2.8% of Tanzania's terrestrial area—for conservation and tourism through exclusive hunting, game
viewing, and lodging.18 Hunting concessions on village lands are often subleased to other hunting operators (Packer,
2015) or even to mining companies (Noe, 2013) without any say by the village governments, whose land is traded as
a commodity between private investors for significant sums of money, with negligible compensation for the villages
(Kisembo, 2012).
In sum, foreign and domestic interests in tourism, wildlife and forest conservation constitute the major immedi-
ate driver of land tenure change and land alienation inTanzania. By comparing the most authoritative yet incomplete
and inaccurate sources, we conclude that around 42% of Tanzania's total terrestrial area is already enclosed for dif-
ferent forms of conservation (Table 3 and Figure 4).19 Taking into account the widespread boundary uncertainties,
overlapping claims, and different data sources, we provide a range of 39.3–51.2%.
18http://www.tgts.com/philanthropy/.
19There is no single accurate dataset of protected areas in Tanzania, but different organizations keep their own records, which they
sometimes share with each other. Because many protected areas are in the process of being upgraded or resurveyed, or their bound-
aries remain poorly known to conservation authorities, any available datasets can show only an outdated, incomplete, and inaccurate
snapshot. To counter this, inTable 3, we provide a spatial range of the total amount of land that is likely claimed for conservation. Our
estimate builds on the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA, accessed January 11, 2017) and improves it by avoiding double
counting and by including a number of known protected areas that are missing in WDPA. WDPA shows an area of around
361,000 km2 under different forms of protection, yet it includes double counting, its WMA coverage is incomplete, and CBFM areas
are entirely excluded.
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This estimate differs significantly from often‐repeated official statistics about land distribution in Tanzania. A
recent draft of the National Land Policy, for instance, gives the impression that there is plenty of village land and
underplays the extent of conservation enclosures by stating that “village land is estimated to be 70 percent, general
land 2 percent and reserved land which includes forest and wildlife sanctuaries is 28 percent” (URT, 2016a, p. 19).
Such misleading statistics become even more problematic if we also consider the many more WMAs that are
currently planned across Tanzania.20 If realized, Tanzania could claim to protect 50% or more of its terrestrial area
in the name of conservation and tourism.21 We do not think that all WMAs will be implemented as envisioned
due to (a) local resistance (e.g., Loliondo and Simanjiro), (b) lack of investment interest (in most southern and western
areas), or (c) too ambitious spatial planning (e.g., Lake Natron). However, the planning process in itself raises serious
concerns over land alienation (Gardner, 2012). It is due to such contestations around planning and territorial claims in
the name of conservation that we do not provide one fixed estimate for total land under conservation, but rather
offer a corroborated estimate on the spatial extent of conservation claims. The widespread and vast boundary uncer-
tainties, overlaps, and discrepancies among different data sources constitute a major driver of land conflicts, as rural
communities have little say over the maps that prescribe whether people's actions and resident status are lawful or
not (Bluwstein & Lund, 2018).
7 | THE INTERLOCKING NATURE OF MULTIPLE DRIVERS OF LAND
ALIENATION
Many current land tenure conflicts are remnants of past processes of land alienation (Nelson, Sulle, & Lekaita, 2012;
Sundet, 1997; URT, 1994). With the onset of colonial rule, agropastoral communities saw their territories diminished
by land reservations and commercial agriculture, and were forced into less fertile territories with a lack of water
resources for agricultural and livestock production (Hodgson, 2001; Neumann, 1998). Colonial land alienation gave
way to policies of post‐colonial villagization through resettlement and the nationalization of land through parastatals
in the 1970s (Shivji, 1998; Sundet, 1997). Land alienation policies were again reconfigured during the transition from
post‐colonial socialism towards liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, when large swaths of communal lands were
appropriated for agriculture, tourism, and mining (Igoe & Brockington, 1999; Richter, 1994; URT, 1994).
The history of dispossession is as complex as it is contested. For instance, large‐scale agricultural investments
through parastatals such as the National Food and Agricultural Corporation displaced many smallholders and pasto-
ralists. Later, these people would be blamed for “invading” alienated lands (Chachage & Mbunda, 2009). After many
parastatal companies had been dismantled and privatized by the late 1990s/2000s, the lands that remained without
claimants were reappropriated by farmers or pastoralists. In some cases, people would advance their land claims in
the form of customary rights of occupancy under adverse possession according to the Village Land Act 1999, having
used abandoned land for more than 12 years. However, their claims and land rights have often not been recognized
formally (Chachage & Mbunda, 2009), and years later, new investors would purchase the contested lands by paying
the former—officially recognized—owners, and attempting to evict the farmers or pastoralists. Examples are a sugar
plantation in Bagamoyo (Chung, 2017), a rice plantation in Kilombero (Maganga et al., 2016), and a tourism lodge and
investment in Loliondo (Gardner, 2016).
The case of Kilombero is particularly insightful in illustrating how multiple and intersecting authoritative claims to
land can converge into a powerful bulwark against the most vulnerable and marginalized groups. In 2006–2007, the
government evicted thousands of pastoralists from the Usangu wetlands that were then incorporated into the Ruaha
National Park. At least 15 villages had to be “moved” to make space for the park. According to Walsh (2012, p. 323),
the expansion of the park was pushed by a small group of well‐connected tourism investors that effectively lobbied
20Different sources suggest 38 or 39 WMAs to be eventually established on 125,000–136,714 km2 (Mayeta, 2016; Sosovele, 2015).
21An accurate estimate is impossible, because some WMAs would replace some of the existent GCAs.
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the central government to evict pastoralists by “disseminating the degradation narratives and fuelling the environ-
mental panic.” Many of the displaced people and their livestock ended up in the Kilombero valley. Kilombero had
already been designated a GCA and a Ramsar site under the international Wetland Convention.22 Backed by the
2009 Wildlife Conservation Act, which introduced stringent restrictions on human activities in Game Controlled
Areas, the state‐run research institute TAWIRI23 concluded that cultivation and settlement—51.4% of land use in
the Kilombero valley in 2009—were “incompatible” with the GCA designation (TAWIRI, 2011, cited in URT,
2013b). Within the scope of Ramsar, 29 villages in the Kilombero and Ulanga districts had to prepare restrictive vil-
lage land use plans (Axberg et al., 2011; Greco, 2016) that in 2011–2012 culminated in evictions in line with the 2009
Wildlife Conservation Act (URT, 2013b). Soon thereafter, in 2013, the international consulting firm Environmental
Resources Management (ERM) conducted environmental and social impact studies for SAGCOT in, among other
places, the Kilombero valley (ERM, 2013; URT, 2013b). With reference to the earlier TAWIRI report, ERM highlighted
how “the designation of the floodplain and surrounding areas as a Game Controlled Area, and also as a Ramsar Site,
has seemingly had very little deterrent effect on encroachment” (URT, 2013b, p. 163). ERM staff also pointed out
that efforts to evict pastoralists from Kilombero were not accompanied by a plan to identify an alternative location
for the displaced (ERM, 2013). The most recent report on vulnerable groups and social impacts of SAGCOT—issued
by the Prime Minister's office in 2016—omitted any references to Usangu evictions as reasons for immigration into
Kilombero, and it failed to include the recent evictions from Kilombero (URT, 2016b). The same year, repeated calls to
protect the “national heritage” against “invaders” were issued by regional government authorities (Guardian, 2016a).
Another prominent case of the interlocking nature of land alienation centres around the plight of Barabaig pas-
toralists, whose homeland in Hanang District was appropriated by a Canadian–Tanzanian wheat investment scheme
in the 1980s and 1990s (Lane, 1994). The Barabaig have, since then, struggled to find other lands for livestock graz-
ing and watering. In response to land alienation, some Barabaig have settled in neighbouring Babati District close to
Lake Manyara, where their resident status is currently challenged by a European ecotourism investor and a village
government in the context of community‐based conservation, known as Burunge Wildlife Management Area
(Bluwstein, 2017). Other Barabaig migrated to Bagamoyo District, where a Swedish company was promised land
for sugar cane production in 2006. Years before the official allocation of 20,000 ha to the company in 2013, this
investment intensified conflicts among Barabaig pastoralists, other pastoral groups, and farmers present in the area.
Eventually, the investment has stalled and failed to plant any sugar cane. In November 2016, the Ministry of Lands,
Housing and Human Settlements Development revoked the investor's title deed. This exemplifies that deals that do
not materialize and fail to produce can also lead to land alienation (Chung, 2017). In another and similar case, both
farmers and immigrant Sukuma pastoralists were dispossessed of land and water access due to a stalled biofuel–food
investment project in Kigoma (Engström, 2013).
Yet another example illustrates the historical amnesia by conservationists who often perceive people living adja-
cent to protected areas as a threat, with little regard to histories of dispossession and land alienation that contribute
to migration and to land conversion to agriculture. Markus Borner, the former director of Frankfurt Zoological Soci-
ety, a prominent German conservation NGO, published an influential paper in 1985 suggesting that due to human
activities such as agriculture taking place around Tarangire National Park in NorthernTanzania, Tarangire is becoming
an “isolated ‘island’ park” for resident species only (Borner, 1985, p. 91). Some of the land conversion to agriculture
was due to immigration of displaced farmers from the slopes of Mount Meru and Kilimanjaro to make space for Euro-
pean coffee plantations and national parks (Igoe, 2008). Regardless, Borner recommended to ban agriculture across
6,000 km2 around the park and to destock the Maasai. Thus, previous dispossession and land alienation taking place
22Ramsar sites are managed by the Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Ramsar sites overlap with vil-
lage lands, game controlled areas, game reserves and forest reserves, lakes, and marine parks, representing an additional layer of land
and water protection against subsistence use (see Table 3 and Figure 4).
23Tanzania's Wildlife Research Institute.
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hundreds of kilometres away (around Meru and Kilimanjaro) created, years later, new justifications for land control
and alienation in a new area (around Tarangire).
We have not touched upon land alienation in the wake of the establishment of refugee camps. However, as
recently as in 2000, Tanzania hosted the largest population of refugees on the African continent with over
680,000 people from Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda.24 Refugee camps were established
across Kigoma and Kagera regions on land that was in most cases acquired from villages and converted into general
land. Camps operated by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have all resulted in land loss to local communities and
were not returned to the villagers even after most camps were eventually shut down (although recently some had
to reopen due to the continuing conflict in Burundi). More research is needed to better determine the extent of land
alienation in these cases.
In response to dispossession, many pastoralists and farmers diversify their income sources, continue migrating to
other parts of the country, or turn to urban areas in search for wage labour (May & Ikayo, 2007; McCabe, Smith,
Leslie, & Telligman, 2014; Nyenza, Nzunda, & Katani, 2013). However, the formal labour market in Tanzania absorbs
only a fraction of those searching for work (Wuyts & Kilama, 2016). The growing tensions between farmers and
pastoralists, pastoralists and conservationists, or farmers and conservationists are exemplifying this development.
To what degree are human population growth and migration intertwined with processes of land alienation and
associated land conflicts that we have illustrated so far? Given the population projections as previously discussed,
most Tanzanians will continue to depend on land as their primary means of (re)production due to lack of alternatives,
although making a living in rural areas is becoming increasingly difficult for many (Coulson, 2013; Patnaik & Moyo,
2011). Coulson (2013) suggests that two opposing processes take place in Tanzania in parallel (and may be spatially
unevenly distributed) and will likely shape the future of Tanzania's peasantry: On one hand, agricultural innovation
can to some degree counteract population growth and a decreasing land availability (see Boserup, 1965); on the other
hand, deagrarianization (see Bryceson's work) is another response to decreasing land availability and reduced agricul-
tural productivity. Although it is difficult to pass a definite judgement on which of the two processes currently pre-
vails, rural–urban and rural–rural migration dynamics and widespread land conflicts suggest that, in a context of
projected population growth and a jobless economic growth, an increasingly land‐deprived peasantry will suffer
growing hardship in the future.
8 | CONCLUSION
Contrary to claims of unused land, we assert that the overall land pressure in Tanzania has increased substantially
over the past 1–2 decades. Reinforced by continual land dependency of the rural population, population growth,
and increasing social differentiation, this development is a consequence of Tanzania's embracement of neoliberal
policies to attract and enable foreign and domestic investment for conservation and tourism, mining, and agriculture.
Historical and present data on land under conservation, medium‐ or large‐scale agriculture, and mining are incom-
plete and to some extent ambiguous. Moreover, many land tenure reconfigurations that we describe cannot be sim-
ply conceptualized, measured, and counted as physical land grabs. Rather, the rush to land use planning and titling,
and pastoral and labour migration patterns are indicators of often indirectly experienced effects of an ongoing and
incomplete primitive accumulation. Accumulation by dispossession comes in many shapes ranging from the complete
alienation of land, to restrictions on the uses of land as a means of production. The processes underlying land alien-
ation are underpinned by uneven power relations that particularly affect poor and female‐headed households
pertaining to land access and resource control. The effects further extend into the patriarchal household, leading
to a locally specific and a priori unpredictable renegotiation of gender roles and relations in the wake of commercial
agriculture, mining, or conservation interventions (Brockington, 2002; Bryceson & Jønsson, 2010; Chung, 2017). Such
24“Tanzanian refugee numbers drops below 100,000: UN,” UNHCR/REFDAILY, November 29, 2009. Also, “Tanzania opens new
camps for Burundian refugees to ease conditions in Nyarugusu Camp,” UNHCR, October 7, 2015.
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land tenure reconfigurations, of course, do not go unchallenged as demonstrated by some examples of failed invest-
ments in large‐scale agriculture or stalled implementations of wildlife management areas or hunting concessions.
The localized effects of all these reconfigurations are geographically contingent, unevenly distributed, not always
associated with foreign investment, and they contribute jointly to a growing land pressure in Tanzania. As shown in
this article, exclusive attention to foreign investment or a particular sector (such as agriculture) would unnecessarily
narrow the analysis. Instead, an aggregated view across sectors, actors, institutions, time, and scales is needed to
appreciate the interlocking nature of different processes of land alienation. The ongoing scramble for land inTanzania
pushes land‐dependent, yet land‐deprived, people to respond in ways that may look like voluntary choices, but end
up further undermining the conditions of land‐based reproduction.25 Local processes of land alienation mutually rein-
force one another, amplifying land tenure reconfigurations that at an aggregate scale mean growing land pressure
overall. With these various processes jointly contributing to a scramble for land, we can begin to see a “simple repro-
duction squeeze” (Bernstein, 1977), whereby the most vulnerable groups—rural poor, migrants, women, youth, pas-
toralists—find it increasingly difficult to maintain or increase their consumption and production. This may, in turn,
lend support to claims that rural livelihoods are less productive than large‐scale investments, thereby further
entrenching the arguments for land tenure changes that adversely affect vulnerable smallholders, who become
increasingly trapped between land dependence and land deprivation. Ultimately, official policy objectives of poverty
alleviation and inclusive development through land use planning, land tenure formalization, agricultural commercial-
ization, mineral extraction, and community‐based conservation and tourism will fail, as long Tanzania's political econ-
omy advances an uneven development through land alienation.
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